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From economic and comparative perspectives, this dissertation discusses the 
problems relating to the enforcement of Chinese AML in general and private enforcement 
in particular; and argues that an effective antitrust enforcement is an inherent requirement 
of China’s sustainable economic development, but China should identify the proper role 
of private antitrust enforcement by looking at 1) the relationship between law 
enforcement and other policy tools such as advocacy and education, and 2) the 
relationship between public and private enforcement, given China’s developmental stage. 
China should also draw particular attention to the sequencing and pacing of reforms and 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The comprehensive achievements of China’s reform in the past thirty years cannot be 
derogated. On economic reform, China has maintained a record average annual GDP 
growth rate of ten per cent; in 2010, China’s economy escalated to the second largest in 
the world;1 and broke into the league of upper-middle-income countries with a GDP per 
capita of about $4000.2 Meanwhile, China is expanding the steady steps towards further 
regional and international integration,3 and has become the largest merchandise exporter, 
second largest merchandise importer, fifth largest outward investor, second largest 
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), and largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves.4 On the political side, the construction of state institutions has formed the core 
of China’s political reform. 5  China has undergone rounds of administrative 
restructuring, 6  launched massive market-oriented legislations, and achieved direct 
election of deputies to the People's Congress at county level, village self-government, and 
multi-candidate election of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
                                                      
1 China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-biggest Economy, BBC NEWS BUSINESS, Feb. 14, 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
2 Beware the Middle-income Trap: China’s Roaring Growth Cannot Last Indefinitely, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 23, 2011, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18832106 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
  Economies are divided according to 2010 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups 
are: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income, $1,006 - $3,975; upper middle income, $3,976 - $12,275; and 
high income, $12,276 or more. See How We Classify Countries, WORLDBANK.ORG, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
3 China accessed the WTO in 2001 and was now actively involved in regional groupings such as the 10+1 
(ASEAN-China), 10+3 (ASEAN-China, ROK, Japan), SCO, Greater Mekong Sub-region Cooperation (GMS), 
Pan-Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation, Central Asia Cooperation and Greater Tumen Initiative in Northeast Asia. See 
Wang Hui, Regional Integration Key to Growth, CHINA DAILY, May 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-05/24/content_9883054.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). For an opinion 
from geopolitical point of view, see Li Qingsi, Regional Integration En Route, , CHINA DAILY, Jan. 25, 2010, available 
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-01/25/content_9369501.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
4 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
5 It is open to debate whether there is a political reform in China. In international academic and policy-making circles, 
a popular viewpoint is that “China only conducted economic reform and not political reform.” This argument was first 
made by Susan L. Shirk in the early 1990s and then became popular in academia. See Cheng Yung-nien, The Chinese 
Model of Development: An International Perspective, 31 SOC. SCI. IN CHINA 44 (2010). I take the standpoint of Cheng 
that the key to understanding this point is how one defines political reform; without some form of political reform, no 
matter how flawed it is, one cannot imagine how today’s China could have come a long way from being a completely 
command and control economy.  
6 新中国成立以来的历次政府机构改革 [Government Restructurings after The Foundation of The PRC], XINHUA 
NETWORK, Feb. 26, 2008, available at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/6923277.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2012). 
 2 
(CPC).7 All these institutional improvements have provided the necessary supporting 
environment for the takeoff of economic growth: basic social and political order, basic 
social justice, and basic protection of property rights.8 
Outstanding records notwithstanding, a linear projection of economic growth may 
not be anticipated, because countries tend to pick the low hanging fruit in early stages of 
economic take-off without touching on the most sensitive sectors of the society, and 
growth rates generally slow down as economies reach a more advanced developmental 
stage and bottle-neck issues become more salient.9  
When China entered into the rank of upper-middle-income countries, the 
middle-income trap became a potential threat given the accumulated economic and social 
risks in the past three decades.10 Moreover, in contrast to many other middle-income 
countries, China is yet in a transitional process from a command and control to a market 
economy. A fiery debate has already been ongoing regarding the so-called China 
                                                      
7 Press Release, 政治体制改革要在党的领导下有序地进行 [Political Reforms Shall Make Orderly Progress under 
The Leadership of the CCP] (Mar. 14, 2011), XINHUA NETWORK, , available at 
http://yn.people.com.cn/GB/211173/211263/215352/215375/14140080.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
8 See Cheng, supra note 6. Before the establishment of a comprehensive body of rules and regulations, the 
administrative and political methods to property rights are a necessary functional parallel.   
9 See e.g., 国家发展改革委经济体制综合改革司, 国家发展改革委经济体制与管理研究所, 改革开放三十年:从
历史走向未来--中国经济体制改革若干历史经验研究, 人民出版社 (2008) [DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
REFORM OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION & INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND 
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION, THIRTY YEARS OF REFORM AND OPENING-UP: 
FROM HISTORY TO FUTURE--SOME HISTORICAL STUDIES ON CHINA’S ECONOMIC SYSTEM REFORMS (People’s Publishing 
House) (2008)].    
10 龚雯, 杜海涛, 崔鹏, 我们能否跨过”中等收入陷阱 [Gong Wen, Du Haitong & Cuipeng, Can We Escape The 
“Middle-income Trap], PEOPLE’S DAILY, July 25, 2011, available at http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/15232454.html 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012). The concept of middle-income trap is that with low levels of income in the country, it can 
make the transition by taking advantage of the cheap labor available. The real challenge comes when a country has to 
leap into the ranks of advanced economies. This is because, as incomes increase, so do costs, which means a country 
has to move up the value chain of production. In addition, the country will need to innovate and use capital and labor 
more productively. This calls for a better-educated workforce and higher investments in research and development. See 
e.g. Sanchita Basu Das, Rising Asia and Risk of Middle-income Trap, STRAITS TIMES, June 24, 2011, available at 
http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=4086 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). For a comprehensive analysis of “middle-income trap,” 
see e.g.: Homi Kharas & Harinder Kohli, What Is the Middle Income Trap, Why Do Countries Fall into It, and How 
Can It Be Avoided?, 3 GLOBAL J. EMERGING MARKET ECON. 281 (2011). Some Chinese scholars put forth transition 
trap. It is a process in which the vested interests formed in the course of reform and transition can hold reforms hostage, 
call for maintaining the status quo, and anticipate the consolidation of some of transitional elements in order to 
formulate a mixed system that can maximize their interest. Transitional trap can lead to the abnormality of economic 
and social development and accumulate economic and social problems. See清华大学凯风发展研究院社会进步研究
所, 清华大学社会学系社会发展研究课题组，“中等收入陷阱”还是“转型陷阱”？[J] 开放时代，2012（3）[Institute 
of Social Progress of Kaifeng Development Studies Center of Tsinghua University & Social Development Research 
Group of Sociology Department of Tsinghua University, Middle-income Trap or Transition Trap?, 3 OPEN TIMES 
(2012)], available at http://www.opentimes.cn/bencandy.php?fid=332&aid=1588.    
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Model,11 which characterized by a political monopoly of the ruling party in the political 
realm, and an eclectic approach to market-based economy in the economic realm.  
At this point, China has to face up to two urgent issues in order to avoid the 
middle-income trap: the slowdown of economic growth, and chaotic market order.12 
They are becoming more acute in the aftermath of the 2008 economic turmoil.13 
Although policy portfolios may be necessary to tackle the two issues, combating 
monopolies and expanding the arena of competition is a key reform priority in that the 
disruption of the market resulting from anti-competitive practices by private firms and 
public entities would hamper China’s transition to a market-based economy and further 
maintenance of a rapidly growing economy in the long run. In particular, the 
                                                      
11 For generally positive perceptions of China Model, see, e.g. JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS (2004) , 
available at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf (Ramo introduced the concept of “Beijing Consensus” while playing on 
the idea of a declining “Washington consensus”); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR 
MODEL FOR THE REST? (2008) (giving a comprehensive analysis of China Model and deliberating on comparison with 
the conventional East Asian Model); for the first authoritative work on this theme published by the Party-run Central 
Compilation & Translation Press (CCTP) which is affiliated to Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, see潘维主
编，中国模式——解读人民共和国的 60 年，中央编译出版社 (2009) [Pan Wei ed., CHINA MODEL: A NEW 
DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL FROM THE SIXTY YEARS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC (2009)] (highlighting the reflections on 
thirty years of experience in China from the perspectives of Chinese scholars which is contrasted with the conventional 
wisdom of the West, and bringing about a response to the “reemergence” of China); for the most recent entry by 
Chinese scholars, see郑永年,中国模式:经验与困局, 浙江人民出版社 (2010年) [CHENG YUNG-NIEN, CHINA MODEL: 
EXPERIENCES AND DIFFICULTIES (2010)] (it was a prescribed textbook for the Party School of the CPC Central 
Committee); for the most recent entry by a Western scholar, see STEFAN HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW 
CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010) (arguing that “just as 
globalization is shrinking the world, China is shrinking the West” by quietly limiting the projection of its values). It is 
noteworthy that the CCP is diffident about laying claim to any development model that other countries might copy, and 
some (former) government officials and scholars seemed cautious about the notion of “China Model” as well. For 
instance, Zhao Qizheng, former director of the State Council Information Office and the current spokesperson of 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference suggested it would be more accurate and suitable to use the term 
"China Case" instead of "China Model", and that the China Model, if there is one, should include both achievements 
and problems. Li is probably the highest official to comment on the China Model discussion. Li Junru, a senior Party 
theorist, warned that the tout of a China model was “very dangerous” because complacency might set in and that would 
sap enthusiasm for further reforms. See The Beijing Consensus Is to Keep Quiet, THE ECONOMIST, May 6, 2010, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16059990  (last visited Mar. 25, 2012), and China Model Both Fish And 
Fowl, GLOBAL TIMES, May 27 2010, available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/special/2010-05/536162.html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012). For a critical examination of the Chinese economic reform without constitutional transition, see Jeffrey 
Sachs, Wing Thye Woo & Xiaokai Yang, Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition (CID, Working Paper No. 43, 
2000). For an extreme pessimistic view towards China, see e.g., GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA 
(2001).  
12 周其仁，竞争、垄断和管制----反垄断政策的背景报告（2001）[Zhou Qiren, Competition, Monopoly and Regulation: 
A Report on Background of Anti-Monopoly Policy（2001）], available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN015590.pdf. It is a report made on request of 
the State Mechanism Reform Office of the State Council. 
13 The global economic crisis that began in 2008 significantly affected China’s economy, especially its external sector. 
China’s trade (both exports and imports) and inflows of FDI diminished sharply, and millions of workers reportedly lost 
their jobs. The Chinese government responded by implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus package (largely 
aimed at infrastructure projects), loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending, and providing various 
incentives to boost domestic consumption. 
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administrative monopolies that constitute the bulk of anti-competitive conduct are 
notoriously detrimental to society and economy and stand at the focal point of the 
antitrust examination,14 because it curbs the formation and completion of the competition 
mechanism, inflates the cost of production, enhances the barrier for further enterprise 
reform, restrains the normal functioning of market mechanisms, and derail the reforms of 
government functions.15  
Responding to the development alarm, the long-waited Anti-Monopoly Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (AML) came into effect on August 1, 2008 after 
approximately fourteen years’ gestation; 16  the implementing rules have also been 
gradually introduced.17 Compliance with the AML is expected to be secured by a blend 
of public and private enforcement, according to the text of the AML regardless of its 
ambiguity about how to actualize the private right of action. In any event, private antitrust 
litigations did come out not long after the AML came into effect.18 
When draft judicial interpretations governing private anti-monopoly litigation for 
public comments were issued by the Supreme People’s Court in April 2011,19 it was 
reported that approximately forty-three cases had been accepted by courts, and 
                                                      
14 王晓晔，依法规范行政性限制竞争行为 [J]法学研究，1998（3）[Wang Xiaoye, Regulating Administrative Restraint 
on Competition, 3 CHINESE J. L. 89 (1998)]. 
15 国家经贸委, 国家工商局“反垄断法”起草小组,关于我国反垄断立法若干问题的研究[J]经济工作通讯，1995(5)，
第 26 页 [State Economic and Trade Commission & AML Drafting Group of State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, Studies on Some Problems of the AML Legislation, 5 CHINA ECON. & TRADE HERALD 25, 26, (1995)]. 
16 Fan long duan fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, 
effective Aug. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). Some commentators describe this law as 
China’s competition law. In fact, there have been other laws and regulations which were adopted prior to the AML and 
address antitrust concerns, though in a less comprehensive fashion. See, e.g.: Zhi zhi jia ge long duan xing wei zan xing 
gui ding [Interim Provisions on Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly] (promulgated by the Nat’l Development and 
Reform Commission, June. 18, 2003, effective Nov.11, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.), or 
Fan bu zheng dang jing zheng fa [Anti-unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Sep. 2, 1993, effective Sep. 2, 1993) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
17 See a summary of the implementing rules in Appendix I. 
18 For the alleged first antitrust civil litigation, see 韦文洁, 百度遭遇中国网络反垄断调查第一案 [Wei Wenjie, 
Baidu Countered The Very First Antitrust Challenge Regarding Internet Monopoly in China], LEGAL DAILY, Nov. 9, 
2008, available at http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2008-11-09/12082566454.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). It is interesting 
to note that the very first antitrust related litigation was an administrative case filed by four anti-counterfeiting ventures, 
and the defendant was a regulatory agency of the central government, AQSIQ. See Chinese Court Turns down First 
Anti-monopoly Case, XINHUA NETWORK, Sep. 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2008-09/05/content_16396400.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
19 最高人民法院就反垄断民事诉讼司法解释公开征求社会各界意见[Supreme People's Court Issued Draft Rules 
Governing Civil Action in Relation to AML Disputes for Public Comments], COURT.GOV, Apr. 25, 2011, available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/gzhd/zqyj/201104/t20110425_19850.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
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twenty-nine were concluded.20 A majority of the cases took place within two years after 
the promulgation of the AML, however, only one of the plaintiffs won. It was also said 
that some reported cases in fact had nothing to do with antitrust at all, probably because 
of people’s unfamiliarity with the new law.21 
As to actions by government agencies, the first fine with teeth was imposed in 
November 2011, three years after the promulgation of the AML; 22  and the first 
investigation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is in process as of now.23 
This seemingly underdeveloped enforcement of the AML has mirrored the typical 
dilemmas that inherently result from the China Model: China is struggling to 
accommodate foreign and domestic market players in the pursuit of industrialization and 
modernization, while the political control remains with the overall party-state. The AML 
has to be implemented as an institutional tool within a larger political and economic 
scheme, where universally applicable legislative norms and macroeconomic levers have 
not been full-fledged, government edicts still assume significance, and public policies and 
popular perceptions reflect the preference for administrative solutions to economic 
problems. The contradictions between central and local governments, between 
competition and industrial policies, between fighting against mammoth multinationals 
and efforts to attract FDIs, between favoring national champions and calling for more 
vigorous private sectors, have shaped the socio-economic ideology24 of the AML and its 
enforcement, a seemingly half-hearted determination in combating monopolies. In 
                                                      
20 叶文娟, 反垄断民事诉讼：微茫中前行——最高院出台 20条规则试图破解反垄断民事诉讼之困局 [Ye 
Wenjuan, Anti-monopoly Civil Litigation: Advancing in The Dark—The Supreme People’s Court introduced Twenty 
Rules to Break up The Predicament of Civil Antitrust Litigation], SHANGHAI LEGAL DAILY, June 3, 2011, available at 
http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/shfzb/html/2011-06/03/content_585825.htm# (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
21 It refers to the cases reported to the Supreme People’s Court. This information was revealed by a Supreme People’s 
Court judge at the 2011 Forum on Anti-Monopoly Civil Litigation in China.  
22 顺通华新两药企涉嫌垄断遭重罚 为首起垄断重罚案 [Two Pharmaceutical Enterprises Committed 
Monopolization; First Heavy Fine Was Imposed]，CHINANEWS.COM, Nov. 14, 2011, available at 
http://health.people.com.cn/GB/16241181.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
23 See Telecom and Unicom Suspected of Monopoly,” CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Nov. 9, 2011, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/09/content_14067429.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
24 It is also termed “competition culture”. It is argued that it is the socio-economic ideology that determines to a large 
extent the success or failure of a competition law. See Michal Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for 
Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries, in COMPETITION, COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT: 
LESSONS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21-52 (UNCTAD eds., 2004).  
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addition, the fragile institutional, human, financial and political foundations of the 
transitional China would further cloud antitrust enforcement in China. 
Accordingly, situated at the intersection of political and economic reform, the AML 
bears the responsibility, at least a significant part of it, to level the playing field, combat 
vested interests, and cultivate fair competition. Furthermore, the understanding of the 
Chinese AML and its enforcement cannot ignore the developmental stage of China, her 
inherent call for further economic growth and structural barriers to it. A careful 
examination of these situations would inform to what extent the AML can help overcome 
the hurdles, and to what extent it can be implemented, and under what circumstances, 
private enforcement is a good option.  
This dissertation discusses the problems relating to the enforcement of Chinese AML 
in general and private enforcement in particular; and argues that an effective antitrust 
enforcement is an inherent requirement of China’s sustainable economic development, 
but China should identify the proper role of private antitrust enforcement by looking at 1) 
the relationship between law enforcement and other policy tools such as advocacy and 
education, and 2) the relationship between public and private enforcement, given China’s 
developmental stage. China should also draw particular attention to the sequencing and 
pacing of reforms and the optimal level of enforcement.  
As for the structure of the dissertation, Chapter II introduces the basic concepts of 
public and private enforcement and elaborates on the theoretical debate regarding 
different approaches applied in developed and developing countries and inquires whether 
antitrust law fits China’s current developmental stage and what the proper role of law 
enforcement could be. After confirming the desirability of competition law and 
fine-tuned enforcement in China, Chapter III reviews the theoretical and empirical work 
on the relationship between public and private antitrust enforcement, evaluates the 
challenges to antitrust enforcement in China and renders some explanations to it. Chapter 
IV resorts on the antitrust experience of five groups of reference jurisdictions, the U.S., 
 7 
EU, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan that are categorized according 
to such dimensions as maturity of antitrust regimes, market size, attitudes towards state 
and market, role of government in economic development, tradition of law enforcement, 
frequency of private enforcement, and form of state intervention in order to draw 
implications for China. Chapter V proposes some policy recommendations including how 
to strengthen public enforcement and invigorate private enforcement. Lastly Chapter VI 
renders multi-layered conclusion remarks. 
In this sense, this proposed dissertation is both descriptive, in examining the existing 
pre-conditions, and normative, in asking whether the present private enforcement makes 
for a good policy tool, and what institutional improvement can be achieved within the 
present framework, given China’s developmental stage and institutional restraints. 
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CHAPTER 2: DOES CHINA NEED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: A BASIC 
INQUIRY  
2.1 Public v. Private Enforcement: Basic Concepts 
In general, public enforcement of law means “the use of public agents (inspectors, 
tax auditors, police, and prosecutors) to detect and sanction violators of legal rules.”25 In 
the context of enforcing specific public laws, like antitrust law, public enforcement refers 
to the law enforcement “undertaken by specially entrusted authorities or courts26…which 
enforce these rules in their capacity as public enforcers, address their decisions to private 
individuals…, and have the power to impose upon the latter administrative sanctions 
(such as fines and periodic penalty payments), structural remedies which may be coupled 
with fines or other penalties), and other measures or constraints, as available in national 
procedural law.”27 As such, public enforcement is also called administrative enforcement. 
The common features of administrative-public enforcement are the verticality of the 
dispute, which remains one between the state and private parties, and the administrative 
nature of the sanctions imposed.28 
With respect to private enforcement, broadly speaking there are three forms of it: 
First, private enforcers could report a monopoly to regulatory agencies as a whistleblower. 
If the latter deem the report material and meritorious, they would launch public 
enforcement. This, in fact, constitutes privately triggered public enforcement. For 
instance, art. 9 of Canadian Competition Act specifies that:29  
 
Any six persons resident in Canada who are not less than eighteen years of age and 
who are of the opinion that  
                                                      
25 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 45 (2000).  
26 Here the court does not belong to the judiciary branch, but rather, a separate, specialized adjudicative agencywithin 
the administrative branch. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Designing Competition Law Institutions: 
Values, Structure, and Mandate, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 455 (2010).  
27 See A.P. KOMNINOS, EC PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT – DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION OF EC COMPETITION LAW 
BY NATIONAL COURTS (2008). 
28 Id. It is typically the case in civil law countries. Exceptions exist in common law countries when the regulatory 
agencies bring the lawsuit before a court as a form of enforcing the antitrust laws. 
29 See Competition Act of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34.  
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(a) a person has contravened an order made pursuant to section 32, 33 or 34, or Part 
VII.1 or VIII, 
(b) grounds exist for the making of an order under Part VII.1 or VIII, or 
(c) an offence under Part VI or VII has been or is about to be committed, may apply 
to the Commissioner for an inquiry into the matter.  
 
In addition, art. 38 of the Chinese AML provides that: 
 
The Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency shall investigate any suspicious 
monopolistic conducts according to law. 
Any entities or individuals may tip off any suspicious monopolistic conducts to the 
Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency. The Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement 
Agency shall keep the informer confidential. 
The Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency shall conduct necessary investigations 
where the tip-off is made in writing and supported by relevant facts and evidence. 
 
Second, private parties could participate in administrative lawsuits relating to 
anti-monopolies as third parties. If a private party conceives that the judgment of a court 
would directly affect his/her legal interest, then he/she may request to participate in the 
pending action between the regulatory agencies and the defendants. For instance, in the 
Administrative Procedure Law of China (APL),30 art. 27 provides: 
 
If any other citizen, legal person or any other organization has interests in a specific 
administrative act under litigation, he or it may, as a third party, file a request to 
participate in the proceedings or may participate in them when so notified by the 
people's court. 
 
Third, private enforcement of antitrust laws can take place horizontally as between 
individuals in the framework of a civil process, in which the private litigants advance 
independent civil claims or counterclaims and do not rely on the permission or action of 
public agencies, such as the police, public prosecutors or regulators.31 Of course, it 
                                                      
30 Xing zheng su song fa [Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l 
People's Cong., April 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
31 See Komninos, supra note 27.  
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should be noted that even in the case of typical private enforcement, the state can still 
exert its influence through public infrastructure—the court system, or less often, a 
regulatory agency as amicus curiae, be it at the first instance level, appellate level,32 or 
both. The sanctions imposed are of a private nature and essentially function as remedies 
for the victim of the anti-competition conduct, although they also perform a function of 
punishment and deterrence in the case of punitive damage. Of course, remedies in the 
context of private enforcement can reflexively serve the public interest in maintaining 
effective competition in the market as well.33 
In this dissertation, without explicit specification, I would use the third definition of 
private enforcement. 
2.2 Dual Language in Antitrust Regimes 
The popular theoretical perception in the West is that antitrust law is a statute34 or a 
series of statutes of general national applicability that prohibit specific forms of 
anticompetitive conduct and creates public and/or private rights of action to redress 
misconduct,35 and it is also an institution designed to overcome the market failure that 
results from anti-competitive conduct.36 In this dissertation I will use competition law 
and antitrust law interchangeably, though there could be some nuanced differences in 
other literatures. The guiding principle of antitrust economics, given the trust in 
liberalization and free enterprise, is that restraints on competition harm consumers and 
thereby efficiency.37 Though specific goals and methods of implementing goals differ, 
                                                      
32 In the case of the presence of an administrative tribunal within the administrative branch serving as the first instance 
court of antitrust dispute, the courts only step in as an appellate court and provide judicial review. 
33 See Komninos, supra note 27. 
34 There is also something called “common law principles of fair trade” which is the origin of antitrust law. In 1914, 
Congress established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to formalize rules for fair trade and to investigate and 
curtail unfair trade practices.  
35 This definition omits laws adopted by local or regional government authorities that do not apply to a nation as a 
whole, and general anti-monopoly provisions in constitutions yet to be translated into operation principles by adopting 
relevant legislation and creating institutions for enforcement. It also ignores consumer protection measures that broadly 
forbid “unfair competition”. See William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Law Reform in Transition 
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2001).  
36 B ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (2008).  
37 A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 
19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 233 (1993). However, the arguable recognition of efficiency as the (primary) goal of 
antitrust laws was a more complex process.  
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and there is great variation in the intensity of political and cultural support behind 
antitrust laws, the underlying goal of combating restraints on competition is the same.38  
The practice of developed countries has clearly echoed this view. For instance, in the 
mission of the Antitrust Division of the Department of the Justice of the U.S., 
“…competition in a free market benefits American consumers through lower prices, 
better quality and greater choice. Competition provides businesses the opportunity to 
compete on price and quality, in an open market and on a level playing field, unhampered 
by anticompetitive restraints.”39 Additionally, the introduction of Competition rules on 
the Gateway to European Union website reads “Effective competition to provide goods 
and services cuts prices, raises quality and expands customer choice. Competition allows 
technological innovation to flourish.”40 
Inspired by the U.S. where private enforcement has become the norm and constitutes 
the vast majority of antitrust enforcement, and also responding to enlargement, the EU is 
trying to energize the private enforcement of EC competition rules through the sequential 
introduction of the Green Paper of 2005,41 the White Paper of 2008,42 and the fruitless 
attempt of “Proposal for a Directive on rules governing damages actions for 
infringements of art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty,” which was the Draft Directive of 2009.43 
Spokespeople for the developed countries tend to argue for “universal norms”, and 
emphasize “consensus-based antitrust enforcement is vital to global business and 
consumer welfare”.44 Thus, convergence in competition law is advocated implicitly or 
explicitly in various international forums, such as the International Competition Network 
(ICN)45 where “best practices”46 in competition law emanate, and the WTO where the 
                                                      
38 DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 4 (2010). 
39 Mission of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html.  
40 Competition Policy of the EU, http://europa.eu/pol/comp/index_en.htm.  
41 COM (2005) 672, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#greenpaper.  
42 COM (2008) 165, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#link1  
43 For an assessment of the desirability of the draft directive, see Jesus Alfaro & Tim Reher, Towards the directive on 
private enforcement of EC competition law: is the time ripe?, EURO. ANTITRUST REV., 2010. 
44 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in the Application of Antitrust to Intellectual 
Property, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 259, 266 – 67, (2005).   
45 See the slogan of ICN, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/.  
46 Usually it refers to the practice of the U.S. 
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EU proactively proposed the initiative on multilateral competition law in Cancún but 
encountered resistence.47 
As of now, more than one hundred nations in the world have adopted antitrust laws, 
of which approximately two thirds are developing countries; yet many other countries are 
considering doing so.48 However, the copy-and-pasting approach cannot guarantee the 
same outcome in the developing world. Empirical studies have indicated that a set of 
factors, such as the economic development, openness to trade and corruption all can 
heavily impact the level of potential enforcement;49 and the effect of competition law on 
the intensity of competition within a nation is limited, though positive.50 Accordingly, it 
seems that the foregoing Western mentalities do not adequately take into account the 
status quo of the developing countries which is often marked by paucity of resources and 
human capital, weak institutions, political capture of market, and inherent impulse for 
sustainable long-term economic growth which to a large degree provides the legitimacy 
of the ruling authorities. Thus, as opposed to the spokespeople for the developed 
countries, the spokespeople for the developing countries often express the need for an 
antitrust paradigm which is different from that of the developed world,51 because this 
paradigm is inevitably embedded in the overall development strategy and affected by 
internal and external economic, social and political dynamics. Some are even skeptical 
about the inclusion of antitrust law on transition economy reform agenda in the first 
place.52 
                                                      
47 On this evolution, see, Angela Wigger, The Convergence Crusade: The Politics of Global Competition Laws and 
Practices 6-9 (Working Paper prepared for the 46th Annual ISA Convention, Mar. 1-5, 2005), available at 
http://www.arccgor.nl/uploads/File/The%20Convergence%20Crusade.pdf. For a historical perspective on the initiatives 
to have multilateral agreements, see Gerber, supra note 38. For a comprehensive reflection on the EC proposal in the 
WTO, please see Ajit Singh, Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A Developing Country 
Perspective on the European Community Proposals (UNCTAD, Working Paper, 2004).  
48 CUTS International, Introductory Chapter: Promoting a Healthy Competition Culture around the World, in 
Competition Regimes in The World: A Civil Society Report iv, xii-xv (Pradeep S. Mehta ed., 2006).  
49 Dina I. Waked, Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement 
Using Resource-Based Evidence (5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2010), at 1. 
50 Hylton, Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of 
Competition Laws and Their Effects. 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 217, 275 (2007). 
51 See Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental 
Dimensions (UNCTAD, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 18, 2002).   
52 For example, see Kovacic, supra note 35.  
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If the landscape and inherent demands of the developing countries are different from 
those of the developed countries, then a fundamental question arises: do developing 
counties essentially need antitrust laws at all? Or to put it another way, to what extent 
does competition law help solve problems encountered by developing countries, given 
their developing context? 
However, it is noteworthy that the whole-sale concept of “developing countries” is 
too coarse to bespeak the specifics of a wide spectrum of countries that may range from 
the bottom, where millions struggle with hunger,53 to the middle-income countries 
obsessed by upgrading and sustainability issues. So the points identified below will only 
provide a framework for discussing the desirability of antitrust law in developing 
countries, as conclusions will eventually rest on the deliberation of specific conditions in 
each country. 
2.2.1 Desirability of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries—Contributions  
It is recognized that for developing countries to enjoy the benefits of liberalization, 
an appropriate regulatory framework must be put in place to avoid the replacement of a 
public barrier by a private barrier.54 Commentators who take an optimistic view about the 
contributions of competition policy, including enforcement of prohibition provisions, to 
economic growth, provide the following rationales. 
First, antitrust law can curtail administrative monopolies. Combatting administrative 
monopolies is a common task for all countries due to the widely-recognized “government 
failures.”55 It is a more urgent job for transitional economies who apply a gradualist 
approach to reforms. Some sectors that are characterized by “half administration and half 
market” have been created in the name of “strategic sectors.” Firms in those sectors are 
                                                      
53 See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 
ABOUT IT (2007) (discussing the reasons explaining the worsened poverty of a group of small nations, largely unnoticed 
by the industrialized West, that are dropping further and further behind the majority of the world's people, often falling 
into an absolute decline in living standards) 
54 Among others see Gal, supra note 24.   
55 Antitrust regimes in major jurisdictions, such the U.S. and EU, and many transitional countries all have provisions 
regulating administrative intervention in competition. See王晓晔，行政垄断问题的再思考[J]中国社会科学院研究生
院学报, 2009（4）[Wang Xiaoye, Reconsideration on the Issues of Administrative Monopoly, 4 J. CHINESE ACAD. SOC. 
SCI. OF GRADUATE SCH. 49 (2009)].  
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seeking profits with congenital financial and policy advantages, erecting entry barriers 
under the umbrella of industrial regulation or law enforcement, and inflating prices of 
goods and services. It has substantially increased the operation cost of firms in other 
sectors, repressed demands, worsened unfair income distribution and generated more 
corruption.56 Competition law can be expected to play a role in combating the abuse of 
administrative power to restrain competition.57 
Competition law can fill in the gaps after trade liberalization.58 Even with extensive 
liberalization of foreign and domestic trade, countries still may remain vulnerable to 
harmful private trade restraints,59 because trade liberalization may do little to improve 
competition for various services and in the local goods market.60 It is especially true in 
small economies, which can accommodate only a small number of competing firms and 
are therefore highly concentrated.61 
Competition law can work as a catalyst for market reform. Many reform initiatives, 
like trade liberalization and deregulation, require government institutions to surrender 
power and contradict the privileges of powerful economic interests that have long 
benefited from the suppression of competition. However, the beneficiaries of the statuts 
quo which include a closely knitted network, including the incumbent regulatory agencies 
and their officials, central and local SOEs and their employees, local firms under the 
aegis of local governments, and other vested interest groups, are unlikely to proactively 
come up with the reform measures and comply with them effectively.62 A competition 
agency can supply an institutional balancing power within the government to promote 
                                                      
56 See Zhou, supra note 12.  
57 徐士英, 政府干预与市场运行之间的防火墙——《反垄断法》对滥用行政权力限制竞争的规制 [J] 法治研究, 
2008 (5) [Xu Shiying, A Firewall between Government Intervention and Market—AML as The Regulation on Abuse of 
Administrative Power to Restrain Competition, 5 RES. RULE L. 3 (2008)].  
58 See Kovacic, supra note 35. 
59 Patrick Rey, Competition Policy and Economic Development, UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE, MIMEO, TOULOUSE, Sep. 
1997, available at http://idei.fr/doc/by/rey/competition.pdf.  
60 Ana Julia Jatar, Comment on “Competition, Information, and Development” by Jean-Jacques Laffont, in ANNUAL 
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 259 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1998).  
61 MICHAL GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (2003).  
62 Jeffrey Sachs, In Defense of Russia’s Reformers, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at A8. 
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liberalization measures and resist overt efforts to sabotage market-oriented reforms.63  
Competition law can help preserve the benefits of privatization. Accompanying the 
course of economic reform are oftentimes privatization and deregulation. However, they 
will not succeed on their own without vigorous rivalry, and that requires an appropriate 
and consistent antitrust policy as a corollary. In the absence of adequate attention to 
competition issues, various strategies may be exploited to reincarnate public monopolies 
into private monopolies, which can incubate a vested interest with the resources to 
influence the reform agenda or even the political process.64 Moreover, suffering from the 
chaotic market order and such complications as unfair distribution of income, 
X-inefficiency, and corruption, people are likely to cast doubt on the overall legitimacy of 
reforms and restrain their further support of it. A number of commentators have 
concluded that measures designed to promote competition are a vital determinant to the 
success of privatization.65  
Competition law can facilitate deterring corruption. Corruption is a chronic disease in 
developing countries, in particularly those former central planning economy countries, 
because of the extensive and centralized government power to intervene in the 
competition process and feeble institutional guards to secure transparency and integrity.66 
An antitrust law system could help undermine corrupt agreements between government 
official and business managers,67 and diminish the gains from improper bargains.68 
Last but not the least, competition law can support the transition from command and 
control to market economies. Extensive and long-lived reliance on government can result 
                                                      
63 See Kovacic, supra note 35.  
64 Joseph, E. Stiglitz, Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy, and Economic Advice, in 
ANNUAL BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 10 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1999). 
65 Id. 
66 Rick Stapenhurst & Shahrzad Sedigh, Introduction: An Overview of the Costs of Corruption and Strategies to Deal 
with It, in CURBING CORRUPTION 1 (Rick Stapenhurst & Shr J. Kpundeh eds., 1999).  
67 William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 
BROOK J. INT’L L. 403 (1997).  
68 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Global Economy, in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT 
INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25, 25 (UNDP ed., 1998), available at 
http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/efa/corruption/Chapter02.pdf.  
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in a pervasive suspicion of competition, like the case of Japan and South Korea,69 or 
even capitalism in the case of former communist and socialist countries. As such, it is 
expected that the government can demonstrate its commitment to liberalization and 
address ensuing serious market failures in the post-liberalization era. The creation of a 
competition policy thus becomes a symbol of a basic change in the government’s role 
from planner and producer to referee.70  
In brief, competition law can provide an endogenous driving force of economic 
growth, advance the free market, and prevent and combating concomitant problems of 
development and transition, so it owns great value for developing countries, especially 
for those subset of transitional economies. 
2.2.2 Desirability of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries—Concerns 
As already warned by Laffont: “even though the pressure of competition is generally 
favorable, some care must be exerted in implementing in the context of weak 
institutions.”71 
Godek also suggested that “newly emerging economies should approach antitrust 
warily; no antitrust policy might be better than one that expands beyond a minimalist 
framework.”72 While competition laws are attractive in protecting efficiency, it does not 
come without cost, and it is unclear of whether it is the only option to achieve efficiency.   
To begin with, international and domestic trade liberalization can effectively 
discipline anti-competitive actions, which makes the antitrust regime basically irrelevant. 
The major point is that consumers may have access to a wider range of potential goods 
and service providers as a result of trade liberalization, and firms could be naturally 
                                                      
69 Yamane Hiroko, Deregulation and Competition Law Enforcement in Japan: Administratively Guided Competition?, 
3 J. WORLD COMPETITION 141 (2000); Alice H. Amsden and Ajit Singh, The optimal degree of competition and 
dynamic efficiency in Japan and Korea, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 940 (1994); 金名俊, 竞争不适用于社会主义经济[J]学
术月刊, 1979(7) [Mingjun Jin, Competition Does Not Apply to Socialist Economy, 7 SCHOLARSHIP MONTHLY 26 
(1979) ].  
70 See Kovacic, supra note 35, at 298.  
71 Jean Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information and Development, in WORLD BANK'S 10TH ANNUAL BANK 
CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 237-257 (1998), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1998/Resources/laffont.pdf.  
72 See Godek, supra note 52, at 273.  
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disciplined for anticompetitive conduct by the market; the pressure of international or 
inter-regional domestic competition is more reliable than law enforcement by antitrust 
agencies or private parties, so free trade is the best antitrust policy.73 This situation is 
particularly the case in small economies, where it is relatively easy to enter some local 
markets on a small scale and make them competitive.74 However, it also has its 
limitations, because 1) it is not so valid for large economies as for smaller ones; 2) even 
small economies need a competition policy that is specifically tailored to balance 
competition and efficiency; 3) some services and goods such as supermarkets are better 
satisfied locally. A sound competition policy is necessary for them. 
Second, a misguided competition law may do more harm than the outright absence of 
a competition policy. Theories regarding competition are far from clear, in the first place, 
as applied through the twists and turns of doctrine in the 20th century.75 Furthermore, 
critics contend that even though competition is an unambiguously good thing in the 
first-best world, developing countries are so far from this ideal world, it is not always the 
case that competition should be encouraged in these countries.76 Officials in developing 
countries will often misapply competition policy commands and retard the development 
of free markets and the decentralization of political power.77 The vested political and 
economic interests may readily subvert the competition policy system to protect the 
existing distribution of wealth and privilege in society. The likelihood of faulty 
enforcement would be exacerbated where competition agencies and court systems lack 
adequate expertise and physical resources.78 Moreover, it is argued that the “negative 
social value” resulting from Type I errors are more likely and costly than Type II errors in 
                                                      
73 Robert D. Cooter, Market Modernization of Law: Economic Development through Decentralized Law, in ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997).  
74 See Godek, supra note 52, at 273; Paul E. Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Does not Need, 15 REGULATION 
20 (1992).  
75 For a more detailed analysis of some similar historical themes, see William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust 
Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000). 
76 See Laffont, supra note 71.  
77 See Godek, supra note 74.  
78 Robert D. Willig, Anti-monopoly Policies and Institutions, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN 
EUROPE 188 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992).  
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antitrust cases, because it would deter development-promoting activities.79 The largest 
class of victims is likely to be in the private sector and among consumers in developing 
countries, because in most cases the private sector is still in its infant stage and more 
vulnerable to faulty enforcement. And both the private sector and consumers are 
overwhelmingly scattered and lack the necessary ability and knowledge to assert their 
rights. 
Third, there are high opportunity costs in the reform process. Countries that 
undertake the transition from control-command to market-oriented economy typically are 
confronted with a collection of reform tasks. An appropriate hierarchy of a wide range of 
goals is particular crucial given the limited institutional, human, financial and political 
capital in developing countries. Some scholars observe that establishing competition 
policy and antitrust enforcement mechanisms can divert scarce resources away from 
achieving high reform priorities.80 Thus, competition policy and antitrust enforcement 
should warrant attention, or at least alongside, a thoughtful assessment of initial 
conditions and some degree of progress with respect to institutional and other foundations. 
Without a decent degree of institutional and organizational preconditions, like sun and 
water, the seeds of antitrust laws just are not able to grow.81 
2.2.3 Roles of Antitrust Enforcement 
It is argued that the implementation of “competition policy” should not be equated 
with the enforcement of prohibitions against restraints on business practices.82 There is a 
tool kit containing a wide range of policy tools by which a country can promote 
competition.83 In the tool kit, antitrust enforcement may not always be the principal 
                                                      
79 Christian Ahlborn, David Evans & Jorge Padilla, Unilateral Practices, Antitrust Rules and Judicial Review, MIMEO. 
PAPER PRESENTED AT THE 2008 CRESSE CONFERENCE (2008), available at 
http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/Paper%20Padilla%20-%20Ahlborn%20-%20Evans.pdf.  
80 Godek provides a vivid analogy saying that “exporting antitrust to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a 
starving man. It is superfluous; a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly, he 
won’t be able to eat what little there is available to him.” See Godek, supra note 74, at 21.   
81 See Gal, supra note 24. 
82 See Kovacic, supra note 35, at 281. 
83 R. Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and Their Relevance for Economic 
Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 
1995).  
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instrument for some countries under given political, economic, and social circumstances. 
Developing countries can use a variety of tool combinations, given their developmental 
stage and the readiness of institutional capacity. Generally speaking, there are four policy 
tools for competition policy: advocacy, education, research, and enforcement by public 
and/or private enforcers.84  
Advocacy is argued to be the most realistic and appropriate role of competition 
policy in the early stages of competition policy implementation, given the fragile 
institutional foundations and limited resources of developing countries.85 Two advocacy 
roles can be identified depending on the recipients: governmental advocacy and public 
advocacy.86 The antitrust agency has a central role in assisting governmental and other 
regulatory agencies to assess the competitive effects of their decisions. The public 
authorities’ awareness of the long-run benefits of competition to the society is an 
important ingredient for building a competitive environment, and furthermore, it may 
change the range of options perceived by government officials to be rational and 
acceptable.87  
Public advocacy is equally important. Without a supporting constituency, an antitrust 
regime is unable to convey its good to the society. The constituency building must rest on 
visible short-term or understandable long-term positive effects that consumers and other 
market players can appreciate. Accordingly, it is vital to create a competition culture 
among consumer organizations, the private sector, the media and other stakeholders.88  
The process of education can be conducted by an antitrust agency, intellectual entities 
or even international cooperative partners.89 Given the complexity of legal and economic 
ingredients in antitrust laws, education and training to government officials, judges, end 
                                                      
84 See Kovacic, supra note 35. 
85 Among others, see Gal, supra note 24; Kovacic, supra note 35. 
86 See Gal, supra note 24. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Before and after the promulgation of Chinese AML, a number of training programs have be launched with teaching 
personnel mainly from the U.S. and EU. Among others, see the training program information 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/xxfb/xxfb.html.  
 20 
consumers, and other market players is extremely important in raising awareness of the 
merits of antitrust law and in disseminating the knowledge about applying antitrust as a 
sword or shield. 
Well-established research capabilities can inform the agency’s advocacy activities 
and the selection of possible subjects for law enforcement. Besides the research entities 
within the government, independent private research entities should also be encouraged, 
because their stance may be more insulated from political pressure and more objective. In 
this respect, the availability of data and information, which is necessary for economic and 
legal analysis, is in urgent need.90 
With respect to antitrust enforcement, in principle, a country could choose a strategy 
that begins with enacting basic prohibitions on hard core horizontal restraints, which 
usually apply straightforward per se rule as opposed to the much more complex “rule of 
reason” and is more compatible with the developing context, featuring lack of expertise 
and experience, weak institutional foundations, and scarce resources;91 alternatively, a 
country could adopt a more comprehensive set of antitrust measures, but prioritize 
enforcement tasks at different stages, namely, from easy pieces to more conceptually 
complex and resource-intensive commands with the improvement of the enforcement 
environment.92 However, it is not realistic for the antitrust agency to become proficient 
in antitrust enforcement if it does not gain experience in investigating and prosecuting 
cases. The same rule applies to courts, which are expected to perform a vital role in 
private enforcement in the long run. Accordingly, what’s more appropriate is including 
some level of law enforcement in the antitrust agency’s initial package of responsibilities 
besides advocacy, education and research, so that private enforcement may have the 
                                                      
90 For the analysis of “data shortcomings,” see Kovacic, supra note 35, at 308. 
91 Malcolm B. Coate, René Bustamante and A. E. Rodriguez, Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating Government and 
Business, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 37 (1992). 
92 See Gal, supra note 24.The Chinese government expressly announced that it would focus on those “clearly” 
restrictive business practices at an early stage, see 张穹谈《反垄断法》实施应注意的五个问题[Five Noteworthy Issues 
about Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement: Interview with the Director of Legal Office of the State Council], PEOPLE’S 
NETWORK (Dec. 7, 2009), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10531538.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
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chance to sprout.93 It is important not to be trapped in all-or-nothing thinking. Some 
prudent dose of law enforcement is needed due to its own merits and its benign interplay 
with other policy tools analyzed below, but subject to appropriate cost-benefit analysis. 
Antitrust enforcement can facilitate the actualization of other policy tools. It can 
serve as both a governmental and public advocacy tool, if such implementation changes 
the parameters of decision-makers and raises the awareness of market stakeholders, either 
by convincing them of the benefits of increased competition or by creating societal 
pressure to adopt competitive measures. 94  During the course of investigation and 
sanction of antitrust violations by public agencies or private parties, education’s role may 
be vividly strengthened. Moreover, enforcement usually means more opportunities to test 
abstract rules through concrete cases, and therefore more materials for meaningful 
research.  
From another perspective, law enforcement may be viewed as a systematic project, 
which can incorporate other policy tools and include not only active enforcement, namely, 
the enforcement of prohibitive provisions by public and private enforcers as an ex post 
approach, but also passive enforcement by public authorities, namely, advocacy, 
education, research and timely and adequate dissemination of information as an ex ante 
approach. In any event, an effective interplay between the four above mentioned policy 
tools can contribute to more efficient law enforcement.95 
In brief, when considering the establishment and improvement of the appropriate role 
of law enforcement in developing countries, we have to bear in mind the developmental 
stage, the dearth of human, institutional, financial and political capital, and the relatively 
marginal role of law enforcement in the initial stage. 
2.2.4 Sequencing and Pacing: The Key 
Competition law as anything else is a double-edged sword. It is meaningless to talk 
                                                      
93 J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation 
in Japan, 94 YALE L. J. 604 (1985).  
94 See Gal, supra note 24. 
95 Without express specification as here, in this dissertation, “law enforcement” is referred to the enforcement of 
prohibitive provisions of antitrust law. 
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about competition law in Mao’s central planning era; however, as long as the market is 
introduced as the fundamental mechanism for economic activities, a level playing field is 
a must-have for its healthy and sustainable development. This requirement is the case for 
both developed and developing countries, and fair competition maybe is even more 
crucial to transitional countries where the state is still able to wield substantial power, 
administrative monopolies have constituted the bulk of anti-competitive practices, and 
private entrepreneurship is still in its infant stage. The significant difference is that the 
Western-style antitrust law was introduced when capitalism was evolving from 
laissez-faire capitalism to monopoly, and market failure began aroused people’s attention; 
western antitrust law is currently functioning on the basis of relatively complete 
institutional infrastructures. In contrast, in many transitional/developing countries, before 
the emergence of competition law, the national champions and regional interest groups 
had already taken root, and competition law is rising as an integral ingredient of reforms 
in the wake of government failure,96  but it is nonetheless with thin political and 
economic capital. 
Another note is that nowadays the notion of “developing countries” or “transitional 
countries” is too coarse to inform the dramatic variation among the developing countries, 
given the widening gap. The prior typical poor countries such as Taiwan, China, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Portugal, were able to double their per capita income in 
closer to 15 years,97 while the bottom billion are still grappling with hunger and 
disease. 98  The implication is that the foregoing contributions and concerns of 
competition law to developing countries are merely parameters that developing countries 
have to ponder; developing countries should be especially wary of an all-or-nothing 
mentality, but focus on the sequence and pace of the competition regime’s construction. 
 
                                                      
96 Or more precisely, reforms took place in the wake of the failure of excessive government intervention, given that 
many transitional economies still mandate a preeminent role for the state.  
97 Doug Peterson, Rich Country, Poor Country, May 2009, http://www.las.illinois.edu/news/2009/poorcountries/.  
98 See Collier, supra note 53.   
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2.3 Does China Need Antitrust Law: Time Is Up 
2.2.5 A Middle-Income Transitional Country 
In her empirical study about antitrust enforcement in developing countries Waked, 
identified economic development, openness to trade, and corruption as the most 
important factors that can affect antitrust enforcement. In addition, political stability was 
also found to have a positive effect.99 In Hylton and Deng’ work, their regression 
suggests that “enhancing enforcement, by permitting private actions or increasing the 
range of remedies available to enforcement authorities, has the largest impact on 
perceived competition intensity.”100 
Accordingly, could antitrust law have a place in China? Let us look at the following 
aspects: 
First, economically speaking, China has reached a certain developmental stage on 
account that the country has become the second largest economy and has entered into the 
up-middle-income rank.  
Second, China’s trade openness has improved tremendously thanks to years of 
opening up policy and integration into international and regional communities. China is 
the largest exporter, and second largest importer, the fifth largest outward investor, 
second largest recipient of FDI. However, the penetration of foreign services and goods 
has not formed a substantial competition.  
Third, in terms of corruption, in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, China ranked 63 with “irregular payments and 
bribes.” The ranking is only better than Vietnam which ranked 104, and is still in the 
upper 50 per cent of 142 countries or areas.101 
Fourth, with respect to political stability, in World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, China ranked 26 in the “public trust of politicians”, 
                                                      
99 See Waked, supra note 49.  
100 See Hylton & Deng, supra note 50, at 275.  
101 Klaus Schwab ed., The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 394, 
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which is only lower than that of Singapore among all reference jurisdictions. 102 
Fifth, when speaking of institutions, by 2010, China had adopted 236 laws and more 
than 690 administrative regulations. The National People’s Congress announced that a 
socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics has been established.103 In addition, 
China ranked 42 in “efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes” which is even 
better than Korea and Taiwan,104 and ranked 63 in “judicial independence” which is also 
better than Korea and Vietnam.105 
A preliminary conclusion is that China has already achieved at least some financial, 
political and institutional capital to accommodate competition policy implementation that 
is consistent with the country’s conditions. This situation represents the supply side of 
competition law. The demand side is definitely more urgen,t as will be analyzed below.  
2.2.6 Administrative Monopolies as A Major Concern 
The rise of administrative monopoly in China was closely related to the central 
planning system before reforms.  
In the pre-reform era, when resources were scarce, no effective market functioned to 
channel allocation of the means of production and of goods, and concerns about wars 
prevailed. The central planning system and the resulting monopolization by the 
government could help insure basic economic and social order and national security, of 
course at the price of efficiency. After thirty years of reforms and a greater openness, 
there have been profound changes with respect to the economy and its institutional 
foundations. The scope and depth of the allocation of resources based on a price 
mechanism is increasing; market competition between firms with different ownership 
structures is in play. The administrative monopoly and its legitimacy does not have a 
future. Nevertheless, the administrative monopoly has become the largest and most 
                                                      
102 Id, at 393. 
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Established], XINHUA NETWORK, Mar. 10, 2011, available at 
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persistent hurdle on the way to further reforms, and combating administrative monopoly 
is a crucial measure to overcome the middle-income trap and break up the curse to late 
starters.  
In China, administrative monopolies take two major forms: industrial monopoly and 
regional monopoly, or alternatively, regional protectionism. The former refers to SOEs 
which perform dichotomous and conflicting roles. They are authorized to discharge some 
regulatory responsibilities, perform as a referee and therefore possess privileges in terms 
of access to credit, resource allocation, production, and sales; at the same time, they are 
competing on the market and seeking profit as a player. Not surprisingly, thanks to the 
patronage of government agencies in their lines, the SOEs are readily able to gain the 
upper hand in competition. This phenomenon is especially notorious in so-called strategic 
sectors such as the petroleum, telecommunication, railway, civil aviation, and electric 
power transportation industries. For instance, in 1999 the “关于清理整顿小炼油厂和规
范原油成品油流通秩序的意见” [Opinions on Cleaning up Small-Scale Refineries and 
Improving Market Order of Refined Oil Product, also called Decree No. 38]106 jointly 
issued by eight regulatory agencies107 created a de facto monopoly on the whole-sale of 
refined oil product to Sinopec and PetroChina with the pretext of eliminating outmoded 
technology, excess capacity, smuggling and unreasonable layout; subsequently, in 2001, 
the two national oil product giants were again granted the exclusive retail right by “关于
进一步整顿和规范成品油市场秩序的意见” [Opinions on Further Cleaning up Small- 
Scale Refineries and Improving Market Order of Refined Oil Product]108 jointly issued 
by another five regulatory agencies.109 Ever since then, it is very hard for private firms to 
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GOV.CN (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
109 They were the State Economic and Trade Commission, SAIC, AQSIQ, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of 
Construction.  
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set foot in this industry, and the supply of oil products has been kidnapped by Sinopec 
and PetroChina.110 
The second form of administrative monopoly is regional protectionism. It means that 
as an organizer of local administrative and economic affairs, subnational governments 
violate the policies of the central government, encroach on the overall  national overall 
interests and the interests of other regions within the country by means of separating the 
market and destroying fair competition in order to maximizing local interests.111 The 
central issue is the contradiction and conflict of interests between the central and local 
governments. In the context of a transitional China, the players in regional protectionism 
include not only governments at various levels but also other interest groups, such as 
government officials, local public and non-public firms, and even local residents.112 
Regional protectionism may assume different patterns with the progression of China’s 
reforms. They range from tariff barrier methods like the imposition of arbitrary quotas 
and service charges at road blocks to non-tariff methods such as outright prohibition, 
products designated by the government, the unequal treatment of local and non-local 
firms, administrative trivia (e.g. medical, sanitation, epidemic prevention, product quality, 
measurement and other such licenses and certificates), and the tolerance of law and 
regulation violations.113  In the absence of effective competition from the outside, 
duplicative construction is rampant everywhere in order to capture centrally mandated 
industrial rent, but at the same time failing companies cannot eventually go bankrupt.  
China is experiencing backward specialization. According to a World Bank study, by 
the early 1990s, the degree of difference in industrial structure across regions in China 
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was much lower than in the United States or the European Community. 114  The 
duplicative construction directly resulted in a great loss of economies of scale. For 
example, in 1996, China had 116 automobile plants, of which only eighteen were making 
more than 10,000 cars per year.115 While it is typically believed that 250,000 units is a 
“minimum efficient scale” for automobile assembly plants,116 the average output volume 
of China’s automobile assembly plants in 1998 was only 14,165 units.117  Similar 
examples of low economies of scale abound in China’s economy.118 
Studies inquiring into why some nations have grown wealthy consistently while 
some have not found that impediments to competition would hamper innovation, growth 
and prosperity.119 After investigating cross-nation differences in income and productivity, 
Parente and Prescott concluded that the differences arise importantly from the protected 
monopoly rights of groups of factor suppliers.120 Firms under the bureaucracy patronage 
have gained undue competitive advantage that would prevent innovative practices of both 
the privileged firms and the firms in disadvantageous positions;121 erect high entry 
barriers for new-comers; hamper the formation of a single; open and competitive market; 
inflate prices of products and services, thereby increasing the cost of downstream firms 
and suppressing the demands; grab monopoly rents and worsen the disparity of income 
distribution; and finally, facilitate corruption. All these sins are powerful dragging forces 
towards the middle-income trap, or even a formidable reversion of the development 
process. 
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2.2.7 Private Monopolies as A Rising Issue 
One of the driving forces for the for the increased pace of the enactment of the AML 
was a pair of reports by the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) and National 
Development and Reform Commission of China (NDRC) respectively on the 
anti-competitive practices of multinationals that have absolute advantages in capital, 
human resources and technologies.122  
One report concerned a three-step strategy of achieving market power conducted by 
those international giants: the monopoly of technology through the possession of patents, 
the monopoly of standards, and the eventual possession of market power. It was reported 
that the multinationals would adjust the target for IP protection with changes in the most 
lucrative industries, so the household electrical appliance, automobile, the pharmaceutical, 
chemical, and agriculture industries all have gone through waves of patent application by 
multinationals, just to name a few. The other report revealed that multinationals owned 
obvious advantages in their respective areas and tended to restrain competition by tie-in 
sale, price discrimination, refusal to deal, and collusive agreement.123  
It is perhaps the media’s emphases on the substantial entry barriers and systemized 
unfair treatment encountered by private firms and the unscrupulous administrative 
monopolies and anti-competitive practices by multinationals that have made private 
monopolies in the typical economic sense fade out of vision. Some observers just think 
that private sectors are still feeble and have not yet reached the stage of exerting effective 
anti-competitive practices that are worthy of people’s attention. However, private 
monopolies do exist everywhere, even in those firms with small registered capital. Take 
the recent eye-catching first heavy anti-monopoly penalty, for example. In response to a 
whistleblower,124 the NDRC recently imposed a large fine on two drug companies in 
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Shandong province: a fine of 6.5 million RMB (about $1.02 million) on Shandong 
Weifang Shuntong Pharmaceutical Co Ltd, and another fine of 100,000 RMB (about 
$15773) on Shandong Weifang Huaxin Medicine Trade Co Ltd, for their “monopoly” on 
the pricing of raw materials for a medicine used to combat high blood pressure. Each of 
the two drug companies has a registered capital of approximately 550000 RMB. An 
investigation by the NDRC's anti-monopoly department confirmed that the two 
companies signed an exclusive agent agreement with the country's only two providers of 
promethazine hydrochloride, a raw material used to make Reserpine. The agreement 
stipulated the two suppliers could not sell the material to a third party without their 
permission. After establishing their monopoly over the supply of promethazine 
hydrochloride, the two drug companies then raised its price. Several Reserpine 
manufacturers were forced to halt production of the medicine as the cost of the raw 
material soared from 200 RMB per kilogram to as much as 1,350 RMB per kilogram.125 
It is noteworthy that reserpine is included in the list of China's essential drugs and the 
NDRC's crackdown will help forestall unreasonable price rises for the medicine in the 
future, which will be a blessing to more than 10 million high blood pressure patients, 
mostly low and middle-income sufferers, who rely on this medicine, and which is perhaps 
one of the main causes for the NDRC’s quick action on this issue.  
In addition, right before the adoption of the AML, a price cartel organized by an 
instant noodle association raised people’s attention.126  
Apart from the rare cases that have actually provoked crackdown by implementing 
agencies, more unofficial attacks to private monopolies have concentrated on high-tech 
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companies and have often taken the form of protests, oral condemnation, or to the best 
unsuccessful private litigations.127 In the ten publicized cases, the defendants of five of 
them were high-tech companies, but none of the cases ended up with plaintiffs’ success 
because of alleged difficulties in evidence production.128 
As indicated in anti-competitive practices by private parties, the conventional 
wisdom in the Western world also has value in transitional China, in spite of the urgent 
call for reining in administrative monopoly as the primary concern and avoiding the 
exploitation of international giants. Private monopolies can and do affect economic 
democracy and social cohesion. To preserve the fruit of deregulation and privatization, 
competition law is a must-have. 
2.2.8 Tailored Antitrust Frameworks for Different Targets 
From what is discussed above, we can see that there are largely four potential targets 
of the AML, and each present different policy considerations: 
A. Privately owned Chinese firms 
Despite the remarkable contributions the private sector has made to China’s 
economic miracle, privately owned Chinese firms, compared to their state-owned or 
foreign competitors, have long been sidelined in political and economic arenas. The 
complexity of antitrust law as well as flawed institution may virtually form another 
vicious state intervention into private firms. Therefore, there should be profound 
considerations concerning the baseline tradeoff between protecting competition and 
deterring anti-competitive behaviors.  
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For the time being, two factors may warrant tapping the scale a little bit to deterrence 
rather than competition: 
Antitrust enforcement is a responsibility of the central government agencies. They 
care more about the anti-competitive behaviors with nation-wide impact. Moreover, their 
thin capacities in the very early stage of Chinese antitrust regime have also objectively 
restrained their focus to those most salient violations. Meanwhile, given that most of the 
privately-owned enterprises are SMEs,129 their economic impact is largely regional, and 
so the likelihood for them to become the target of antitrust enforcement is not high. 
Although in principle, antitrust agencies can delegate enforcing powers to 
subnational agencies; this delegation is decided case by case. This may have left some 
room for bargaining between subnational agencies and violators. For instance, in 
behaviors Fuyang Paper Association price-fixing case, although the Association was fined 
500000 RMB, no information indicated that the participating firms were fined as well.130 
In the so-called first case investigated by the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC) system, however, subnational agencies first tried to apply soft 
measures in the form of administrative instruction and suggestions to deal with a market 
division organized by a concrete trade association. It was only after those measures 
proved to be useless, and the division of market had become a major impediment for a 
resettlement project in an extremely sensitive area in terms of social unrest in 
contemporary China, that the SAIC delegated the power to subnational agencies. 
Eventually the trade association and major violators were fined. 131 Unsurprisingly, the 
case-based delegation may have resulted in an enforcement vacuum at the subnational 
level and inconsistency of law enforcement. 
B. Foreign firms 
In current antitrust regulatory frameworks, there are no special treatments for foreign 
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firms except merger reviews. As a matter of fact, regulatory frameworks regarding 
mergers and the acquisition of Chinese firms by foreign firms have been in existence ever 
since 2003. In general, where the concentration of business operators reaches any of the 
following standards, the business operators concerned shall declare it to the competent 
department of commerce of the State Council beforehand, otherwise, the concentration is 
not allowed:  
(1). the worldwide business volume of all the business operators involved in the 
concentration exceeds 10 billion yuan in the last accounting year, and the Chinese 
business volume in China of at least two business operators among them exceeds 400 
million yuan separately in the last accounting year; 
(2). the business volume in China of all the business operators involved in the 
concentration exceeds 2 billion yuan in the last accounting year, and the business volume 
in China of at least two business operators among them exceeds 400 million yuan 
separately in the last accounting year. 
As per a newly promulgated Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the 
Establishment of the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors in 2011 (Notice), the security review would be added on 
top of a regular merger review as long as mergers and acquisitions include: 1) foreign 
investors' mergers and acquisitions of domestic military industrial enterprises and 
supportive military industrial enterprises, enterprises surrounding major and sensitive 
military facilities, and other entities relating to national defense security; 2) foreign 
investors' mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises relating to important 
agricultural products, important energies and resources, important infrastructural facilities, 
important transportation services, key technologies, manufacturing of major equipment, 
etc., which relate to the national security, and whose actual controlling power may be 
obtained by foreign investors. 
However, the Notice did not set up a specialized organization for security review, but 
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rather adopted a joint conference led by NDRC and MOFCOM. They shall conduct a 
security review jointly with other relevant sectors according to concerned industries and 
sectors.  
The MOFCOM owns the power to subject a proposed merger to security review. In 
addition, relevant sectors of the central government, national industrial associations, firms 
in the same line, and upstream as well as downstream firms can suggest security review 
through the MOFCOM to the joint conference and subject a proposed merger for security 
review after receiving affirmative responses from the joint conference. 
C. Regional government and regionally-owned or affiliated firms 
Regional governments and their officials may act for regional political rather than 
economic considerations, and regionally-owned or –affiliated firms may capture regional 
political actors to facilitate regional protectionism. Considering the complex background 
for current rampant regional protectionism and the incompetence of the AML in the face 
of anti-competitive behaviors of regional governments, efforts may go well beyond 
antitrust and extend to more extensive institution construction. 
Largely speaking, the major cause of regional protectionism is fiscal decentralization 
and yardstick competition among regional government heads. It will be discussed in 
detail in 3.6.3. 
In principle, the AML is supposed to apply equally to anti-competitive behaviors in 
well-defined regional market, but it is incompetent in the face of regional government 
because 1) as per Art. 51 of the AML, where any administrative organ or an organization 
empowered by a law or regulations to administer public affairs abuses its administrative 
power to eliminate or restrict competition, the superior authority shall order corrections 
and impose punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other directly 
liable persons. The Anti-Monopoly Authority may offer advice to the relevant superior 
authority pursuant to the law.132 The implication is that there would be no clear costs for 
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regional governments and their officials who violate the AML, notwithstanding the clear 
gains. 2) According to recent cases against governments at various levels and a draft 
judicial interpretation,133 the first instance court for antitrust litigations is very likely to 
be the intermediate court. The relative weight of the defendant in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy may provide a hint as to the results. For instance, the prominent case against the 
ministry-level General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) which was lodged on the first effective day to the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate 
People’s Court was finalized with a dismissal in the name of expiration of statute of 
limitations;134 in contrast, another case that was instituted on exactly the same day to the 
Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court was accepted and settled based on correction 
measures by the defendant, Yuyao County government.135 Accordingly, how to adjust 
relevant procedural rules to make enforcement agencies insulated from regional capture 
for the time being, and to amend substantive rules in the future to substantially arm 
enforcement agencies are two major issues facing the antitrust framework. 
Moreover, it was claimed that 90 per cent anti-competitive conduct by regional or 
sectoral government officials can be prevented or automatically corrected if regional 
government officials have known relevant laws. 136  Therefore, as for policy tools, 
advocacy and education may be more realistic. 
D. Central SOEs 
The central SOEs can capture regulators or other parts of government to use as cover 
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against the antitrust regulators. They are also the major cause of industrial monopolies 
and probably the largest barrier to further reforms.  
Indeed, as aptly cautioned by Chang, there is no clear systematic evidence that SOEs 
are burdens on the economy, and the Sappington-Stiglitz Fundamental Privatization 
Theorem shows that the performance of private-sector firms is superior to that of SOEs 
only under stringent and often unrealistic conditions.137 However, Chang also confessed 
that SOEs are vulnerable to the principal-agent problem, the free-rider problem, and the 
soft budget constraints.138 Without privatization, SOE performance can alternatively be 
improved through organizational reform, an increase in competition, and 
political-administrative reforms.139 Therefore, SOEs are not good or bad per se, but 
institutions have to be put in place to avoid or minimize the associated problems of the 
SOE. The AML is exactly such a kind of institution safeguard for benign performance of 
the SOEs. But considering that the central SOEs own close personnel and benefit ties 
with the central government, in particular their sector-septicity regulatory agencies, more 
efforts may also lay beyond the AML regime. 
2.4 Summary  
In response to their different economic, political and social conditions at home and 
abroad, developed and developing countries argue for different methods when 
approaching antitrust. 
There are pros and cons for the adoption of antitrust regime in developing world. 
However, theory and experiences have informed us that antitrust enforcement is only one 
of the options in the tool kit.  
In addition, we should not be confused by the wholesale concept of “developing 
country” which may cover a number of jurisdictions with substantial differences. So the 
all-or-nothing mentality should be duly avoided, and the proper combination of different 
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policy tools at different developmental stages should be considered to secure the 
appropriate dosage of competition. 
In the case of China, after decades of development, the country has accumulated 
basic resources with respect to finance, human resource, political stability, and state 
institutions. Hence, she is able to apply some combinations of competition policy tools. 
On the other hand, the unscrupulous administrative monopolies and rising private 
monopolies are becoming important hurdles for China’s sustainable development.  
So China does need competition law and is ready to implement a carefully designed 
dosage of law enforcement. Moreover, given China’s special political and economic 
landscape and the multiple potential antitrust targets, the deliberately calibrated antitrust 
policies that are centered on but not limited to the AML are of importance.  
This situation suggests the following questions: what is the policy option between 
public and private enforcement and what makes a good tool combination in the early 
stage? These questions will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES ABOUT ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
CASE OF CHINA  
3.1 Political Theories of Enforcement of Public Laws: An Overview 
The literature review indicates that there were initially two absolutist political 
perceptions with regard to enforcement of public laws: exclusive public enforcement and 
exclusive private enforcement. The shared point of the two rival approaches is that 
private and public enforcement are two distinct mechanisms functioning as substitutable 
institutions, potentially able to completely replace each other, which means the adoption 
of one would naturally negate the other.140 
3.1.1 Exclusive Public Enforcement 
The liberal state theorists, applying a utilitarian approach, have taken an unfavorable 
view of private enforcement of public laws. For instance, from Hobbes’ perspective, 
before the establishment of the state, the state of nature is characterized as a place only 
producing solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short human life,141 probably due to the 
heavy reliance on private enforcement.142 Responding to the disorder and inefficiency 
caused by arbitrary private enforcement, individuals seeking richer and longer lives will 
willingly trade the ability to enforce law for a public monopoly over violence. Then, the 
saved resources from self-protection and self-help may be invested in more productive 
activities.143 
Exclusive public enforcement was theoretically augmented by Rousseau’s “social 
contract theory” and the advantage of bureaucratic rationality suggested by Weber. 
According to Rousseau, public enforcement was not simply more efficient, but was also a 
more genuine expression of public policy.144 Weber suggested that more developed 
societies would regularize their policies through the mechanism of bureaucratic 
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rationality. Full-time professional prosecutors subject to hierarchical control and 
oversight were better situated to implement public policies than private individuals, 
whose actions were not guaranteed by bureaucratic control and might be subject to 
irrational motivations. Moreover, unlike the part-time private prosecutor, a full-time 
public prosecutor could develop specialized expertise. 
3.1.2 Exclusive Private Enforcement 
Theoretical arguments in favor of the private enforcement of public laws started from 
the conditional justification of private enforcement. Drawing on retributive theories, 
some commentators have argued that private enforcement is justified if the litigant is 
vindicating pre-existing natural rights, but enforcement is not justified if it is based on 
legislation that attempts to maximize general welfare.145 However, the modern legislation 
is concerned with both social welfare and individual rights. Expanded notions of 
entitlement and rights to citizen participation will increase the range of laws that can be 
subject to private enforcement. In this vein, private enforcement can be seen as a 
participatory activity that allows individuals and groups to compete over increasingly 
pluralistic understandings of the public interest. It thus has generated skepticism about the 
ability of electoral and legislative politics to perform the only forum for mediating 
competing interests and stressed the role of judiciary system.146 
3.1.3 Blurring Boundaries of Private and Public Enforcement in Terms of Achieving 
Public Goals  
Increased skepticism about distinctions between public and private power in terms of 
public interest protection and promotion also support private enforcement. In some area 
of law, a private plaintiff may have as much, if not more, expertise and information than a 
public official. Moreover, such an actor may, because of its own self-interest, have a 
stronger incentive to enforce a public law than a public agency concerned with its own 
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interests.147 It is not unlikely to align private interest with public interest.148 Furthermore, 
private enforcement can check on the regulatory capture thanks to its independence.149  
An important but largely negative justification for private enforcement is 
governmental failure, particularly capture and public choice theories of governance.150 If 
public enforcers cannot be relied upon to enforce laws honestly and vigorously, then it is 
necessary to replace or at least supplement their efforts with private enforcement. A larger 
number of private enforcers are more difficult to lobby lobbied than the quantitatively 
limited public enforcement enforcers. Besides, even if the public enforcers’ performance 
is acceptable, from the optimal enforcement’s point of view, private enforcement can be a 
good complement.151 
3.2 Economic Theories about Enforcement of Public Laws: An Overview  
The study of law through an economic approach started with Becker. Following his 
pioneering work arguing for the optimality of a high penalties and low probabilities 
approach in the context of public enforcement,152 Becker together with Stigler held that 
systems of public enforcement tend to coexist with procedures for private enforcement.153 
Their principal argument was that on the one hand, public enforcement creates incentives 
to bribery which undermine deterrence, so if law enforcement were privatized, public 
enforcers would have no incentive to take bribes; on the other hand, even in jurisdictions 
with highly competent and sophisticated bureaucracies in terms of offence detection and 
sanctions, victims would nevertheless search for rights of access to courts or other 
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independent adjudication venues to seek remedies.154 Landes and Posner155 challenged 
the Becker and Stigler argument. They held that public enforcement may be superior to 
private enforcement in many contexts, because public enforcers can more easily control 
the combination of high fines and low probabilities of detection argued to be optimal by 
Becker.156 Furthermore, the increased penalties in the context of private enforcement 
may increase the incentives of private enforcers and accordingly, the enforcement 
probability so that over-enforcement could follow. As opposed to the over-enforcement 
theorem, Polinsky argued that private enforcement driven by bounty-hunters can lead to 
under-deterrence of poor offenders because of limited liability,157 and Garoupa showed 
that private enforcement can result in not only under-detection but also lower accuracy.158 
3.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Private Enforcement of Public Laws 
The advantages of private enforcement are as follows: 
First, private parties may have information and knowledge advantages in some cases. 
For instance, in antitrust cases, if the private harmed parities are third party competitors 
or direct downstream purchasers, oftentimes they own more, if not equal, professional 
knowledge and detailed information about anti-competitive behaviors. They are willing 
and able to pay for antitrust litigations for a variety of reasons.159 
Second, private funds can subsidize the limited resources of public enforcers.160 The 
pecuniary legal claims that function independently of the resources of government agents 
represent a “high powered” incentive scheme that may remedy the expected inadequacies 
of a centralized public enforcement system. 
Third, although sometimes termed “bounty hunters”, private enforcers can check on 
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the “low powered” public enforcers who are prone to capture,161 political biases,162 and 
behavioral failures.163 
Despite the widely acclaimed benefits of private enforcement, skepticism towards 
private enforcement has started long ago. 
Thomas Malthus blamed the private rights of access by the indigent to common law 
courts as the cause of “the high price of provision.”164 Following the Malthusian tradition, 
economists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries often found the liberal appeals to 
private systems of regulation to be “unscientific.” Clark, an influential figure in the 
development of economic analysis in the United States, for instance, categorized appeals 
to law organized economic processes into “anarchist” and “socialist’” groups, and he 
dismissed attempts to limit the powers of the state as ‘self- terminating.’165 To speak in 
detail, the disadvantages of private enforcement are as follows: 
First, there might be a divergence of private interest and social interest. The only 
consideration that drives private enforcement is the private gain. This may lead to at least 
three problems: inadequate investment, unmeritorious suits and undesirable 
settlements.166 
Second, there is the risk of over-enforcement. As analyzed in Landes and Posner’s 
over-enforcement theorem, in the design of an optimum system of penalties where the 
probability of apprehension and conviction is less than unity, the fine is set higher than 
the social costs of the illegal activity not because an activity’ value has increased relative 
to other activities, but rather as a device to minimize the cost of resources. From a social 
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standpoint, it is definitely the wrong signal for the private profit maximizer.167  
Third, there may be cost of duplication and coordination problems.168 Some private 
parties who suffer from the same offence may incur similar judicial proceedings multiple 
times, so this would raise a serious problem of duplication. The institutional design of 
class action can remedy this problem to some degree; however, coordination costs would 
therefore arise. 
Fourth, private parties have the incentive to defray the costs of legal enforcement and 
deterrence to the public enforcers. This is especially true if the victims are poor, and the 
offenders either too rich or too poor to be punished by the victims or their private 
representatives.169 
3.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Enforcement of Public Laws 
The advantages of public enforcement are as follows: 
First, public enforcers can take advantage of state power, specialties, and economies 
of scale during the course of detection and sanctions. 
Second, public enforcement is likely to be more public-interest driven and in line 
with social welfare. In the absence of abuse of power and regulatory capture, public 
enforcers can maximize social welfare and hence overcome the divergence of private 
interests and social interests and minimize enforcement costs without reducing the 
enforcement effect. Furthermore, the pursuit of public interest could be guaranteed by 
hierarchy control and oversight within the government and democratic framework.170 
Like private enforcement, public enforcement is a double-edged sword as well. 
Physiocrats in the French court focused on the perverse incentives created by the 
enforcement of monopoly rights granted by the monarchy, while authors of the Scottish 
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Enlightenment like Adam Smith pointed out the costs of trade regulation on local and 
colonized economies. 171  Liberal thinkers stressed the potential of unintended 
consequences of the exercise of centralized political authority to regulate socio-economic 
behavior.172 To speak in detail, the weak points of public enforcement are: 
First, objective restraints can lead to under-enforcement results. The economic 
approach suggests that, even in the presence of benevolent public agents, budget and 
information requirements of public enforcement ration the ‘rule of law’ in jurisdictions 
that do not provide sufficient scope for private legal action by victims.173 As detailed by 
Weber174 and formalized more recently by Aghion and Tirol, public agents are typically 
paid fixed salaries, generating the possibility that they will have ‘low powered’ incentives 
to implement the formal authority of the law. 175  Responding to the low-powered 
problem of public enforcement, Becker and Stigler suggest addressing this problem by 
rewarding the public enforcers;176 however, as Garoupa and Klerman find, this approach 
can, in turn, create other problems in the context of a rent-seeking government.177 
Furthermore, Frey’s study about the crowing out effect suggests that there are serious 
limits to external intervention whatever their form; individuals guided by their intrinsic 
preferences in some circumstances perform well and an interference from the outside is 
harmful, sometimes vise versa.178 
Second, as mentioned above, public enforcers are prone to capture,179 political 
biases,180 and behavioral failures.181 The agency problem is a chronic disease and 
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difficult to completely overcome.  
Third, reaching a certain threshold in terms of the size and complexity of a 
jurisdiction, the informational benefits of decentralization may weigh more heavily in 
favor of private rather than public enforcement.182 Following this analytical approach, it 
seems that exclusive authorization to public challenge might be a better option for smaller 
jurisdictions on financial grounds, and it is the state that would pay for the deterrence 
through the general tax pool. However, for larger jurisdictions, like China, the United 
States and the EU, a mixture of public and private enforcement systems might be an 
optimal choice. 
3.2.3 A Mixed Approach 
Becker’s seminal study by Becker provides the framework for most formal rational 
choice models. 183 The theoretical idea of—private enforcement—serves as a benchmark 
for the analysis of public legal systems. Becker’s pioneering work was followed by two 
generations of models of private enforcement: 
The first-generation model argues for the substitution of private and public 
enforcement.184 Gerschenkron provided the seminal introduction of this concept in his 
historic criticism of deterministic Marxian models of economic history. It implicitly 
assumes that the two distinct mechanisms function as substitutable institutions, 
potentially able to completely replace each other.185 However, two key differences 
between public and private enforcement may make the “one or the other” paradigm 
impossible. 
First, the quality of information available to the enforcers at different stages and the 
costs of acquiring additional information, as well as verifying it to the court, may vary for 
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public and private enforcers.186  
In many settings private parties have superior information about potential violations 
and the resulting harm inflicted by them. This reasoning has also been used as the main 
rationale for giving standing to sue to the parties harmed by the violation, since they are 
often the ones most likely to have information about the violation and the resulting 
harm.187 However, in some circumstances, like antitrust cases, the recognition of the 
violation of antitrust law is often determined by the “rule of reason,” which compares the 
likely social costs and benefits of the action. A large amount of knowledge required to 
identify antitrust violations is precisely “scientific knowledge” that favors centralized 
public decisions. In addition to the information that is initially available for free, 
additional information may be gathered at a cost, and this cost may be different for public 
and private enforcers. Financing public enforcement by raising taxes may run the risk of 
imposing a deadweight cost on economic activity, but public enforcers have a lower cost 
of information discovery due to the power of the state.188 
Second, public and private enforcers embrace different goals.  
Private enforcers only care about the payoffs based on cost-benefit analysis. A private 
party who sues for damages will take the harm as given and so will not care about the 
deterrence effect of its suit.189 On the other hand, a public agency, which deals with 
violations frequently, may be able to pre-commit to a policy of how to monitor behavior 
and respond to detected violations by announcing guidelines and developing a reputation 
for following them.190 It should be noted that public enforcers are usually portrayed as 
maximizers of social welfare;191  however, in practice the employees of the public 
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agencies may have personal objectives that differ from those of the designer.192 
The second-generation model holds that private enforcement can complement the 
resources and information available to the public and enhances the credibility of legal 
rules present in statues and precedent.193  
Landes and Posner argued that when there are effective private rights of standing in 
the courts, public enforcers lose their monopoly position in law implementation. Without 
discretion, legal rules would be susceptible to over-enforcement, and many actions with 
little social harm would be subject to blackmail by private enforcers as “bounty hunters.” 
However, where public enforcers face budget and information paucity, and victims do not 
have independent access to courts, offences with large social costs may go under-deterred. 
As such, public enforcers often encourage blackmail by using confidential informants and 
leniency programs.194 
Laffont and Martimort did not directly address the problem of private enforcement, 
but they instead emphasized the political difficulties in the implementation of “separation 
of power” strategies. They focused on the internal organization of the government as the 
determinant of the ‘efficient’ allocation of regulatory rights and the design of 
communication channels for the acquisition of costly private information about law 
violation. They assumed that the power to capture the government results from the 
presence of costly and asymmetric information between the regulators and the regulated. 
They showed that a decentralized government is only good if it does not improve the 
communication channels between local state entities and interest groups as opposed to a 
centralized government. This approach stressed that reorganizing regulatory power is not 
feasible when it is optimal from an economic perspective. The presence of asymmetric 
information leads to endogenous political resistance by those who benefit from the status 
quo. In the context of private enforcement, this conjecture provides an explanation for 
                                                      
192 Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Public vs. Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: A Survey (Stanford 
Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 335, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952067.  
193 Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarity, 35 INT’L ECON. 
REV. 657-76 (1994); See Rajabiun, supra note 154. 
194 See Landes & Posner, supra note 155.   
 47 
situations in which formal access rights to private parties exist in legislation, but judges 
and public prosecutors effectively block standing rights by victims.195 There are basically 
three approaches to modeling private enforcement within the Laffont-Martimort 
framework to the study of private enforcement. 
Harart, Martimort and Pouyet contributed to this discussion by distinguishing 
between ex ante regulation and ex post litigation. They presumed that firms have private 
information about their level of risky behavior with respect to third parties, and the role 
of public enforcers is primarily limited to setting the relevant standard of precaution. It 
shows that when the level of precaution by firms that engaged in potentially risky 
activities is imperfectly observable by the public enforcers, high-risk offenders act as if 
the activities would incur few expected costs. Private enforcement thus serves as a form 
of co-insurance against such possible risk behavior by a sub-group of potential offenders 
who are easily able to mask their respected social costs from external observers.196 
Aubert et al. focus on the difference between two alternative methods of motivating 
private enforcers to reveal their valuable information about offences to public agencies. 
Their analysis suggests that reduced fines and leniency are less effective than positive 
rewards or bounties in helping the government acquire information from private parties, 
in particularly in the area of the public enforcement of antitrust laws.197  
Chen offered a third approach by means of depicting private enforcement as a 
“divide and conquer” strategy that allows a state to control the power of a bureaucracy. 
The approach suggests that the availability of effective and open channels generated 
stronger incentives for compliance with the law by the offenders and constrained the 
discretion of mid- and low-level bureaucrats and judges who often protected resourceful 
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perpetrators from detections and sanctions.198 
3.3 Complementarity of Private to Public Enforcement: Economic Theories about 
Antitrust Law Enforcement 
A typical regime of mixed public and private law enforcement is competition laws. 
After World War II, private action against hard-core anticompetitive behavior became the 
principal mechanism for enforcing American antitrust laws.199 Recently, the EU has 
published Green and White Papers to improve private rights of access. However, even in 
the states where locus standi is available to private parties, actual private actions are rare 
except in the U.S.200  
The improvement of private enforcement can theoretically accomplish two somewhat 
opposing goals: deterrence and compensation.201 
If the primary goal is deterrence, then legal reforms should be aimed at increasing the 
willingness of individual victims to sue by improving information about violation, 
overcoming the problems of rational apathy and free-riding, and increasing the expected 
sanctions. How to achieve them? Multiple damages and class action with opt-out 
proceedings may be desired, but passing-on defense may be excluded.202 
On the other hand, if the primary goal is compensation, the damage awards for 
victims should be aligned with the severity of the harm actually suffered; the class action 
would be accompanied by opt-in proceedings enabling the parties who do not explicitly 
express their willingness to partake in the action not bound by a court decision.203 
It is arguably believed that with respect to deterrence, public enforcement is superior 
to its private counterparty;204 however, the literature review in Chapter II also indicates 
the inefficiencies in delegating the enforcement power only to antitrust agencies, be it 
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centralized or decentralized. It thus follows a call for a mixed enforcement paradigm.205 
To speak in detail: 
With respect to access to information, in general, antitrust agencies are specialized in 
the competition regime and have incomparable investigative powers to those of private 
parties.206 However, confronted with the diffuse information about violation and the high 
cost of collecting it, public enforcers have limited capacity to detect anticompetitive 
horizontal agreements and abuse of dominance due to budgetary and political constraints. 
Private enforcers with specific knowledge about the explicit or tacit can tackle this issue 
within a bounty system. However, private parties may fear retaliation and therefore be 
reluctant to file claims;207 besides, the verification of violation before courts is also likely 
to be costly. Well-funded public enforcers with state power may demonstrate particular 
advantage. 
As to enforcement incentives, public enforcers are supposed to start from the social 
welfare without private bias. However, as analyzed above, they may also have the 
distorted incentive to implement competition law in an efficient manner due to budget 
restraints, regulator capture or agency problems. There exists the likelihood in which 
public enforcement may lead to over-deterrence of potentially beneficial business 
actions208  or under-deterrence of more costly practices. 209   Private enforcement is 
obsessed by moral hazard as well. Individual plaintiffs merely base their decision on 
personal cost-benefit analysis. Accordingly, rational apathy occurs when the expected 
payoff is smaller than the expected cost of the trial because of tiny damages, the 
uncertainty of being able to prove infringement or judgment-proof problems. Free-riding 
problems may impede the achievement of the deterrence goal.210 
When speaking of optimal deterrence, in the case of small-damage claims, every 
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victim suffers trivial damage, but the overall harm to society may be very substantial. 
Some consumers may choose to pay supra-competitive price; while others have resorted 
to less desired substitute products or refrained from buying at all (the deadweight-loss 
thus occurs). Given that not all small-damage victims would institute a lawsuit, the 
violators would not actually internalize the full size of externalities caused, and optimal 
deterrence therefore would not be achieved.211 
In brief, more recently scholars have point out that a hybridized enforcement system 
in which private enforcement complements public enforcement, is preferred to purely 
public or private enforcement of antitrust laws.212 
3.4 Structural Determinants of Effective Private Antitrust Enforcement 
An effective private antitrust enforcement system has to rely on appropriate 
institutional design. What’s more, the configuration and intensity of various institutions 
as structural determinants also has to be fine-tuned so as to adapt to the larger political 
and economic context and to strike a dynamic rather than static balance. 
The following are seven key parameters supportive of private antitrust enforcement. 
They draw inspiration from the ideas of former AG van Gerven,213 DG Woods, Sinclair 
and Ashton,214 and European Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kroes,215 all of 
whom provided insightful reflections on the underdevelopment of the private 
enforcement of EU competition rules. 
3.4.1 Independent Judicial Review 
When speaking of private antitrust enforcement as an independent enforcement 
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system vis-à-vis public enforcement, it is noteworthy that the system actually still has to 
rest on a pivotal public institution—the court system. 
A. Functions of judicial review 
Geradin and Petit categorize the functions of judicial review into three types, which 
may remedy three structural flaws of antitrust enforcement from the perspectives of 
fundamental protection of rights, social welfare and accountability.216 
The three functional approaches are as follows: 
1. Functional approach based on rights 
Geradin and Petit argue that scrutiny by independent legal experts is deemed 
necessary to protect core substantive rights, principles and values, because regulatory 
activity inevitably involves elected politicians/appointed bureaucrats supported by 
shifting majorities.217 This watchdog role of the court system is aimed at legislative and 
administrative actions, but with respect to the final goal of right protection, this scenario 
can be extended to the private cause of action against private parties as well. 
According to Geradin and Petit the “rights-based” functional approach to judicial 
review has two variants. 
The first variant bears on fundamental procedural rights. In this case, judicial review 
performed as an instrument ensuring (i) participation in regulatory debates; (ii) 
representativeness of regulatory choices;218 and (iii) full articulation in an adversarial 
process. In an antitrust regime, this implies, for instance, the opportunities for private 
parties to challenge the administrative monopoly, the monopoly of those SOEs, and equal 
and fair treatment of both plaintiffs and defendants. 
A second variant perceives judicial review as a means to protect all fundamental 
values – not only essential procedural values, but also substantive ones – from cyclical 
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majoritarian influence. The court system as a “forum of principle” is expected to guard 
not only the values explicitly expressed in black letter laws, but also all underlying moral 
values of the laws219 through necessary techniques of statutory interpretation. In the field 
of antitrust laws, typical illustrations of those values include general principles of law 
(e.g., legal certainty, proportionality, etc.), as well as fundamental substantive principles 
(e.g., the principle of free and undistorted competition, the freedom of business practice 
etc.). 
2. Functional approach based on outcome 
The “outcome-based” function approach employs social welfare as a benchmark and 
thus primarily draws from two economic functions of judicial review. 
First, judicial review is envisioned to be a “means of error correction” by experts of 
decision-theory frameworks, like Shavell.220 It can realign the flawed decision-making 
by both public players221 and private parties to social welfare. Furthermore, the possible 
sanctions following judicial review or the cost of judicial view itself may act as an 
incentive device on decision-makers, inducing them to craft welfare-enhancing decisions 
for fear of having these decisions struck down, which would result in negative 
consequences on their reputation, monetary benefit, etc.222 Besides, judicial review is 
arguably perceived as a relatively cheaper, and more efficient alternative to other 
error-correction mechanisms as for public players, such as increases of the regulator’s 
resources, ex ante impact assessments, peer review mechanisms, advisory committees, 
etc.223  
Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla have sought to apply Shavell’s findings to the field of 
competition law. They argue that judicial review can greatly contribute to the reduction of 
the likelihood of Type I decisional errors (false convictions) in the competitive 
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assessment of unilateral business practices undertaken by dominant firms. Because Type I 
decisional errors are more likely and costly than Type II decisional errors (false acquittals) 
in competition cases, they support a strong appeal system in this field.224 However, a 
basic premise of their conclusion is that the court is at least as good as the antitrust 
agencies, which is not necessarily true. 
The efficacy of judicial review as a “means of error correction” is also challenged by 
some economists. 225  Still some other scholars doubt courts’ ability to collect the 
information and expertise required to review complicated antitrust issues.226  Those 
concerns are empirically demonstrated by two U.S. academics.227 Moreover, scholars 
have voiced worries about a risk of “ossification” of agency action arising from 
systematic annulments.228 
Second, judicial review is able to establish normative standard, i.e., the rule-making 
role of judiciaries. This may improve efficiency because (i) the normative standards 
ensures the downstream uniformity that can limit transaction costs, lead to economies of 
scale, and eliminate negative legal externalities. In the case of private antitrust 
enforcement, a decentralized enforcement mechanism, the definition of binding 
normative standards in the appropriate court has a positive harmonizing effect throughout 
the jurisdiction; (ii) when review courts affirm binding normative standards, they limit 
the ability of administrative agencies to promote regulatory changes in the future,229 and 
accordingly contribute to legal certainty in rendering the legal environment more durable 
and predictable.230 Legal certainty limits compliance costs because firms do not need to 
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monitor the regulator’s activities on an ongoing basis. However, this advantage of judicial 
review cannot be taken fully utilized in jurisdictions where there is no strong system of 
precedents. 
Everything has two sides and the judicial review’s function of establishing normative 
standards is no exception. First, binding normative standards may prevent regulatory 
experimentation and innovation at downstream levels. Second, in jurisdictions applying a 
strong doctrine of precedent – or, more prosaically, because of statu quo biases – obsolete 
normative standards (for instance, standards that do not reflect the evolution of science) 
may remain in force for unduly long periods of time.231 Here there is indeed a tradeoff 
between the benefit of standards established by precedent and the cost of the persistent 
existence of outdated doctrines. What’s more, the positive economic effects of binding 
normative standards are based on proper dissemination, which means that those legal 
decisions have to be available and informative to ordinary readers. 
3. Functional approach based on accountability 
Judicial review is perceived as an instrument of “good governance” by political 
scientists. In essence, they conceive of the relationship between elected governments and 
independent administrative agencies through the lenses of Principal-Agent theory.232 
This regulatory paradigm, which is predicated on the view that independent and expert 
decisions reach efficient outcomes,233 has been applied in a wide range of sectors 
including the antitrust law regime. However, as indicated in many principal-agent 
scenarios, administrative agencies and their officials may go after sectorial/personal 
interests which is alien to public interest and therefore gives rise to the agency problem. 
This risk stems from the facts that administrative agencies are prone to capture,234 
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political biases,235 and behavioral failures.236 The alienated decisions made by captured 
and incompetent competition authorities are able to negatively influence particular 
private parties in related cases, especially follow-on cases, or private parties in general in 
future cases due to the rule-making role of competition authorities. Thus, a timely and full 
challenge of inappropriate administrative decisions is crucial to private antitrust 
enforcement.  
According to Principal-Agent theory, the agency problem can be defused through 
control mechanisms. However, as far as the antitrust regime is concerned, the 
accountability instruments should not undermine the agencies’ independence. In this 
regard, many political scientist scholars hold that the ex post judicial review is in general 
superior to other instrument, like political or managerial controls237 and can help to 
maintain popular sovereignty. On the one hand, by conveying relevant information about 
government misconduct in a highly public fashion, the courts enable the people to control 
their government in an informed and coordinated manner; on the other hand, by backing 
judicial review with the threat of popular action, the people give the government reason 
to obey the courts.238 More specifically, in political systems fraught with democratic 
deficit, judicial review allegedly enjoys a pivotal accountability function.239 
While judicial review is instrumental to “good governance” in many senses, the 
counterargument is standing beside it. First, judges might also pursue selfish motives or 
be influenced by behavioral biases or other cognitive quirks.240  Second, the very 
existence of a judicial review system may change the incentives of administrative 
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agencies and enhance moral hazards. Anticipating that regulatory mistakes can be 
subsequently rectified, administrative agencies subject to an ex post error correction 
mechanism may indeed be tempted to act carelessly.241 Finally, the courts may not be 
independent and still subject to political control. 
4. Other functions  
Judicial review provides certain psychic benefits to addressees of regulatory 
decisions and the private parties harmed by anticompetitive conduct.242 Knowing that 
they can avail themselves of “a forum of principle,” addressees of decisions will tend to 
view regulatory interventions as more legitimate, and private players of the market will 
make their business judgments with more certainty and confidence.  
Another function of judicial review may be to reach a settlement over issues 
triggering disagreement.243 This function can arguably help to save litigation costs and 
mitigate the tension between both parties, and accordingly is redound to ensure social, 
legal and economic stability. 
In spite of all the merits of independent judicial review, there are two caveats: 
If courts, particular those immediate or grass-roots courts which are the major 
judicial bodies adjudicating the bulk of antitrust related cases in China, are more 
susceptible to capture by regional government or sectoral agencies, the quasi-judicial 
appellate review conducted by units in ministerial or above-ministerial enforcement 
agencies may be superior. 
Presumably enforcement agencies are more specialized than courts, especially when 
general courts are used to handle antitrust cases in countries without a tradition of 
economic analysis.  
B. Importance of judicial review to antitrust regimes 
The general features of an antitrust regime render an effective system of judicial 
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review particularly necessary in this field.244 
1. Antitrust law is susceptible to serious errors 
As a comprehensive legal regime, the field of antitrust involves legal, economic, and 
even political issues. This complexity inevitably entails enforcement errors. 
First, antitrust law is rife of conceptual heterogeneity. The successive development of 
antitrust schools of thoughts, such as the Harvard School,245 the Chicago School,246 and 
the post-Chicago School has created a significant degree of conceptual complexity.247 
Second, there are remarkable evidentiary hurdles due to the complexity of antitrust 
issues and more basically the asymmetry of information. This can be further articulated in 
two scenarios: (i) both public and private parties often encounter “identification 
problems,” when the present antitrust issues involve heavy reliance on ex post 
circumstantial evidence.248 This is true in most cases regarding concerted actions and the 
abuse of the dominance position. (ii) as opposed to the “identification problems” with 
respect to ex post circumstantial evidence, antitrust enforcers also face “speculation 
problem” where ex ante predictions must be formulated for lack of information. Such a 
typical case is merger and acquisition. 
Third, the normative standards are terribly sophisticated. With the limited exception 
of hard core cartels, the application of clear-cut per se rules to common commercial 
practices is definitely inadequate, but the application of economic-based standards raises 
its own difficulties.249 
Fourth, the subject matter of antitrust issues is exploding in the information age on a 
daily basis. This evolution generates a significant challenge for competition enforcers in 
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terms of expertise, monitoring, and procedural efficiency, which may translate into an 
increased risk in decisional errors.250 
Fifth, the cost of errors in antitrust enforcement is relatively high. Antitrust law in 
most jurisdictions provides for chilling sanctions. 251  A decision wrongly banning 
pro-competitive discounts or rebates (Type-I error), for instance, deprives consumers of 
lower prices and creates a price umbrella whose sole effect will be to protect inefficient 
competitors,252 and decisions mistakenly interfering with product design, for instance, by 
preventing efficient forms of product integration or tying, deprive consumers of smaller, 
cheaper and more innovative products. What makes erroneous antitrust decisions 
particularly costly for society is that they do not only affect the recipient of the mistaken 
infringement decision, but also a much larger group of market actors which, as result, 
may refrain from adopting the conduct prohibited by that decision.253 In the case of 
Type-II errors, both competitors and/or consumers may suffer from the conduct that 
should have been prohibited. At worse, the victim of an infringement may simply be 
forced out of the market, with dramatic consequences for society at large; what’s more, 
the harmed final consumers are indeed least likely to claim damages and get recovery. 
Given the very fact that antitrust is prone to costly decisional mistakes, judicial 
review offers a crucially important opportunity to correct the adverse effects of misguided 
decisions on welfare. This goes to the core of the “outcome-based” approach to judicial 
review supported by economists. 
2. Antitrust law may interfere with fundamental rights 
In forbidding firms to trade freely in the market place, competition law seriously 
interferes with individual freedoms, such as, for instance, the freedom of association, 
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ownership of property, and the right to the protection of personal data.254 In many 
countries, those rights are protected by constitutional texts. In addition, they may be 
protected by international instruments, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Individual Freedoms (ECHR) 
The antagonism between competition law and individual freedoms becomes even 
clearer from a procedural standpoint. Competition authorities typically have the right to 
conduct intensive inspections and investigations, and even apply coercive measures to 
obtain the information.255 Private parties also enjoy broad powers during the course of 
the discovery stage, such as asking for various documents and applying for 
preliminary/interim injunctive relief and specific performances.  
In other words, competition law investigations and decisions may be extremely 
intrusive, and thus need to be subject to review to ensure that basic rights of the subject of 
competition law are protected and that abuses of power are redressed. This goes to the 
“rights-based” approach of judicial review. 
3. Antitrust law may not be enforced in the public interest 
It is more likely that the private antitrust enforcement, if not fine-tuned, runs great 
risk of departing from the public interest, given the nature of private enforcers as bounty 
hunters.256  Even in the case of public enforcement, the delegation entrusted to a 
competition authority may not necessarily be exercised in the public interest, mainly 
because the officials in charge of competition enforcement may – as other officials – be 
subject to a variety of biases. 257  To speak in detail, there is perhaps a natural, 
psychological inclination for an official entrusted with investigative duties to search for 
and give greater weight to evidence that supports his or her belief that an infringement 
has occurred. 258  Moreover, even if the antitrust officials are not dishonest or 
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unprofessional, their structure of incentives will often be such that they derive greater 
“value” from the adoption of an infringement decision than, for instance, a decision to 
discontinue an investigation.259  
Therefore, this inherent flaw of antitrust law fits well with the promotion of the 
“good governance” function of judicial review, which is highly valued by political 
scientists. 
3.4.2 Standing to Sue 
The standing to sue (equivalent to locus standi in the EU) is in essence a question 
about “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or 
of particular issues.”260 It could be an effective institutional design to either enhance or 
restrain private antitrust enforcement with the evolvement of antitrust enforcement 
overtime. 
In the United States, the standing to sue in an antitrust action is only granted to the 
parties who have met the general requirements of the Constitution and the laws. Art. III 
requires that a party show particularized injury or otherwise have a sufficient stake in the 
outcome of the dispute,261 while the courts expect to find a close relationship between 
the plaintiff’s injury and the alleged antitrust violation.262 How close is close enough? 
The exploration to define the extent to which the so-called close relationship is 
appropriate is far from easy and clear. The American appellate courts have contributed 
great wisdom in this regard, during their persistent endeavor: 1) the “direct injury” test 
was introduced by the Third Circuit and focused on whether the victim and the antitrust 
violator are separated by intermediate tiers of victim;263 2) the “target area” test was 
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introduced by the Ninth Circuit and requires the plaintiff to “show that he was within that 
area of the economy which was endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in 
a particular industry,” so a person incidentally injured lacked standing to file an antitrust 
action; 264 3) the “zone of interest” test which was introduced by the Sixth Circuit and 
inquires as to whether the plaintiff had properly alleged that the defendant caused his 
injury in fact and ‘whether the interest sought to be protected by the complaint was within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee 
in question;’265 4) the “factual matrix” test which was introduced by the Third Circuit 
and utilized a balancing test comprised of many constant and variable factors in resolving 
Section 4 standing problem; 266  5) and finally the “multi-factor” test which was 
introduced by the Supreme Court267 and was believed to suggest that standing was 
denied only when there was a lack of causal nexus between the plaintiff ’s antitrust 
violation and the plaintiff ’s harm, or when the derivative nature of plaintiff ’s injury 
threatened duplicative recovery.268 
The Sherman Act originally did not deny any of the injured parties by antitrust 
infringement with the standing to sue. The incentive to actualize this right was further 
strengthened by the treble damage provision of the Clayton Act. The first wave of private 
antitrust enforcement was characterized as follow-on actions rolled after the public 
prosecution of a price cartel of electrical equipment manufacturers in the late 1950s. The 
number of those follow-on cases grew steadily in the ensuing decade. 
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Most likely in a response to the gradually booming private antitrust actions, the US 
Supreme Court decided on a landmark case—Hanover Shoe269—in 1968. In its decision, 
the Supreme Court rejected the pass-on defense for fear of undermining deterrence, 
adopted the gross overcharge calculus, but left the likelihood of the standing to sue as for 
the affected parties further down in the production chain.270 
It was the leaked opportunities in Hanover Shoe that allegedly exposed defendants to 
multiple liabilities. This was a concern in relation to rising private actions. Direct 
purchasers were regarded as the more efficient enforcers because they could have access 
to superior information and face lower costs in obtaining the evidence. Meanwhile, the 
complexity of proceedings and proof was thought better reduced by a symmetric 
restriction of the plaintiff’s rights.271 These considerations ultimately led to the related 
Supreme Court ruling in another landmark case, Illinois Brick. In this case, the Supreme 
Court disallowed the offensive use of the pass-on argument and thus established the rule 
that only direct purchasers could maintain the standing to sue in private antitrust actions. 
The combination of Hanover Shoe‘s overcharge and exclusion of the pass-on defense, 
and the Illinois Brick‘s exclusion of the pass-on offense was meant to cool down the then 
heated private cause of actions. However, accompanying them was strong opposition for 
the injustice to those affected indirect purchasers and the rationale behind the two 
decisions.  
When distribution chains widen towards the bottom, the case law established in the 
two cases effectively deprives the majority of victims of their right to compensation, 
whereas arguably the smallest damages occur in the upper layers of the production chain. 
Denying affected parties the right to recover their damages is deemed unfair by many. 
Moreover, there is a concern that direct purchasers may have a decreased incentive to sue 
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when they are able to pass-on a large part or all of their damages. They may also be 
reluctant to sue their direct suppliers in order to not disrupt long-term business 
relationships. Often, direct purchasers are more interested in receiving terms of trade 
similar to those of their rivals than low competitive input prices. Still further, the 
efficiency and deterrence argument of the direct purchaser rule can be undermined by an 
abuse of Illinois Brick in which upstream cartels incorporate their direct purchasers 
tacitly in their collusive arrangements.272 In response to those doubts and concerns, in 
1989, in California v. ARC America,273 the Supreme Court ruled that Illinois Brick did 
not preempt states to allow indirect purchaser suits in State courts under the respective 
State competition statutes, thus leaving the matter to the discretion of the states. 
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have passed so-called Illinois 
Brick-repealer statutes. Thus, only eight states presently adhere to the federal direct 
purchaser rule, two of which lack competition statutes altogether.274 
Other jurisdictions, when importing and enhancing private enforcement mechanisms, 
are very cautious in order to avoid spurious and frivolous suits.275 However, a restrictive 
view of standing would have offended the constitutional status of some competition rules 
and created obstacles to individuals’ reliance on rights derived from a constitutional text. 
As Clifford Jones has explained, EC competition law is in this sense different from US 
antitrust law, and the latter’s prudential mechanisms and its restrictive rules on standing 
cannot be automatically transposed to the EC context.276  Some European scholars 
suggests giving standing to all affected parties in the production chain, and call for a 
centralized consolidation of fragmented individual damage claims. At the same time, they 
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exclude those auxiliary incentive mechanisms such as treble damages, class actions and 
contingency fees, which are likely to result in a culture of litigation soliciting spurious 
cases, extortive settlements and failing compensation.277  
3.4.3 Access to Documentary Evidence 
Given that most of the evidence is usually in the hands of the defendant, uncertainty 
as to the result of an action in court, combined with the risk of having to bear all costs 
that are related to the procedures if one loses the case, is probably one of the main 
reasons why potential plaintiffs decide against going to court, even when they have a 
good case.278 
It is useful to distinguish between the situation where a competition authority has 
already made a decision, finding an infringement of the antitrust rules, and the situation 
where that is not the case. In the former situation, the plaintiff subsequently starts 
proceedings before a national court in order to be compensated for the damage. It is the 
typical follow-on action. Here the issue is one of being able to rely on the decision of the 
competition authority as evidence of the infringement.  
With regard to Commission decisions, in the EU, the Court of Justice came to the 
plaintiff’s aid by declaring in the Masterfoods case279 that a national court cannot make a 
decision which runs counter to the Commission’s decision. This has been codified in 
Regulation 1/2003.280 The plaintiff could thus use the Commission decision finding an 
infringement to stand as evidence of the violation. The EU competition officials also have 
considered furthering and applying the Masterfoods case law to decisions of National 
Competition Authorities (NCA).  
In the US, it is already widely admitted that the convenience and expedience of 
follow-on cases relative to stand-alone cases are heavily dependent on the knowledge of 
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public enforcement and the availability of relevant documents from government agencies. 
Information regarding antitrust litigations and investigations, in line with the transparency 
principle in the United States, can be traced on the official websites of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).281 
3.4.4 Contingency Fee 
There are generally two sources of risks: the risk of not winning a costly lawsuit and 
the risk of other potential plaintiffs free riding (a collective action problem). Abating the 
two concerns is one of the key factors to stimulate private enforcement. A contingency 
fee can solve the second concern and reduce the first concern.  
In the mechanism of a contingency fee, instead of receiving a direct payment from 
the clients, the attorney, if successful, receives a portion of the award. It is regarded as 
one of the driving forces, among others, of private antitrust enforcement. The attorneys, 
in particular those who sue a defendant on behalf of a group of private individuals in 
class actions, are called “private attorney general”.  
On the one hand, a contingency fee is welcome because it, to a great extent, helps the 
injured parties who cannot afford legal service have access to justice;282 on the other 
hand, it is criticized by many for resulting in the inflation of private litigations.283 
Empirical studies indicate that even in cases where the courts engage in the lodestar 
calculation (the product of reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate), the client’s 
recovery generally explains the pattern of awards better than the lodestar.284 The US 
Supreme Court is currently thinking about the reformulation of the private attorney 
general model and is allegedly placing more reliance on government enforcers.285 In 
Europe, contingency fees are not allowed in some Member States (MS) and are regulated 
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in others;286 at the EU level, it is an area that has not been harmonized. 
3.4.5 One-Way Fee-Shifting 
One-way fee-shifting is another mechanism directly aiming at resolving the financial 
problems encountered by impoverished plaintiffs.  
U.S. statutes entitle prevailing plaintiffs to recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees. Fee shifting is asymmetric; a successful defendant cannot recover its legal fees from 
the plaintiff. Compared to other jurisdictions, the rules of procedure in the U.S. courts 
more readily permit the prosecution of private antitrust cases on behalf of entire classes 
of injured parties. The relatively greater likelihood of obtaining the certification of a class 
in the U.S. can strengthen the position and magnify the negotiation power of the plaintiff 
in private suits.287 
However，Kaplow argues that relying on higher damage awards is more efficient than 
shifting plaintiffs' fees, because fee shifting is more valuable for plaintiffs with higher 
litigation costs. Thus, it is possible to substitute higher damage awards for fee shifting in 
a manner that leaves deterrence unaffected while eliminating the suits of plaintiffs with 
the highest litigation costs. However, this proposal still runs the risk of over-deterrence,288 
and moreover, the situation would be more complex when considering who effectively 
bears these costs, the lawyer or plaintiff, and their risk aversion degree. 
3.4.6 Punitive Damage 
The size of the award is the design parameter that determines both the litigation 
incentives of plaintiffs and the deterrence effect on perpetrator.289  
Imposing penalties in excess of actual harm may be needed to deter actions that have 
a low probability of detection, and it is optimal to impose very high penalties for actions 
that are never socially beneficial. The Competition Commissioner of EU once 
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commented that though most MSs exclude damages which go beyond what is necessary 
to compensate the victims for the losses they have suffered, she did think the EU needed 
debate on how to create appropriate incentives for victims to go to court; in this case, 
damages which go beyond pure compensation may be a necessary tool in this respect. 
Punitive damage can remedy under-deterrence problems deriving from 
under-enforcement due to dispersed damages that may not meet the litigation costs and 
prevent the unjust enrichment of the perpetrators.290  
For actions that are easily observed and whose legality is determined by the “rule of 
reason,” punitive damages would offer excessive deterrence – i.e., deter some socially 
desirable actions.291 Also, treble damages or any damage multiplier that is not responsive 
to the actual external effects of the perpetrator’s actions, e.g., harm to consumers who did 
not buy due to relatively high price, pass-on to downstream buyers, etc., would not 
provide optimal deterrence incentives.  
Another problem with punitive damages is that they could attract nuisance lawsuits 
in antitrust, unless some form of decoupling takes place. But decoupling has problems of 
its own.292 
However, when punitive damage is put into a larger picture, and associated with 
other structural parameters, different opinions regarding the nature and effect of punitive 
damage may arise. For instance, some scholars doubt if the U.S. antitrust “treble” damage 
is in fact single damage, given unavailability of pre-judgment interest, effects of the 
statute of limitations, plaintiff’ attorney’s fees and costs, and costs to the judicial system 
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in handling antitrust cases.293 
3.4.7 Class Action 
When anticompetitive behavior occurs in an upstream industry, the antitrust injury 
inflicted further down in the production chain is widely dispersed. Often each of these 
widespread individual damages does not amount to a sufficiently large claim to overcome 
the legal expenses in bringing the case to court. This is particularly the case for end 
consumers. But one thing is for sure: a private enforcement system which disables or 
even discourages end consumers from bringing actions for damages is unacceptable, 
because it would fly against the very reason of having competition rules in the first 
place.294 Every effort should therefore be made to design a system that protects the 
genuine interests of the final consumer without imposing a disproportional burden on the 
defendant. In that context, intuitional designs such as class actions and the like are 
deemed noteworthy possibilities.295 
Accompanying the advantages and desirability of class action are the concerns. 
First, the US style class action, coupled with pre-trial discovery and contingency fees, 
have led to excesses.296 They can result in blackmailing and the extortion of huge sums 
by class action lawyers from companies that wish to avoid the costs and uncertainties of 
protracted litigations.297 Accordingly, in Green Paper, it is stressed that ‘the ultimate 
objective should be to foster a competition culture, not a litigation culture.’298 
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The second concern is whether private enforcement would contradict public enforcement. 
This concern is most obvious with a leniency program, namely, whether a leniency 
program becomes less effective as an anti-cartel device when private rights grow more 
powerful. A central aim of competition policy is to achieve optimal deterrence. 
Augmenting leniency mechanisms and strengthening private rights of action are 
alternative or complementary means for increasing a firm's incentives to comply with a 
prohibition against cartels. Leniency increases the probability that misconduct will be 
detected, and strong private rights to recover damages increase the likelihood that 
misconduct will be prosecuted and, more importantly, raises the severity of the sanctions 
to be imposed upon wrongdoers beyond any punishment obtained by the public 
prosecutor. To date, no researcher has assembled the data to show which 
strategy—increasing detection or boosting sanctions—has a greater effect in spurring 
compliance.299 However, in order to ameliorate the problem of coordinating the disparate 
array of public and private enforcers, some scholars have proposed classing antitrust 
claims on a mandatory basis, vesting the enforcement license initially to the public 
enforcer. The latter then auctions the private license to enforce the class action; the 
auction proceeds are deposited with and distributed by the court for compensatory 
purposes, and finally the public enforcer can option to buy back the private license at the 
winning bid price.300 Nevertheless, it is also admitted that from the administration of the 
actual auction to the political feasibility of mandatory-litigation class actions, to the 
operation of the buyback option, there would be growing pains as this nascent idea has 
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3.5 Review of Current Antitrust Enforcement in China and Evaluation of 
Challenges  
3.5.1 Current Antitrust Enforcement in China  
A. Public enforcement: fledgling and cautious 
Three years have passed since the AML was promulgated. Two key words, in my 
opinion, can largely characterize public enforcement: fledgling and cautious. 
The fledging side has presented itself in the following four aspects. 
First, the enforcement authorities are still in the process of exploring an appropriate 
position. The AML provides for two parties with complementary roles to handle AML 
work: the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC) and the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement 
Authorities (ALEA). There are three separate government players appointed as the ALEA 
whose prior responsibilities overlapped with the designated new responsibilities in the 
framework of the AML: the MOFCOM who is in charge of merger review, the SAIC who 
is responsible for non-price-related anti-competitive practices, and the NDRC who takes 
care of price-related anti-completive conducts. However, all three agencies are 
comprehensive administration departments with multiple tasks, and in the beginning, 
there were no detailed requirements of the very units that take charge of antitrust 
enforcement. So there existed great variance in terms of status of the enforcement units. 
In the MOFCOM, the enforcement unit is the Anti-Monopoly Bureau; in the SAIC, the 
enforcement unit is Anti-Monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau, an 
equivalent of the counterparty in MOFCOM; although the NDRC is dubbed “small State 
Council,”301 at first the enforcement unit was the Anti-Price-Monopoly Bureau of the 
Department of Price Supervision, a unit lower than the counterparties in the MOFCOM 
and SAIC. In July 2011, the Department of Price Supervision was lifted and renamed the 
Department of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly. 
Second, there is still manpower shortage. The official disclosure regarding the 
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resources of the enforcement authorities is very sparse, but anecdotal information 
indicated that the enforcement agencies are still understaffed three years after the 
adoption of the AML. The Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM is staffed with thirty or 
so people and is alleged to own the largest and most competent staff in terms of education 
background;302 there are about nine staff members taking care of anti-monopoly issues in 
the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of the SAIC. The 
Department of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly of the NDRC initially was only 
staffed by only three people, including the head of the Bureau, but after the lifting of the 
anti-price-monopoly division, an additional twenty people will be added, and the total 
number is expected to reach forty-six.303  
A note is that as per the AML, the enforcement powers belong to the agencies at the 
central government, but a case-by-case or general devolution to regional agencies is 
allowed. And after years of enforcement of Price Law and Anti-unfair Competition Law, 
a relatively large and specialized enforcement force has been established at the regional 
level. For instance, the Deputy Director General of the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair 
Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC at the 2011 Forum on Anti-Monopoly Civil 
Litigation in China noted that there are approximately 79, 000 people doing 
anti-monopoly and anti-unfair competition work nation-wide. A number of special work 
groups have been established at the provincial level, and training is broadly conducted.304 
The MOFCOM and NDRC have local branches as low as the municipal or county level 
and a large regional enforcement force as well. So for the time being, the established 
regional enforcement forces are playing an important supplemental role to make turn the 
AML from a law in a book to a law in action.305 
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Third, path dependence exists, so the enforcement transition from Price Law and 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law to the AML may take some time. The Price Law and 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law were respectively promulgated in 1998 and1993, and their 
enforcement bodies include central and local agencies. In the past ten to fifteen years 
before the adoption of the AML, the enforcement agencies have accumulated a wealth of 
experience and human capital and made some achievements in combating 
anti-competitive practices. For example, the price cartel established by instant noodle 
companies was smashed by the NDRC pursuant to Price Law in 2007.306 From 1995 to 
2005, the SAIC have concluded 5643 industrial monopolization cases that involved 
public utilities, railways, insurance, telecommunications, postal service, banks, tobacco, 
petroleum, and salt industries, as well as 519 cases regarding regional protectionism.307 
As admitted by officials of the SAIC and NDRC, given the overlap of the AML and Price 
Law as well as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the enforcement inertia is inevitable 
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and devolution of enforcement powers may happen often to exploit the established 
human capital and mitigate the shortage of manpower at the central level. As mentioned 
above, the limited enforcement records have reflected the deep involvement of local 
forces. But this also means that the mismatch of resources and demands can delay the 
broad implementation of the AML. 
Fourth, the enactment of implementing rules is still in process and their guidance 
value has to be honed by enforcement actions. After the long-waited AML came into 
being, it remained basically dormant except for merger review in large part because of the 
delayed adoption of the implementing rules. In late 2010, five AML-related implementing 
rules were promulgated by the NDRC and SAIC.308 Several drafts of each of the Rules 
mentioned above were published by the NDRC and SAIC during 2009 and 2010, and 
those drafts were the subject of extensive consultation between the antitrust agencies and 
the business sector, lawyers and academics. These consultation processes are generally 
regarded as having been very productive, with some significant improvements being 
made to each of the Rules in terms of their alignment with assessment and enforcement 
methodology in mature antitrust regimes before their finalization.309 Even so, it was 
reflected that the new information and explanation provided in the Rules does not offer as 
much practical guidance as their counterparts in mature antitrust regimes, such as the U.S. 
and the EU, so the true scope and impact of many of the AML behavioral prohibitions is 
only likely to become clearer once the SAIC and NDRC begin enforcement of these rules. 
At this point, two proposed interim measures are still in the gestation stage: the Interim 
Measures for Evidence Collection of The Suspected Anti-competitive Concentration of 
Enterprises That Do Not Meet the Application Threshold (exposure draft) and the Interim 
                                                      
308 They are Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly, Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly Administrative Law Enforcement 
Procedures, Rules on Industry and Commerce Authorities’ Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, Rules on Industry and 
Commerce Authorities’ Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market Position, and Rules on Industry and Commerce 
Authorities’ Prohibiting Abuse of Administrative Powers to Exclude or Restrict Competition.  
309 Enhanced Antitrust Enforcement Expected in China as Long-awaited Anti-Monopoly ‘Implementing Rules’ 
Finalized, http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=10280&nid=6.  
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Measures for Investigation of Unapproved Enterprises Concentration (exposure draft).310 
Among them, the first draft rule finished its request-for-comments more than two years 
ago but is still in fermentation. The absence of implementing rules has left the antitrust 
authorities silent in the face of the merger wave of SOEs triggered by the economic 
meltdown.311  
When speaking of the cautiousness of the young public enforcers, the most obvious 
indication is the sparse reported enforcement actions. Except the recent visible actions of 
the public enforcers at telecommunication companies and pharmaceutical firms,312 the 
past three years of reported enforcement has been so sparse that it may be ignorable. Of 
course, the absence of the rigid information disclosure requirement is an important reason 
for the silence of the public enforcers, except the MOFCOM, because art. 30 requires the 
ALEA to publicize the decision on concentration in a timely manner, and as mentioned 
above, the MOFCOM has more human resources. 313  As for other anti-monopoly 
enforcement, art. 44 only render a general requirement for disclosure.314 Consequently, 
there is a steady increase of the caseload of merger review, 315  but the reported 
enforcement with respect to collusive agreement and abuse of the dominant position is so 
scarce that when the so-called “first heavy anti-monopoly penalty” was issued, many 
media, including the state-run mainstream media mistook it as the first anti-monopoly 
                                                      
310 关于对未达申报标准涉嫌垄断的经营者集中证据收集的暂行办法（征求意见稿）[Interim Measures for 
Evidence Collection of The Suspected Anti-competitive Concentration of Enterprises That Do Not Meet the Application 
Threshold (draft for comments)], MOFCOM.COM.CN, Jan. 19, 2009, available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/200901/20090106010097.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); 未依法申报经营者
集中调查处理暂行办法（征求意见稿）[Interim Measures for Investigation of Unapproved Enterprises Concentration 
(draft for comments)], MOFCOM.COM.CN, June 13, 2011, available at 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/as/201106/20110607595564.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
311 张向东, 《反垄断法》介入央企重组 [Zhang Xiangdong, The AML Intervened in The Restructuring of The Central 
SOEs], EARTH BIWEEKLY, NOV. 2009, available at http://paper.people.com.cn/dd/html/2009-11/16/content_407788.htm 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
312 See Zhang, supra note 303; see also supra note 22. 
313 Art. 30 of the AML stipulates that where the Anti-Monopoly Authority  decides to prohibit a concentration or 
attaches restrictive conditions on concentration, it shall publicize such decisions to the general public in a timely 
manner.  
314 Art. 44 of the AML stipulates that where the Anti-Monopoly Authority  decides that a monopolistic conduct is 
constituted after investigating and verifying a suspicious monopolistic conduct, it shall make a decision on how to deal 
with the monopolistic conduct, and publicize it. 
315 张斌, 反垄断立案数量猛增 商务部称外资进入并未趋严 [Zhang Bin, Accepted Cases Are Soaring; MOFCOM 
Denied Tightened Control of Foreign Investment]，EEO.COM.CN, Jan. 31, 2011, 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/Politics/beijing_news/2011/01/31/192714.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
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penalty.316  
Another indication of the cautious attitude of the public enforcers is that they are 
walking a thin line when dealing with administrative monopolies.  
Regarding the price-related anti-competitive behavior, before the first heavy fine was 
issued, it was speculated that it would go to the two state-owned telecommunication 
companies, China Telecom and China Unicom due to their squeezing out practices.317 
The investigation of the two national giants started early this year allegedly responded to 
a complaint filed by China Tietong and other internet service providers,318 and a vice 
director heading the Anti-Price-Monopoly Department in the NDRC gave a high-profile 
interview condemning the suspicious anti-competitive practices of the two 
telecommunication companies.319 In any event, while the chaotic discussions involving 
interest groups from different industry lines were going wild, 320  a complicated 
investigation process is still on-going and no decision has yet been made.321  
Historically the NDRC was very benign to the price monopoly of SOEs. For example, 
TravelSky Technology Limited (TravelSky,中航信) is the only provider of information 
technology solutions for China’s air travel and tourism industries, a top player in China’s 
                                                      
316 700万！发改委首开反垄断罚单[Seven Million Yuan! The First Antitrust Ticket by the NDRC], CHINA DAILY, Nov. 
15, 2011, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/zgjj/2011-11-15/content_4369641.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2012).  
317 涉嫌打压竞争对手 电信联通或领首张反垄断罚单[Suspicious of Squeezing out Competitors; China Telecom 
And China Unicom May Receive The First Antitrust Ticket], CHINA.COM.CN, Nov. 10, 2011, 
http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-11/10/content_23875775.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). For a collection 
of news about the underlying political economy of this case and contentions between different interest groups, see 中
国电信与联通遭反垄断调查 [The China Telecom and China Unicom Have Encountered Anti-monopoly 
Investigation], PEOPLE. NET, http://tc.people.com.cn/GB/183743/190818/234393/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2012).  
318 工信部望铁通取消此对电信联通的举报 广电总局称应彻查[Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
Anticipates That China TieTong Can Withdraw Complaint against China Telecom And China Unicom; State 
Administration of Radio Film and Television Insisted A Thorough Investigation], CAIJING.COM.CN, Nov. 22, 2011, 
http://industry.caijing.com.cn/2011-11-22/111433310.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
319涉嫌打压竞争对手 电信联通或领首张反垄断罚单[Suspicious of Squeezing out Competitors; China Telecom And 
China Unicom May Receive The First Antitrust Ticket], CHINA.COM.CN, Nov. 10, 2011, 
http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-11/10/content_23875775.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
320 For a collection of news about the underlying political economy of this case and contentions between different 
interest groups, see supra note 317, “The China Telecom and China Unicom Have Encountered Anti-monopoly 
Investigation.” 
321See Zhang, supra note 303. 
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air ticket distribution market with a market share of 97 per cent,322 and has major 
shareholders such as China Southern Airlines Group Corporation, China Eastern Air 
Holding Co., China National Aviation Holding Company, and China TravelSky Holding 
Company.323 In 2009, it changed the air ticket discount calculation system allegedly in 
line with international practices, and therefore was suspected of manipulating the price of 
air tickets; 324  subsequently, in 2010, TravelSky acted with China Air Transport 
Association (CATA) to ban unapproved third-party “plug-in” ticket agencies. TravelSky 
stated that the actions were to “maintain the order of airline ticketing and to protect 
consumer interests.” However, hundreds of thousands of affected “black agencies” soon 
built a coalition, collectively complaining that the action was aimed at protecting the 
TravelSky monopoly in a general distribution system for tickets of all domestic airlines 
except Spring Airlines,325 and threated to keep the possibility to appeal to court with 
anti-monopoly charge. In the first case, it was reported that the NDRC began 
investigating the many allegations of price fixing that were bought against TravelSky the 
first time, and then turned their investigation to the role played by Air China after 
learning that similar actions were happening there as well. About five months later, the 
controversial air ticket pricing system eventually collapsed allegedly under the pressure 
of the NDRC. But the NDRC has never made any open statement regarding the 
investigation process and final result. Exactly as already forecasted by an unknown 
insider of the civil aviation system, the whole story ended up with nothing definite.326 In 
the second case, the AML enforcement agencies did not vocalize their concerns when 
                                                      
322 Wang Biqiang, China's Anti-monopoly Law: One Year On, EEO.COM.CN, Nov. 10, 2009, 
http://eeo.com.cn/ens/Politics/2009/11/10/155247.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
323 Shareholder Structure, http://www.travelsky.net/cn/tzzgx/gpxx/gqjg/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
324 机票上涨有悖反垄断法 民航垄断公司疑幕后推手 [Inflation of The Flight Fare Is Not Consistent with The AML; 
State-owned Airlines Are Susceptive of Fixing Prices], PEOPLE.NET, April 21, 2009, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/9164609.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
325 The Spring Airlines is the first privately-owned airline in China. 
326 揭秘中航信操纵机票涨价内幕 发改委介入调查[Uncovering The Air Ticket Manipulation by TravelSky; NDRC 
Has Started Investigation], IFENG.COM, May 19, 2009, http://finance.ifeng.com/air/hkyw/20090519/679969.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012); See Wang, supra note 322; Liao Jiehua, Controversial Air Ticket Pricing System Collapses, 
EEO.COM.CN, Sep. 22, 2009,  http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/Politics/2009/09/22/152023.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 
2012).  
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facing a spate of antitrust charges of the TravelSky. Other regulatory agencies, such as the 
National Audit Office (NAO), Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), and 
CATA intervened but did not touch on competition issues.327 A further note is that in the 
first case, it was reported that the airlines also confessed that it was very hard to keep the 
price cartels even without government intervention, and in the second case, although the 
TravelSky had made a strong push for its own ticketing platform LinkSky, it was not 
operating in good shape due to the lack of competence.328  
Immediately after the promulgation of the AML, the teeth of merger review has been 
pulled out by the combination of China Unicom and China Netcom, two leading 
state-owned telecommunication companies. The two national champions went through all 
merger procedures without notifying the MOFCOM.329 Ever since then, rarely any 
information is reported about merger review on any of SOEs. 330  With regard to 
non-price-related anti-competitive behaviors, no solid case involving SOEs and 
department of the central government or subnational government has been prosecuted by 
the SAIC. A source close to the State Council explained “how can a bureau-level law 
regulator possibly oversee a ministerial-level CEO?”331   
However, some encouraging signs are starting to emerge. For instance, the fact that 
China Eastern Airlines’ proposed acquisition of Shanghai Airlines was first reviewed by 
the MOFCOM, as required by the AML, is a sign that companies are beginning to pay 
                                                      
327姜虹, 中航信清理门户引发口水战 国家审计署介入[Jiang Hong, The Ban of Unapproved Third-party ‘Plug-in’ 
Ticket Agencies Triggered War of words; State Auditing Administration Stepped in], SINA.COM.CN, July 23, 2010, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100723/00038348424.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
328 刘伟勋, 机票销售平台回击中航信：独家垄断制约民航发展[Liu Weixun, Ticket Sales Platforms Fought back: 
Monopoly Is to Restraint The Development of Civil Aviation], EEO.COM.CN, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/industry/shipping/2010/07/21/176154.shtml  (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
329 联通网通合并涉嫌违反《反垄断法》 商务部证实[MOFCOM Affirmed That The Merger of China Unicom and 
China Netcom Is Suspicious of Violating The AML], STOCK STAR.COM, May 1, 2009, 
http://finance.stockstar.com/SS2009050130031348_1.shtml  (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
330 Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the SOEs are de facto immune from merger review, because 1) there 
is a relatively high threshold for review application and there are not so many large-scale companies in China, 2) the 
central government is getting more serious about antitrust enforcement which is signaled by the launch of the 
investigation of the two national telecommunication companies, and 3) even if the SOEs want to circumvent antitrust 
block, they may exploit the inter-agency bargaining without flagrant disregard of the public enforcers.  
331 See Wang, supra note 322. 
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more attention to the AML. 332 
In sum, public enforcement in China has been impeded by inter-agency struggle and 
a lack of resources, manpower, and experience, which substantially influenced their 
enforcement incentive and capacity. Looking from the two non-merger cases that public 
enforcers have handled, they do rely heavily on information provided by private players 
in a given industry. Meanwhile, enforcement agencies have also indicated their 
informational and financial advantages in the post-complaint stage. 
B. Private enforcement: ambitious and handicapped  
Notwithstanding its awful ambiguity,333 art. 50 of the AML has made possible 
private participation of the “economic constitution” in the form of private civil 
litigation.334 Subsequently, the work on judicial interpretation of civil litigation started in 
2009, and the draft interpretation came out for public comment in April 2011.335 
Unfortunately, now it is still fermenting. 
Perhaps it is because Chinese people have suffered enough from decades of 
exploitation by monopolies, the media have drawn too beautiful a picture of the 
post-AML era, and the great complexity of the AML has been overly simplified. At least 
ten private litigations were instituted in about one year after the promulgation of the 
AML,336 and roughly 43 cases as of 2010. Anecdotal information showed that one 
                                                      
332 See Wang, supra note 322. 
333 Art. 50 of AML provides that: “where the monopolistic conduct of an undertaking has caused losses to another 
person, it shall bear civil liabilities according to law” without modest clarification about how to implement. For more 
discussions, see易有禄,《反垄断法》第 50 条之司法适用与立法完善[J]甘肃政法学院学报，2009 (5) [Youlu Yi, The 
Judicial Application and Legislative Improvement of Art. 50 of The Anti-Monopoly Law, 5 J. GANSU INST. POL. SCI. & L. 
90 (2009)]. 
334 China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Commission in Force, XINHUA NETWORK, July 16, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/16/content_8553183.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
335最高人民法院关于审理垄断民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的规定（征求意见稿）[Supreme People’s Court’s 
Regulations on Application of Law in Antitrust Civil Litigations (draft for comments)], CHINACOURT.ORG, April 26, 
2011, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/201104/26/449182.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); see 
news about the invitation for public comments: 最高法就反垄断民事诉讼司法解释公开征求意见[Supreme People’s 
Court Called for Public Comments as for the Judicial Interpretation of Anti-monopoly Civil Litigation], LEGAL DAILY, 
April 25, 2011, available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2011-04/25/content_2619461.htm?node=20908 (last visited Mar. 25, 
2012).  
336 See Wang, supra note128.  
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plaintiff has won the case,337 regardless of the vagueness of provision and the absence of 
a more enabling judicial interpretation.338 This absolute number is not large, but it is 
impressive enough for a young and transitional antitrust regime, relative to many major 
economies in their parallel period and many other new transitional regimes.  
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337 A talk by Zhu Li, a Supreme People’s Court judge, at the 2011 Forum on Anti-monopoly Civil Litigation in China.  
338 See supra note 19. 
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Source: 王斗斗，两年受理反垄断民事诉讼仅 10件 [Wang Doudou, Only Ten Ant-Monopoly 
Civil Cases Were Accepted in Two Years]，LEGAL DAILY, Aug. 30, 2010, at 05, available at 
http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/PDF/20100830/05.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
Note: Cases 9 and 10 in the news were in fact the same case, so I j only list it once in the table. 
 
Examination of the publicized cases and interviews with the litigants, lawyers and 
judges of the cases indicate that private enforcement in China at this point has the 
following characteristics: 
Entities with governmental backgrounds are among the ones that were first targeted 
and likely to be the major potential targets in the future. Among the publicized ten cases, 
two defendants are state-owned telecommunication companies, one is a leading national 
bank, one an insurance association of a provincial level metropolis, yet another a 
corporation which was formerly a government-affiliated institution. 339  We cannot 
conclude that entities with government backgrounds have constituted the bulk of the 
defendants given the poorly implemented information disclosure of the courts,340 but 
considering the record of the publicized cases and public resentment of the entrenched 
administrative monopoly, those entities are expected to be a major potential target for 
private bounty hunters.341 
Another large body of defendants is IT firms, or more precisely, internet-related firms, 
which were defendants of four out of the ten publicized cases. Baidu, a leading search 
engine company in China, was the defendant in two cases, the defendant in the other two 
                                                      
339 See Wang, supra note128. 
340 There is no reliable case reporting system in China, so the exact number of such lawsuit is unknown. See裁判文书
上网为何“雷声大雨点小”[Why There Is No Substantial Improvement on Court Decision Online Disclosure], XINHUA 
NETWORK, April 13, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-04/13/content_11175475.htm (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012).   
341 潘洪其, 破除行政垄断“软权力”还需动大手术[Pan Hongqi, A Big Operation Is Need to Smash Administrative 
Monopolies], CHINANEWS. COM, Nov. 11, 2011, available at http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/11-11/3454541.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
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cases were Shanda Interactive Entertainment Limited and Shanghai XuanTing 
Entertainment Information Technology Co., LTD, and Verisign Digital Service 
Technology Co., LTD and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. It 
is not surprising that in the private sectors, IT firms have been challenged ahead of others 
due to the young stage of most private firms, which are just not big enough to possess any 
significant market power, as will be discussed below. The officials of SAIC charged with 
anti-unfair competition and anti-monopoly issues also disclosed that in the near future the 
enforcement focus of the SAIC is going to be the information, communication, internet 
industry, and software industries.342 
On the plaintiffs’ side, the plaintiffs of the cases involving entities with government 
backgrounds are usually end consumers; while for cases with private firms as defendants, 
their plaintiffs are usually competitors or downstream firms. If we, at this point, assume 
that the AML were correctly read by the judges in those cases,343 the accused practices in 
the consumer-versus-firm cases are all about the abuse of dominance in the form of 
exploitative conduct, typically excessive pricing, which exploits “other market 
participants without directly affecting the structure of the market.” Despite that, it is 
doubtful that excessive pricing is covered by the AML, since in line with the 
exclusion-focused paradigm of the U.S. and EU,344 the Chinese AML has focused on 
exclusionary practices as well through the non-exhaustive list in art. 17 and the general 
                                                      
342张维, 工商总局官员就 3Q大战引发法律问题表态 将加强有效监管 [Zhang Wei, SAIC Official Expressed 
Opinions on Legal Issues Arising from The Battle between QQ and Qihoo360: Effective Regulations Would Be 
Strengthened], LEGAL DAILY, May 9, 2011, available at 
http://www.dzwww.com/rollnews/news/201105/t20110509_7169101.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
343 Wentong Zheng, China’s First Court Decision under the Anti-Monopoly Law: A Misreading of the Law?, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/10/chinas-first-court-decision-under-the-antimonopoly-law-a
-misreading-of-the-law.html. (suspecting that some judges as well as the litigants and their attorneys have misread the 
AML for lack of relative legal and economic knowledge) 
344 In fact, there has not appeared to be a clear boundary between exploitative and exclusionary conduct, the two 
readily recognized abuses of dominance, because some practices, such as exclusive dealing, tying, and price 
discrimination, could be used to both exclude competitors, and to exploit customers. Essentially the U.S. and the EU 
have approached the two types of abuses in a different way. The American antitrust laws have largely focused on 
exclusionary conduct and refrained from attacking purely exploitative conduct such as excessive pricing; in contrast, 
the EU competition law, TFEU art. 102, explicitly targets exploitative conduct. Nevertheless, actions against purely 
exploitative conduct by the EU competition commission are also very rare, and communication by European 
Commission’s official indicated that the Commission’s enforcement priorities in the abuse-of-dominance area focus on 
exclusionary conduct. See Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, 
and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L 643, 633-34 (2010). 
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provision of art. 6.345 The accused practices in the firm-versus-firm cases are usually 
exclusionary in nature. 
Test cases are an important factor for the first filed cases. Three plaintiffs are lawyers 
themselves with no specialty in competition issues. Among them, two are well-known 
weiquan lawyers, or rights-protection lawyers,346 and one of them represented the first 
AML-related administrative case base that was lodged on the first day of the AML 
coming into effect. Weiquan lawyers are those who advocate interests that are larger than 
those of their immediate clients.347 Challenging the entrenched monopolistic conduct is 
only a part of their right fighting actions. They selected telecommunication companies as 
their target because they themselves are the victims of the exploitative conduct of the 
national champions. 348  As opposed to ordinary victims, years of experience have 
informed the Weiquan lawyers that their cases are more like an alarm to both consumers 
and the monopolists that a potential weapon is now in place, and regardless of their true 
incentive and the merits of the case from an antitrust technical point of view, their cases 
help to test the water of the robustness of the antitrust regime in China.  
The economic incentive to seek relief is weak. The litigants have to go through 
                                                      
345 Art. 17 provides that a business operator with dominant market position shall not abuse its dominant market 
position to conduct following acts: 
(1). Selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low prices; 
(2). Selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause; 
(3). Refusing to trade with a trading party without any justifiable cause; 
(4). Requiring a trading party to trade exclusively with itself or trade exclusively with a designated business 
operator(s) without any justifiable cause; 
(5). Tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading without any justifiable cause; 
(6). Applying dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to counterparties with equal standing; 
(7). Other conducts determined as abuse of dominant position by the Anti-Monopoly Authority under the State 
Council. 
For the purpose of this law, “dominant market position” refers to a market position held by a business operator 
having the capacity to control the price, quantity, or other trading conditions of commodities in relevant market, or to 
hinder or affect any other business operator to enter the relevant market.  
Art. 6 provides that any business with a dominant position may not abuse that dominant position to eliminate, or restrict 
competition.  
346 Weiquan literally means "rights protection." Weiquan is the term now typically used in China to identify the type of 
legal activities commonly referred to in the West as "cause lawyering" or public interest legal work. See Hualing Fu & 
Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest 
Lawyering, 59 CHINA J.111, 111 fn 1 (2008).  
347 Id.  
348 朱雨晨, 反垄断诉讼第一案原告李方平：我为什么告网通 [Zhu Yuchen, Plaintiff of the First Anti-monopoly 
Civil Litigation: Why Do I sue China Netcom], 21CN.COM, Sep. 21, 2008, 
http://news.21cn.com/zhuanti/domestic/fanlongduan/2008/09/21/5226197.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
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various impediments to institute a case, if possible at all, which may range from the 
bureaucracy of judges, difficulties in the production of evidence, 349  and financial 
constraints. In particular, the non-technical hurdles due to the sensitivity of the 
defendant’s status, such as national champions, have further complicated the case.350 On 
the other hand, there is no special rule about damages available, so even if the plaintiff 
wins the case, the benefits could hardly cover the cost, not to mention that the winning 
ratio is fairly low at this point. 
3.5.2 Major Challenges Encountered by Private Enforcers 
The ambiguity and lack of implementing rules indicates that on the 
rule-implementation side, the state remains highly nervous about excessive citizen 
litigation. It was perceived by Clarke that many ostensibly mandatory norms in 
legislation can be enforced only, if at all, through action by the appropriate governmental 
agency, and do not confer a private right of action.351 Even in places where a private 
right of action might seem to be conferred by law, the state in the form of the Supreme 
People’s Court has stepped in to impose a non-statutory requirement that all private suits 
be preceded by an adverse finding against the defendant in administrative or criminal 
proceedings.352 Till now, there are no statutory requirements, implementing rules, or 
precedent conveying similar barriers with respect to private anti-monopoly actions. 
However, the present institutional factors may also be substantial impediments. 
China’s strategy of economic development is encapsulated by the term “socialist 
market economy.” This means using market forces to improve the efficiency of 
                                                      
349 See Ye, supra note 20. 
350 It took a whole month for the court to eventually accept the case. Though the lack of experience was an important 
reason, as confirmed by Li, the court was fairly cautious due to the status of China Netcom as an important central SOE. 
See supra note 348. 
351 Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan H. Whiting , The Role of Law in China's Economic Development (GWU 
Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 187, 2006).  
352 Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan H. Whiting , The Role of Law in China's Economic Development (GWU 
Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 187, 2006). As for the example of Supreme People’s Court’s intervention, 
see 最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 [Some Provisions of the 
Supreme People's Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market] 
(promulgated by Sup. People’ Ct., Jan. 9, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2003), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) 
(P.R.C.). 
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production while retaining a managed, predominantly state-owned economy and 
authoritarian control over political activity. China’s leaders want to achieve “an economic 
system that integrates the basic system of socialism with the market economy in an 
organic way whereby, under macro-regulation and control by the state, the market 
mechanism plays a fundamental role in the disposition of resources and [the state 
achieves] a high degree of balance between efficiency and fairness.” That economy, as 
Ramon Myers has observed, should also be “firmly connected to a political and legal 
system managed by the Chinese Communist Party.”353 
A. Lack of public enforcement 
At an early stage of an antitrust regime, public enforcement assumes tremendous 
importance due to the complexity, ambiguity, and people’s unfamiliarity with the laws. 
The young implementing agencies of China are facing similar challenges that many other 
young agencies are also facing, such as a shortage of staffing and resources, a lack of 
experience and expertise, and a lack of understanding or even trust of an antitrust regime. 
Meanwhile, they also encountered difficulties that are more or less specific in a 
transitional context, namely, deep-sited sectoral interest, absence of rule of law, political 
status in power hierarchies, and strong vested interests. All these agencies have decided 
that the public enforcers cannot provide many meaningful inspirations to private 
enforcement; nevertheless, they also suggest the importance of private enforcement in 
playing a complementary role to public enforcement 
B. Difficulties in evidence production 
To prove a monopoly is not easy everywhere. In advanced antitrust regimes such as 
the U.S., courts usually energize private enforcement via a fine-tuned shift of burden of 
proof. In antitrust cases, China still applies the rule of “who advocates, whose proof,” 
which has constituted one of the highest hurdles for private plaintiffs among others. 
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Principles?, in CHINA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: MARKET REFORMS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (James A. Dorn ed., 
1998).  
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Actually, most of the plaintiffs in the publicized cases finally lost due to a lack of 
persuasive evidence. 
In addition, the Chinese antitrust regime is young, so enabling institutions have not 
fully developed. Another important reason for difficulty in evidence production is the 
underdevelopment of independent intermediary organizations with specialty in providing 
credible market assessment. A judge of Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's Court said 
that such a research report that may qualify for evidence may be as costly as 600, 
000-700, 000 RMB, but even so, there is no intermediary organization in China that is 
able to do the job.354 
C. Oppressed class action 
Representative action, interpreted straightforwardly from relevant Chinese law, has 
been formally established since the passage of China’s 1991 Civil Procedure Law 
(CPL).355 Art. 54 and art. 55 of CPL stipulate two typical representative actions in China, 
namely the class action with a large but fixed number of plaintiffs356 and the class action 
with a large and unfixed number of plaintiffs.357 Collective dispute resolutions are not 
alien to today’s China.358 There has been an impressive increase in the number of 
collective actions and complaints in recent years in the course of economic 
                                                      
354 See supra note 19.  
355 Min shi su song fa [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April. 9, 
1991, amended Oct. 28, 2007, effective April. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
356 Art. 54 of the CPL provides that “[i]f the persons comprising a party to a joint action is large in number, the party 
may elect representatives from among themselves to act for them in the litigation. The acts of such representatives in 
the litigation shall be valid for the party they represent. However, modification or waiver of claims or admission of the 
claims of the other party or pursuing a compromise with the other party by the representatives shall be subject to the 
consent of the party they represent.” 
357 Art.55 of CPL provides that: 
“Where the object of action is of the same category and the persons comprising one of the parties is large but uncertain 
in number at the commencement of the action, the people's court may issue a public notice, stating the particulars and 
claims of the case and informing those entitled to participate in the action to register their rights with the people's court 
within a fixed period of time. Those who have registered their rights with the people's court may elect representatives 
from among themselves to proceed with the litigation; if the election fails its purpose, such representatives may be 
determined by the people's court through consultation with those who have registered their rights with the court. The 
acts of such representative in the litigation shall be valid for the party they represent; however, modification or waiver 
of claims or admission of the claims of the other party or pursuing a compromise with the other party by the 
representatives shall be subject to the consent of the party they represent. The judgments or written orders rendered by 
the people's court shall be valid for all those who have registered their rights with the court. Such judgments or written 
orders shall apply to those who have not registered their rights but have instituted legal proceedings during period of 
limitation of the action.” 
358 Lester Ross, The Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of Zouping County, Shandong, 
26 STAN. J. INT’L L. 15, 15 (1990). 
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development.359 
It is alleged that China’s decision to provide courts with procedures for handling 
group disputes appears to have been spurred both by a willingness to experiment and by 
functional concerns regarding the ability of the judiciary to handle an increasing number 
of multiparty disputes.360 But my perception is that the emergence of class action is more 
likely to be attributed to the rise of collective disputes accompanying transitional China. 
However, the so-called “policy-implementing type judicial procedures” 361  can 
manipulate the court’s approaches with the variation of policy priorities, such as social 
stability and economic growth, and dilute the role of class action in practice. Although, 
class action in China has been in existence for decades, it is dormant in most cases due to 
the social stability concerns that arise with advancement of reform and more sensitive 
issues, such as eminent domain, labor disputes, pollution, land contract disputes, and SOE 
restructuring disputes, just to name a few.362 In the face of news issues involved in class 
actions, the courts encountered such dilemmas as conflict between pursuing fairness and 
justice and hew to the line of local economic development; conflict between prejudiced 
parties who only care about the result and fixed procedures written in the book; and 
conflict between the limited function of judiciaries and the multiple goals sought by 
harmed parties.363 Maybe just in order to avoid these awkward situations, in 2005 the 
Supreme People’s Court came out with a judicial interpretation, “最高人民法院关于人
                                                      
359 Lianjiang Li & Kevin J. O'Brien, Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China, 22 MOD. CHINA 28, 
28-29 (1996); Despite the lack of formal procedures, some Chinese courts adjudicating multiparty disputes prior to 
1991 applied procedures resembling those which were included later in the CPL. See江伟，贾长存, 论集团诉讼（下）
[J]中国法学, 1989(1) [Wei Jiang & Changcun Jia, On Class Action (II), 1 CHINESE LEGAL STUD. 103 (1989)]; 王红岩, 
试论推选代表人制度[J]政法论坛, 1989(3) [Wang Hongyan, Preliminary Study on the Representative Action System, 
3 LEGAL F. 37 (1989)]. 
360 Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1525 (1998). 
361 王福华，代表人诉讼中的利益诉求[J]法学，2006（6）[Wang Fuhua, Interest Demand in Representative Actions, 
6 LEGAL SCI. 3, (2006)].  
362
 童兆洪;群体性纠纷案件审理情况的调查[N]中国经济时报(2003) [Tong Zhaohong, A Survey on Adjudication of 
Collective Dispute Cases, CHINA ECON. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20031007/0848467008.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012)].  
363 童兆洪，从法院审理群体性案件的困境看政府职能完善的重要性[J]中国党政干部论坛, 2003(10) [Tong 
Zhaohong,  An Analysis of the Importance of Improving Government Function from a Perspective of the Plight in 
Collective Actions Encountered by Courts, 10 CHINESE CADRES TRIB. 31 (2003)].  
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民法院受理共同诉讼案件问题的通知”[Notice of the Supreme People's Court on 
Accepting Joint Action Cases by the People's Courts].364 This interpretation expressly 
authorizes the lower courts to dismantle a class if they deem it inappropriate and handle 
them case by case, but it did not give clear guidance about what conditions are 
inappropriate; moreover, it require the grassroots court to be the major forum in charge of 
class action, and if special conditions call for the High Court to be the adjudicating forum, 
it has to be sanctioned by the Supreme’ People’s Court first.  
A typical illustration of this dilemma is a class action brought by shareholders. Stock 
exchange markets were established in 1990 in China. By 2002, they have been 68, 000, 
000 account holders, and most of them were natural persons. Nevertheless, in 2002, the 
Supreme People’s Court issued a judicial interpretation, “关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述
引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定”[Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on 
Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities 
Market].365 It defined the class action brought by shareholders as representative action 
with fixed a number with the reason that there are not so many developed intermediary 
agencies in China as in the U.S., and it is not realistic to merely rely on the courts to 
finish all jobs such as notification, registration and calculation of damages. In addition to 
limitations on the operation of class action, this interpretation imposed further barriers for 
lodging a lawsuit. For example, it made the administrative decision about a violation of 
the law a prerequisite for filing a damage lawsuit, and it made the administrative decision 
or criminal ruling the only valid evidence for seeking damage resulting from false 
statement.  
However, there are also some good signs. The so-called “public interest” lawsuits, 
which are instituted by government agencies or NGOs, have made some achievements in 
                                                      
364 最高人民法院关于人民法院受理共同诉讼案件问题的通知 [Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Accepting 
Joint Action Cases by the People's Courts] (promulgated by Sup. People’ Ct., Dec. 30, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), 
LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
365最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 [Some Provisions of the Supreme 
People's Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market] 
(promulgated by Sup. People’ Ct., Jan. 9, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2003), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) 
(P.R.C.).  
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recent years.  
In fact, public interest lawsuits have no solid legal source in Chinese CPL or APL 
because traditionally only people who have a direct interest with in a lawsuit can have the 
right of action. However, one of the positive sides of China’s transitional stage, and lack 
of the rigid rule of law is that it has left enough room for institutional innovation. Rules 
and regulations have been issued in some provinces.366 There are even some records of 
winning cases,367 and there are also some signs that the authorities may officially accept 
this new type of action.368 
However, I still hold some concern about how the underfunded, understaffed and 
inexperienced courts would deal with an increasing number of class actions, when they 
are entangled with complex and fractious anti-monopoly issues and the inherent 
loopholes, ambiguity, and conflict may also deserve some concern. 
In the United States, supplemented by one-way fee-shifting, contingency fees, treble 
damages and parens patriae, the limits on locus standi of those filing antitrust class 
action suits does not significantly affect the goals of antitrust law. While in China, losers 
pay the litigation costs and plaintiffs and defendants are responsible for their attorney’s 
fees respectively;369 contingency fees are allowed but unavailable to for some categories 
of litigation, including group actions;370 punitive damages are allowed in Chinese law 
                                                      
366 周颖，浙江探索环境公益诉讼：零的突破成效如何？[Zhou Ying, Experiment with Environmental Protection 
Public Interest Lawsuits: How Is The Result?], CHINA ENVTL NEWS, Dec. 19, 2011, at 3, available at 
http://www.acef.com.cn/html/hjflfw/hjfzjj/10720.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012)].  
367齐静静, 国内环境公益诉讼案中最大金额民事赔偿案二审宣判 [Qi Jingjing, Final Ruling Handed down for the 
Environmental Protection Public Interest Lawsuits with the Largest Damage in China] , PEOPLE’S NETWORK, May 31, 
2011, http://yn.people.com.cn/GB/210654/210657/14790089.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
368 In “关于为加快经济发展方式转变提供司法保障和服务的若干意见” [Notice of the Supreme People's Court on 
Issuing the Several Opinions on Providing Judicial Guarantee and Services for Accelerating the Transformation of the 
Economic Development Mode] , the courts are required to accept damage actions filed by environmental protection 
agencies on behalf of the state. “关于为加快经济发展方式转变提供司法保障和服务的若干意见”[Notice of the 
Supreme People's Court on Issuing the Several Opinions on Providing Judicial Guarantee and Services for Accelerating 
the Transformation of the Economic Development Mode] (promulgated by Sup. People’ Ct., June 29, 2010, effective 
June 29, 2010), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
369 See Art. 29 of Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs. 诉讼费用交纳办法[Measures on the Payment of 
Litigation Costs] (promulgated by St. Council, Dec. 19, 2006, effective April 1, 2007), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
370 See Art. 12 of Measures for the Administration of Lawyers’ Fees. 国家发展改革委、司法部关于印发《律师服务
收费管理办法》的通知[Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Justice on 
Issuing the Measures for the Administration of Lawyers' Fees] (promulgated by NDRC & Ministry of Justice, April 13 
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but are narrowly applicable in product liability cases.371 There is no such concept or 
practice regarding parens patriae. 
The stimulus to file antitrust class action is not warranted in China as in the United 
States. In the case of small claimants, the underlying logic is apparent, given that 
litigation costs are expected to be unacceptably higher than received benefits. Even in the 
case of large claimants, they would have little incentives to ally with small claimants, 
because first there would be large communication cost involved; second, the group 
decision-making rule of CPL is so rigorous that it subjects the considerable stake of the 
large claimants to the unstable attitudes of small dissenters who are likely to be bought 
off by defendants; third, the “limited fund” issue would discourage large claimants from 
making an alliance with others, which might finally result in under-compensation. 
Considering industrial associations own more human and material resources relative 
to individual businesses, and the maintenance of a sound competition setting is consonant 
with the by-laws of the industrial associations, some Chinese scholars advocate granting 
industrial associations the standing to file antitrust litigation to complement limited 
government prosecution resources on the one hand, and facilitate access to legal relief by 
private parties on the other hand. Yet concerns remain to be seen due to a large number of 
influential industrial associations’ undeniable relation with the government.372 In any 
sense, in the case of consumers’ challenge against businesses’ anti-competitive behaviors, 
consumer associations are expected to play more profound roles. 
                                                                                                                                                              
19, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).. 
371 Art. 49 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests provides 
that “Business operators engaged in fraudulent activities in supplying commodities or services shall, on the demand of 
the consumers, increase the compensations for victims' losses; the increased amount of the compensations shall be two 
times the costs that the consumers paid for the commodities purchased or services received.” Xiao fei zhe quan yi bao 
hu fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) 
(P.R.C.). 
Art. 47 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of China provided that “[i]n the event of death or serious damage to 
health arising from a product that is manufactured or sold when it is known to be defective, the infringee shall be 
entitled to claim corresponding punitive compensation.” Qin quan ze ren fa [Tort Law of the People's Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July. 1, 2010) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
372 For more discussions see 孟雁北, 反垄断法视野中的行业协会[J]云南大学学报，2004(3) [Meng Yanbei, An 
Analysis about Industrial Association from a perspective of Antitrust-Monopoly Law, 3 J. YUNNAN U. L. EDITION 22 
(2004)]. 
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An outstanding characteristic of res judicata of class action in China is that the 
rulings made in class action not only bind all the litigants before the bar but all the 
following actions filed within the statute of limitations by those victims who did not 
enroll in class action in the first place. This is the so-called extensive effect of rulings. 
The extensive effect of a ruling could entail three issues. 
First, the large claimants would not only like to sue individually but also as early as 
possible. Otherwise, they would have to tolerate the prolonged decision making within 
the group, or accept the ruling made in the preceding class action and pick up the 
leftovers of class plaintiffs, if any. Furthermore, according to art. 53 of the CPL, to merge 
cases with the same or similar cause of action, courts have to receive the consent of 
litigants. Thus, since even multiple cases with the same or similar causes of action are 
filed at almost the same time, individual plaintiffs need not worry about mandatory 
merging, for their suits can still retain their individual statuses. The two factors would 
jointly incur litigation race amongst large claims. It would eventfully benefit large 
claimants and harm the small ones who are indeed in more urgent need of justice. 
Second, the free-rider issue may be a barrier of the class action device. Art. 6 of 
Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs of China provides that the litigants shall pay 
acceptance fees, application fees and reimbursements for witnesses, experts, translators 
and accountants. Art. 14 1-3 of this administrative regulation further stipulates that the 
present plaintiffs who could have been members of a preceding class action but did not 
enroll in the class, are allowed to pay just the application fee and be exempted the 
acceptance fee and reimbursements. Some judicial interpretation provides that the 
acceptance fee is allowed to be temporarily waived for plaintiffs when they file 
representative action defined by art. 55 of CPL,373 and finally paid by the losers after the 
                                                      
373
 See Art.129 of Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China. 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》若干问题
的意见 [Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure 
Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Sup. People’ Ct., July 14, 1992, effective July 14, 1992), 
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conclusion of the action. The sizable application fee and reimbursements are still 
formidable, however. Under such circumstances where there is no large discrepancy 
among victims, a free-rider concern can erode a class action device because each member 
of the class wants others to bear the costs of filing the class action and generate a leading 
ruling, then each of them will hang back waiting for someone else to undertake the 
litigating function. Some Chinese scholars suggest awards to class plaintiffs be two times 
higher than their extra cost invested in class action, and correspondingly two times the 
amount of any additional costs of class plaintiffs be deducted from the awards to 
plaintiffs who did not enroll in the preceding class action and file their individual lawsuit 
later. Theoretically, it is a reasonable design, but the question of how to calculate the 
“extra cost” merits more deliberation. 
Third, the extensive effect enables class action to capture not only victims in the class 
but all who file lawsuits after the preceding class action. It to some degree threatens the 
claim of legitimate rights of those who do not go to the bar in person. Moreover, the 
opt-in mechanism deepened this concern. Unlike the American counterparty which takes 
an opt-out policy, the Chinese CPL requires those who want to be class members to 
register first. This mechanism would further increase the litigation cost with no 
substantial increase of the net benefit, because 1) notice to the class is usually posted in 
the People’s Court Newspaper, which is a professional medium with a relatively small 
range of circulation, thus timely notice could not be readily warranted; 2) victims have to 
personally go to the forum to enroll, which would incur large expenditures from 
widely-dispersed antitrust class members in such a large country. 
The convenience and expedience of follow-on cases relative to stand-alone cases are 
heavily dependent on the knowledge of public enforcement and the availability of 
relevant documents from government agencies. Information regarding antitrust litigations 
and investigations, in line with the transparency principle in the United States, can be 
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traced on the official websites of DOJ and FTC.374 
The existing government information disclosure mechanism in China is still not 
sufficiently supportive of private enforcement. The government information disclosure 
was not within the logic of a planned economy. Not until 30 years after the 
commencement of the reforms and opening policy in 1978 did the Regulation on 
Government Information Disclosure come into effect.375  Furthermore, the late-born 
regulation is often impeded by upper-level laws like the State Secrets Law of the People's 
Republic of China and the Law on Archives People's Republic of China. 376 
Implementation of the awkward regulation is also discounted by government agencies.377 
This situation can be illustrated by the fragmentary enforcement information that is 
available at the official website of Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition 
Enforcement Bureau. According to Regulation on Government Information Disclosure, 
private parties are allowed to apply for information disclosure, and there are clear time 
limits with regard to administrative procedures, but the prerequisites are to some degree 
demanding, which require the description of the content of the information. This vague 
requirement may result in a death spiral because the purpose of knowing the content is 
the incentive to file the application; therefore how could the law expect the applicant to 
describe the content beforehand. 
D. Vague standing to sue 
Art. 50 specifically provides for civil liability where monopolistic acts cause third 
parties to suffer losses. However, there is still some disagreement in China as to which 
third parties will have standing to bring an action. While there seems to be some 
                                                      
374 Commission Actions, http://www.ftc.gov/os/actions.shtm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); and Public Documents of the 
DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
375 中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例 [Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Disclosure of 
Government Information] (promulgated by St. Council, April 5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), LAWINFROCHINA (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
376 For more discussions see陈林, 面向社会的政府信息公开[J]理论前沿，2009(16) [Lin Chen, Government 
Information Disclosure Facing the Society , 16 THEORY FRONT 33 (2009)]. 
377 For more discussions see陈建华, 楚迤斐，魏成龙, 政府信息公开制度实施中存在的问题与对策研究[J]当代财
经，2009 (8) [Jianhua Chen, Yifei Chu & Chenglong Wei, A Study of the Problems in Implementing the Government 
Information System and the Countermeasures , 8 CONTEMP. FIN. & ECON. 30 (2009)]. 
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agreement amongst legal scholars that all injured individuals should be able to file suit, 
some scholars have argued that giving competitors standing could lead to the filing of 
frivolous lawsuits to harass competitors. Questions concerning whether industry 
associations can have standing to bring lawsuits on behalf of their members remains to be 
clarified. 
As of now, the limited number of precedents have been unable to give any 
constructive answers, given that all plaintiffs of the total 11 private actions were direct 
purchasers of a product or service.378 The bill of Some Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Dispute Arising from Anti-Monopoly Behaviors 
is eagerly awaited to provide more direction in this regard. 
E. Punitive damages 
As previously mentioned, punitive damages are allowed in Chinese law but narrowly 
applicable in product liability cases. Now the Supreme People’s Court is conducting 
consultations regarding its bill of Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Trying Cases of Civil Dispute Arising from Anti-Monopoly Behaviors. It is provided in 
this bill that double damage shall be applied. Though still less than the treble damage in 
the US, this increased penalty has already achieved applause, because the remarkably 
large scale of consumer groups of the monopolies may constitute credible deterring 
power. 
F. Case guidance system 
In November 2010, the People’s Supreme Court promulgated Rules on Guiding 
Case,379 which is expected to regulate the discretion of judges, reconcile legal unity with 
regional variance, minimize the arbitrariness of judgment, and disseminate knowledge 
about new and difficult cases.380 The selected guiding cases may include five types of 
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cases whose decision have come into effect: 1) cases with extensive concern, 2) cases 
decided upon general legal principles, 3) typical cases in a given area, 4) complicated or 
new types of cases, and 5) other cases with guiding value.381 
It took a relatively long time for the gestation of the case guidance system. The case 
guidance system was first introduced in the People’ Court’s Second Five Year 
Reformative Outline in 2005, five years before the promulgation of the Rules mentioned 
above. While the first four guiding cases eventually came out in December 2011, another 
year has passed. However, it is a pity that the four guiding cases, two civil cases plus two 
criminal ones, are not relevant to anti-monopoly law. In any event, learning by doing is 
an important ingredient of China’s success.382  Several features of the institutional 
innovation of the Chinese judiciary may have some positive implications for the efficient 
dissemination of experience and knowledge of private antitrust enforcement. 
First, the case guidance system may more or less functionally mimic cases law, 
though essentially it cannot break out of institutional restraint. It is still not clear how to 
implement this system and a more detailed implementing rule is underway. But according 
the introduction by the head of the research department of the Supreme People’s Court, 
three key points must be borne in mind: 1) the power of the guiding cases would be 
strictly limited to the so-called “decision point.” All application of the guiding cases 
cannot exceed the core of the decision point; 2) guiding cases can only exert their 
influence on similar cases in the sense that not only the facts are similar, but the disputed 
issue is also similar; 3) judges “should” refer to the guiding cases when making decisions 
as per laws and judicial interpretations, and may or may not add it in to the decision on an 
analytical basis, which indicates the cases’ unparalleled status as opposed to “typical 
cases”.383 
                                                                                                                                                              
Enforcement], LEGAL DAILY, May 13, 2011, 5, available at  
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2011-05/13/content_2656397.htm?node=20733 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
381 See Art. 2 of the Case Guidance Provisions of the Supreme People's Court.  
382 林毅夫，发优势与后发劣势——与杨小凯教授商榷[J]经济学 (季刊)，2003（3）[Yifu Lin, Backward Advantage 
or Backward Disadvantage: A Discussion with Yang Xiaokai, 3 CHINA ECON. Q. 989 (2003)]. 
383 最高人民法院研究室负责人就案例指导制度答记者问[Press Release, Director of Research Division of the 
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The written law in civil countries, including China, is inclined to be too general and 
abstract. Though people tend to further rely on interpretations or implementing rules by 
the government or the Supreme People’s Court, there are inevitabe loopholes. Moreover, 
China is an ever-changing state since 1979, so a great variety of new issues might pop out 
every day. In particular, such complicated matters as anti-monopoly would call for quick 
clarification and workable approaches. The great difference of personnel quality in courts 
all over China has accentuated this requirement. 384  A caveat is the legislature’s 
supremacy in relations between legislature and judiciary, and the interventions from party, 
local government, upper level court and chamber leaders will doom the real creativity of 
judges in face of new legal issue. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court is cautious to 
mistake a case guidance system for case law in common law countries. In any event, a 
small step toward progress is better than nothing. 
Second, broader participation and easier availability would make the case guidance 
system closes to its actual needs. The Supreme People’s Court is the only government 
body that can issue guiding cases, but courts at various levels, congress representatives, 
CPPCC members, scholars, lawyers and all interested parties can recommend candidate 
cases. It insures a relatively broad participation of the formation process of the guiding 
cases. A special office has been established within the Supreme People’s Court. When 
preparing for the guiding cases, the office shall ask for opinions of relevant chambers of 
the Supreme People’s Court and the court that made the ruling. After discussions with the 
Supreme People’s Court’s judicial committee, then the Supreme People’s Court can 
publicize the selected cases on the Gazette and website of the Supreme People's Court, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Supreme People’s Court, Press Conference about Case Guidance System (Dec. 20, 2011)], COURT.GOV.CN, Dec. 20, 
2011, http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/jdjd/sdjd/201112/t20111220_168539.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
384 国家司法考试坚持对中西部地区放宽政策[National Bar Examination Continues to Apply Relaxed Policies in 
Central and West Regions], TIANSHANNET.COM.CN, Jan. 9, 2008, 
http://www.tianshannet.com.cn/news/content/2008-01/09/content_2384558.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). (saying 
that in order to meet the demand of legal talents in central and west China, the policies about bar examinations continue 
to be generous in the sense of relaxed eligibility, lowered admission scores and employment of ethnic group languages). 
If we look at the publicized cases, anti-monopoly civil litigations do not necessarily take place merely in developed 
areas. They were also instituted in such less developed cities as Chongqing and Huzhou. It is presumably because at the 
setout of anti-monopoly regimes, people are not familiar with rules and cost of the game. When people become more 
sophisticated, anti-monopoly litigation may become a more cautious option for potential litigants. 
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and People's Court Daily. The broad reach of the internet and large circulation of People's 
Court Daily can make the dissemination of knowledge embedded in guiding cases more 
efficient. 
It is undeniable that the case guidance system may facilitate private enforcement 
through improved information collection, assimilation and dissemination. There still exist 
some weak points. 
First, the judge-centered ideology is persistent. The Supreme People’s Court official 
said that the “reference” to the guiding cases may or may not be included in the decisions. 
If a litigant expressly requires the court to refer to a given guiding case, the judge may 
respond in the course of adjudication, or in the final decision. This means that the case 
guidance system is designed primarily for the convenience of judges, instead of litigants 
or potential litigants.385 This intention is not surprising because the conventional belief is 
that judicial interpretation, as opposed to formal laws, is a guideline merely for judges 
rather than average people.386 Guiding cases and judicial interpretation are both regarded 
as major forms of interpretation and guiding tools by the Supreme People’s Court about 
the application of the law,387 so we cannot anticipate too much different treatments of the 
case guidance system in terms of its status. However, it does not matter whether it is 
formal law, judicial interpretation or case guidance, as long as the rules or principles can 
influence judges’ decisions, they would surely shape the expectation and behavior of 
litigants and potential litigants. So the case guidance system is likely to be more effective, 
if the principles extracted from case guidance system can be expressly articulated 
whenever they are referred to.  
Second, the case guidance system in China is a multileveled system. Apart from the 
                                                      
385 最高人民法院研究室负责人就案例指导制度答记者问[Press Release, Director of Research Division of the 
Supreme People’s Court, Press Conference about Case Guidance System (Dec. 20, 2011)], COURT.GOV.CN, Dec. 20, 
2011, http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/jdjd/sdjd/201112/t20111220_168539.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
386 CCTV, 婚姻法新司法解释反响强烈 最高院都没料到[CCTV, Strong Response to New Judicial Interpretation of 
Marriage Law Is beyond the Expectation of the Supreme People’s Court], CHINA.COM, Aug. 26, 2011, 
http://news.china.com/domestic/945/20110826/16731127_1.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
387 周伟，通过案例解释法律：最高人民法院案例指导制度的发展 [J]当代法学，2009（2）[Zhou Wei，Interpretation 
on Law through Cases: the Development of Case Guiding System of Supreme People’s Court, 2 CONTEMP. L. REV. 139 
(2009)].   
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case guidance systems which is handled by the Supreme People’s Court and has the 
highest nationwide effect, as per art. 9 of the ”关于规范上下级人民法院审判业务关系
的若干意见” [Several Opinions on Regulating the Trial Work Relations between the 
People’s Courts at Different Levels], the provincial high court can issue reference cases, 
among others, to guide and supervise the work of lower courts in its jurisdiction.388 
Potential chaos may follow if we look at the case guidance system and the evaluation 
system of lower courts and judges thereof together. It is the immediate upper level court, 
instead of the Supreme People’s Court, that will evaluate the performance of lower courts. 
Among the comprehensive indexes, an important one is the remanding rate. The 
evaluation would be directly linked to the income, welfare, and promotion of the lower 
court judges. So we can imagine which group of cases the first instant court judges would 
pay more attention to, and when conflict exists, which groups’ cases those judges would 
favor. This kind of bias may be worsened if the Supreme People’s Court’s case guidance 
is not adequately transparent to litigants and their attorneys who are likely to be the most 
trusted watchdogs. 
3.6 Some Explanations: the Backdrop  
A valid explanation of the present enforcement hinges on a careful examination of 
the economic and political stage, and legislation history that have shaped the Chinese 
competition policy and the general legal environment. 
3.6.1 The Role of The State to Be Properly Positioned 
Here the term “state” refers to the central and local authorities as an integral body 
that formulates and implements political and economic reform agendas.  
The role of the state during the course of development is somewhat controversial. 
Neoclassical theories emphasize that the state should refrain from overt intervention. 
Though the state still has a substantial role to play, it must be limited to provide public 
                                                      
388 最高人民法院印发《关于规范上下级人民法院审判业务关系的若干意见》的通知 [Notice of the Supreme 
People's Court on Issuing the Several Opinions on Regulating the Trial Work Relations between the People's Courts at 
Different Levels] (promulgated by Sup. People’ Ct., Dec.28, 2010, effective Dec.28, 2010), LAWINFROCHINA (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
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goods and mitigate market failure such as inequality, monopoly, and externalities.389  
However, the experience of Japan and the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), 
and more recently such transitional countries applying gradualist approach as China and 
Vietnam, has challenged the neoclassical sense of this minimal role. Those experiences 
have demonstrated the importance of a state-driven economic development approach in 
the major form of aggressive industrial policies, at least in the economic take-off stage.390 
The central objective of competition policy in these economies has been dynamic rather 
than static efficiency. Instead of maximizing competition, these economies have 
deliberately restricted it in many areas in order to increase their investment rate and 
accelerate technological development. A detailed examination of the experience of Japan 
and the NIEs will be presented in Chapter 4.  
It is argued that the role of the state is even more important in transitional socialist 
economies in that 1) before the establishment of a well-functioning market mechanism, 
market failure will be especially large in an atmosphere of great uncertainty that is 
pervasive during the course of transition, and private agents tend to look more toward 
short term speculation rather than longer term investment, so that the gap between private 
and social benefits may be specially wide; 2) economic transformation heavily relies on 
the state, which relative to the infant private sectors owns unparalleled informational, 
financial, and organizational advantages to identify problems, formulate reform programs, 
coordinate and balance various interests and needs, and allocate national resources to 
implement development policies;391 3) it is also perceived that when facing large scale 
adjustment of interest patterns, it is only the authoritarian regimes that can force through 
                                                      
389 See e.g., PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 19th ed.2009).  
390 Japan’s economy took off shortly after the WWII. The NIEs embarked on rapid economic growth from 1960s to 
1970s. China and Vietnam’s economies started their economic boom in 1980s. A remarkable characteristic of their 
economic development is that the state is the prime driving-force of all social-economic forces. See e.g. Amsden & 
Singh, supra note 69; Justin Yifu Lin, Transition to a Market-Oriented Economy: China versus Eastern Europe and 
Russia, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 215-47 (Yujiro Hayami & 
Masahiko Aoki eds., Palgrave Macmillan 1998); Gordon White, Developmental States and Markets in East Asia: An 
Introduction, in DEVELOPMENTAL STATES IN EAST ASIA (Gordon White ed., Palgrave Macmillan 1988).  
391 Inderjit Singh, China: Industrial Policies for An Economy in Transition (World Bank, Discussion Papers No. 143, 
1992), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/1992/04/440061/china-industrial-policies-economy-transition. 
(partly attributing China’s success in economic reform to an active state-sponsored industrial policy) 
 100 
tough economic decisions and still maintain basic social order and justice, albeit to some 
degree by restricting civil and political rights. In particular it is oftentimes a volatile 
period of time in which resources are insufficient to satisfy rising demand and institutions 
are weak. In contrast, democracies are subject to more public and interest-group pressures 
and are less able to repress without undermining the legitimacy of, and support for, the 
regime.  
The Chinese government has played a crucial role throughout the whole process of 
economic reform. 392  
A. The proactive role of the state throughout the reform era 
In the first stage of economic reform from 1978 to 1983, the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC launched the great process of China’s 
transition. The state ex-post recognized the legitimacy of the contract responsibility 
system initiated in Fengyang Country, Anhui Province, and promoted it in rural areas 
nationwide. Shortly after that, liberalization was extended to the industrial sector and 
urban areas. The state allowed SOEs to retain more profit and have more autonomy in 
firm management. As for tax reform, the two-step tax-for-profit reforms were completed 
in 1984; with a so-called initiative of “serving meals to different diners from different 
pots,” more fiscal and economic autonomies were granted to subnational governments.  
From 1984 to 1991, the second stage started from the adoption of the ”中共中央关
于经济体制改革的决定” [Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Economic 
Restructuring] at the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of the CPC 
in 1984, which brought about the notion of a planned commodity economy on the basis of 
public ownership and thereby set up market-oriented reforms lines. During this period of 
time, the state granted more autonomy to enterprises and subnational governments and 
implemented a series of comprehensive tax, price, and financial reforms. The Chinese 
                                                      
392 See DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM REFORM OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION & 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION, supra 
note 9.  
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people started to taste the flavor of the market mechanism in the dual track system.  
From 1992 to 2002 was the third stage. Two mile-stones marked a complete 
transition from a command and control to a market economy: one was Deng Xiaoping’s 
Inspection Tour of 1992, during which he delivered a series of remarkable speeches 
aimed to clarify the muddled idea about whether the establishment of special economic 
zones were “capitalism” or “socialism” in nature;393 the other was the 14th CPC National 
Congress of 1992 which clearly established the socialist market economy as the goal of 
the reforms. Following these events, a series of significant reforms were implemented 
including, but not limited to, substantial enterprise reforms with a view toward 
establishing a modern enterprise system in the form of a shareholding system. The 
reforms focused on the strategic adjustment of the state sector of the economy, the 
promotion of non-state sectors, the cultivation of capital market, the establishment of a 
social security network, entrance into the WTO, macro-economic reforms, and grain 
distribution.  
The fourth stage is from 2003 until the present, which is marked by the “中共中央关
于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干重大问题的决定” [Decision of the Central 
Committee of the CPC on Several Important Issues of Completing The Socialist Market 
Economy System] at the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the 
CPC. In this historical document, the CPC put forward the concept of the Scientific 
Outlook on Development, which takes development as its essence, while putting people 
first with core, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic 
requirement. Its fundamental approach394 was derived from theories of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.395 In this period of time, the state is continuing to push a 
comprehensive transition to market economy on the one hand, including administrative 
                                                      
393 Deng Xiaoping's Inspection Tour to South China, CHINA DAILY, 
http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/party16/leaders/dengtour.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
394 Thoroughly Applying the Scientific Outlook on Development, IDCPC.ORG.CN, available at 
http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/cpcbrief/sci-outlook.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
395 Scientific Outlook on Development Part of Theories of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, XINHUA NETWORK, 
Oct. 15, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content_6883024.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
 102 
restructuring, factor market and macro-economic reforms, and reforms of the 
management system for state assets of monopolized industries, and of social networks. 
On the other hand, the state is moving deeper into the reform and institutional building of 
the Scientific Outlook on Development and is involved in the coordination of urban and 
rural reforms, the coordination of economic development, resource conservation, and 
environment protection, and the concomitant tax, financial, investment, and planning 
reforms. 
B. Swaying from regulatory capture to regulatory failure: an unfinished process of 
repositioning 
Although the state has played an unparalleled role in China’s brilliant economic 
growth, as its society becomes more pluralistic, the market economy continues to develop, 
and some decisions are better made by a more democratic and open process, the state has 
not completely broken away from the dirigiste role in the planning era. The downside of 
the state’s role is that it may sway from regulatory capture to regulatory failure.  
The Chinese government is still learning how to regulate its economy. in the 
pre-reform period, the ministries directly managed the major industries and firms thereof 
in their respective industrial lines;396 however, in the post-reform era, the state needs to 
redefine the scope and the  extent of its involvement in the economy.  
China largely took two different approaches towards different industries on the basis 
of their characteristics and policy needs.  
In industries that the government believes should be subject to market competition 
and that state capital should eventually exit, China has gradually reduced the role of the 
government as a direct manager through six rounds of restructuring and has pushed for 
the separation of government functions from enterprise management.397 In order to end 
                                                      
396 SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (1993) (She commented that the economic 
sectoral ministries can be thought of as divisions in a huge conglomerate called “China, Incorporated”).  
397 See supra note 6; 聚焦中国第六次机构改革 [Focus on the Sixth Government Restructuring of China], XINHUA 
NETWORK, Mar. 17, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-03/17/content_7810078.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
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the direct management of enterprises by specific ministries, the first step was also an 
interim arrangement. In 1998, the ten ministries that oversaw the coal, machinery, 
metallurgy, chemical, light, textile, building materials, and nonferrous metal industries, 
were downgraded to the bureau level as a constituent part of the State Economic and 
Trade Commission. Three years later, in 2001, the nine such interim bureaus were 
eventually abolished.398 Zheng suggests that this was an implicit recognition that the 
government’s interest in those sectors was no more than its ownership interest in the 
SOEs in those sectors;399 however, this goal cannot be realized if the general regulatory 
framework is not completed. As long as other policy needs become more urgent, the state 
interest will exceed the ownership realm and the state will advance and force the private 
sector to recede.  
At the central level, the proposition of the division of the so-called “competitive 
SOEs” and “functional SOEs” was introduced by the Vice Director of the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2011. The functional 
SOE will cover three areas, including is the development of important resources given the 
contradiction between environment protection and the lack of enterprises’ self-discipline 
and effective regulation.400 This proposition did not give any examples of the kind of 
resource industries that will be treated this way, but the intention of the proposition was 
vividly illustrated by the coal mining industry renationalization movement that took place 
in 2009 in Shanxi Province. Shanxi Province is rich in coal, but due to pure regulation it 
is denounced for the waste, pollution, and industry accidents that occur during the course 
of coal mining. The criticism is most often targeted at private coal firms. In 2009, a 
                                                      
398 国家经贸委和委管国家局机构进行重大改革 撤销了国家经贸委管的9个国家局[Important Reform of the State 
Economic &Trade Commission and Its Nine Mandatory Bureaus], PEOPLE’S NETWORK, Jan. 19, 2001, 
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movement that primarily took the form of merging private coal firms was launched in the 
name of redressing the problems mentioned above. There was a strong flavor of 
administrative mandate given the designated subjects, areas, patterns, and time window. 
401 According the agenda, until 2010 the coal-mining firms would be reduced from more 
than 2, 200 to about 100.402  
A further note is that the concentration that resulted from renationalization was 
realized without an introduction of industry-specific regulation, as will be discussed 
below, and it relies on the hope of self-discipline among these large SOEs. This reliance 
may sow the seed of exploitative and exclusionary practices. 
In such strategic industries where the government decides to retain significant control, 
such as electricity, banking, insurance, telecommunications, petroleum, civil aviation, and 
railroads, reforms have generally focused on separating government functions from 
enterprise management, dividing national monopolies, and establishing specific 
regulatory agencies.403 However, many of the industry-specific regulatory agencies are 
former leaders of the SOEs, and it is commonplace to see frequent personnel exchanges 
between the high-level officials of regulatory agencies and the top executives of the giant 
SOEs.404 The last major monopoly left untouched is the railway industry, but after a 
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In the petroleum industry, regulatory power has been stripped from the SOE duopoly, China National Petroleum 
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 In the telecommunications industry, the SOE monopoly, China Telecom, was separated from its affiliated ministry, 
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supposedly more independent industry regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry in 1998. Among others, see 
OECD, CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 292 (2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_33735_35340704_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD, CHINA: DEFINING THE 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE 92–95 (2009) , available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_2649_34141_42222884_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
404 陈姗姗, 王丹波, 国航东航人事齐变动 [Chen Shanshan & Wang Danbo, Personnel Changes of China Airline 
and China Eastern Airline], FIRST FIN. DAILY, Nov. 3, 2011, available at 
http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/11/1177579.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (reporting that there are frequent 
personnel exchanges of the national airlines and the CAAC). Biography of current Chairman of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/who/gsq/. He once served the Chairman 
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number of scandals regarding corruption and bullet train accidents, there is an initiative to 
separate government functions from enterprise management.405 
Regulation reform is still half-way. The shadow of the government still haunts areas 
where it has withdrawn from industry-specific regulation. Renationalization may be one 
form, and industrial association is another more common form. Following the 
deregulation of the 1990s, a number of industrial associations started to emerge under the 
patronage of the government. They are usually staffed by former or retired government 
officials from the industries’ former supervising ministries and have the similar 
organizational structures and functions as the defunct supervising ministries. Many of the 
industrial associations are officially “affiliated” with various government agencies.406 
Accordingly, incomplete deregulation, the close ties between regulatory agencies and 
the regulated SOEs, the oscillatory retreating of state capital, and the absence of effective 
oversight of the regulatory agencies themselves have jointly led to the twisted state of the 
progress of transition. 
As discussed above, there is a mismatch of the AML’s focus on exclusionary 
practices and the claimants’ attack on exploitative practices. This incongruity exemplifies 
the awkward regulatory landscape in the antitrust regime of China.  
On the one hand, if exploitative conduct is generally allowed to be regulated in the 
competition law framework, that means that antitrust authorities and courts have to deal 
with such practical and technical issues as prices, costs, and transactions of dominant 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Party Secretary of the China Construction Bank, Party Secretary of China Cinda Asset Management Co.Ltd and 
China Jianyin Investment; See the profile of the current Chairman of the Insurance Regulatory Commission at 
http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab100/i182133.htm. He once served as the Chairman and Party Secretary of the 
China Agricultural Bank. Biography of the current Chairman of the CRBC, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/shfl.do. He once 
served as the President and Party Secretary of the China Agricultural Bank. 
The personnel exchange has already expanded, namely, the top executives of central SOEs may take offices of 
subnational governments and vice versa. 竺延风, 苏树林, 卫留成, 中国一批国企高管纷纷步入政坛 年纪轻学历
高 [Zhu Yanfeng, Su Shulin & Wei Liucheng, China’s Young and Well-educated SOE Executives Go into Politics], 
SOUTHCN.COM, April 4, 2011, http://economy.southcn.com/e/2011-04/04/content_22296598.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
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405 实施政企分开 铁路体制改革大幕拉开 [Separating Government from Enterprise Management: Reform of 
Railway Is to Be Launched] , CHINA SEC. J., Dec. 24, 2011, available at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/h/2011/1224/c226333-2886630851.html?navigation=1(last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
406 See Zheng, supra note 344, at 669. 
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firms, which they are not specialized in.407 In addition, antitrust authorities are generally 
reluctant to assume a role that is considered “the antithesis of the free market.”408 So it is 
generally believed that price regulation is better reserved for industry regulators who 
possess the relevant specialty knowledge and experience in the form of ex ante 
regulations, but the scope is better restrained to natural and legal monopolies.409  
On the other hand, the Chinese government has retained its regulatory apparatus in 
the monopoly industries, so the monopoly industries are subject to the ex ante regulations 
of their Zhuguan Bumen, i.e., regulatory agencies, but an effective and market 
economy-compatible regulation system has not been set. For example, all of the 
defendants in the three publicized abuse-of-dominance lawsuits discussed above had an 
industry regulator: China Construction Bank by the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) and China Netcom and China Mobile by the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT). The China Construction Bank case may illustrate 
the agencies’ regulatory failure. The conduct challenged in that case was the charging of 
an “account management fee” for small accounts, a common practice of the banking 
industry that is widely viewed by the public as unreasonable, but can survive rounds of 
regulatory movement. Under “商业银行服务价格管理暂行办法” [Interim Measures 
Governing the Service Prices of Commercial Banks] jointly issued by the CBRC and 
NDRC in 2003,410 most bank fees are subject to “market prices” with government guided 
prices as a complement.411 The government guided prices do not cover the account 
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& BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 586 (Oxford University Press, USA, 3d ed. 
2004). Cited by Wentong Zheng, see Zheng, supra note 435, at 704, fn258 (2010).  
408 See Zheng, supra note 344, at 704, fn259.  
409 See Jones & Sufrin, supra note 408. 
410 商业银行服务价格管理暂行办法[Interim Measures Governing the Service Prices of Commercial Banks] 
(promulgated by CBRC & NRDC, June. 26, 2003, effective Oct. 1, 2003), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) 
(P.R.C.).  
411银监会《商业银行服务价格管理暂行办法》答问 [Interview with Officials of the CBRC about Interim Measures 
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management fee for small accounts. In 2011, the CBRC, People’s Bank of China, and 
NDRC jointly issued a notice requiring commercial banks to waive some service 
charges.412  Once again the account management fee was not included.413  Granted 
deregulation is the right direction, it has to respond to the lack of effective competition in 
the banking industry. Conceivably, because of the absence of effective regulation plus the 
absence of effective competition, the exploitative practices are unsurprisingly rampant in 
this industry and people have to resort to the AML to reign in the predatory charges. It is 
revealed in the “银行业金融机构服务及收费情况通报” [Briefing of The Service and 
Charge of The Banking Financial Institutions] that the number of paid items of large 
commercial banks has risen 104 per cent to 662 as of 2010, and that of the joint-stock 
commercial bank has risen 55 per cent to 354.414  
The China Mobile case presents an example of regulatory capture. The condemned 
conduct in this case was the charge of a monthly fee for phone service, a practice based 
on ministerial regulations. It is these regulations that directly endorse the suspected 
exploitative actions of China Mobile and make consumers worse off. However, a trickier 
issue here may be a muddled picture of the priorities of competition law and industrial 
regulations, and the coordination of competition authorities and industrial regulatory 
agencies. This muddled picture is waiting for enforcement behavior to clarify the 
intermingled problems. 
Equipped with three years of experience, the enactment of two implementing rules, 
415 and enhanced implementation forces, the NDRC launched an investigation of China 
                                                                                                                                                              
Governing the Service Prices of Commercial Banks], CHINANEWS.COM, June. 26, 2003, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20030626/1837357387.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
412 中国银行业监督管理委员会、中国人民银行、国家发展改革委关于银行业金融机构免除部分服务收费的通知
[Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission, the People's Bank of China and the National Development and 
Reform Commission on the Waiver of Some Service Charges of Banking Financial Institutions] (promulgated by 
CBRC, PBOC & NRDC, Mar. 9, 2011, effective July 1, 2011), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
413 刘文静, 小额账户管理费 不在银行”免费”之列 [Liu Wenjing, Account Management Fee for Small Accounts Is 
Not Enlisted in the Free Service Notice Jointly Issued by Three Regulatory Agencies], YANZHAO EVENING PAPER, July, 
14, 2011, available at http://www.chinanews.com/fortune/2011/07-14/3182109.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
414中国银行业协会, 银行业金融机构服务及收费情况通报 [China Banking Association, Briefing of The Service and 
Charge of The Banking Financial Institutions], FINANCE SINA, July 12, 2011, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20110712/221910135673.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
415 They are respectively: 反价格垄断规定 [Provisions against Price Fixing] (promulgated by NDRC, Dec. 29, 2010, 
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Telecom and China Unicom. In this public enforcement case, the charged action of the 
two telecommunication giants was the excessive pricing of their competitors and also 
downstream firms. Again, the telecommunication service price regulation was brought 
out as a solid defense. In the face of this regulation, the NDRC still persisted in the 
investigation, and the two telecommunication firms even indicated some signs of 
compromise by submitting an application for suspending the investigation and promising 
some corrective measures.416 Currently, both sides are struggling and the investigation 
process is still ongoing. 
In brief, after three decades of undeniable contributions to the economy, the state has 
not properly located itself within rapid economic growth. The regulatory failure and 
regulatory capture are coexisting. A key issue is that an effective scrutiny mechanism has 
not been established to differentiate the necessary government regulation from arbitrary 
and/or rent-seeking state intervention. 
C. Price liberalization: An uncompleted project 
The change of price mechanism was put on the agenda at the beginning of China’s 
reform scheme. However, as suggested by Lin, China’s transition to a market system was 
not led by a well-designed blueprint, nor guided by a theory of gradual transition.417 The 
initial goal was only to tinker with the transitional economic system instead of replacing 
the planned system with a market system. Reforms were pushed by the internal logic of 
economic problems, and the economic system moved step by step toward a market 
system.418 In line with this ideology, price reform has been treated as a key ingredient of 
the economic system reforms and has been decided by the approaches of the economic 
                                                                                                                                                              
effective Feb. 1, 2011), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.) and 反价格垄断行政执法程序规定
[Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement against Price Fixing] (promulgated by NDRC, Dec. 
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416 钟晶晶, 赵谨, 电信悄然改动垄断整改声明 暗示未违反行业条例 [Zhong Jingjing & Zhao Jin, The Telecom 
Quietly Modified Its Announcement Suggesting That It Did Not Violate Industrial Regulations]，BEIJING NEWS, Dec. 29, 
2011, available at http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40606/16552109.html(last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
417 See Lin, supra note 390.  
418 Id., at 218.  
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system reforms.419  
Starting from increasing the procurement price of major agricultural products, 
Chinese price reform has gone through three stages: 
The first stage was from 1979 to 1991 with a well-known label of a dual-track price 
system. As discussed by Lin, Cai, and Li, this stage may be further divided into two 
sub-stages.420 In the first sub-stage, from 1979 to 1984, when facing stagnant agricultural 
production, a sluggish economy, and price scissors, the government increased the 
procurement price of major agricultural products and adjusted the prices of some 
products of light and heavy industry. It also adjusted the price of transportation in order to 
revitalize the economy and energize agricultural production. In the second sub-stage, 
from1985 to 1991, drawing lessons from post-WWII Germany, who relaxed prices and 
subsequently were confronted with food price souring and massive protests, and Poland, 
who liberalized food prices in 1984 and encountered even the subversion the communist 
regime, the Chinese government introduced the dual-track gradualist approach to price 
liberalization, that is to say, the prices of the commodities that were included in the state 
plan were directly set by the government as before, and in contrast, the prices of the 
commodities outside of the state plan were determined by the market. Accordingly, three 
pricing patterns were presented: fixed government-regulated prices, government-guided 
prices, and market-determined prices. 
Prior to the price reform, price control was highly concentrated. The price setting and 
adjustment power of the majority of commodities belonged to the government at various 
levels; only the prices of few commodities that were traded in rural fairs could be set by 
the two parties to the trade. After years of price liberalization, in the eve of the 1992 
abolition of the dual-track price system, the weights of market-determined prices 
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accounted for only about 68.8 per cent of the total volume of retail sales, 57.8 per cent of 
the total value of agricultural product procurement, and 45.7 per cent of the total volume 
of sales of means of the production. See Table 2. 
Recommended by Stiglitz and praised by Roland as a central political-economic 
institution for the success of the Chinese reforms,421 notwithstanding, the dual-track 
price liberalization is a double-edged sword that had resulted in significant differences 
between the market prices and the planned prices. For instance, in 1989, the market price 
of coal was 149 per cent higher than the planned price; crude oil was 212 per cent higher, 
steel 105 per cent, timber 112 per cent, copper 150 per cent, and aluminium124 per 
cent.422 The lucrative price difference became a hotbed for large scale of corruption.  
Moral hazard and opportunism have spread to every aspect of the society423  and 
eventually led to the notorious June Fourth Incident. 
The second stage, from 1992 to 2000, focused on the establishment of a socialist 
market price system. The starting year, 1992, of this stage is a milestone that marked the 
price system transformation from the old, government-led system to the new, 
market-based one.  
In 1992, 648 out of 737 prices regulated by National Price Bureau and other agencies 
were liberalized; 50 out 60 procurement prices of agricultural products were relaxed; all 
light industry product prices except for salt and some medications were open to the 
market. The convergence of state controlled and market-determined prices were even 
extended to steel, the majority of machinery products, onshore crude oil, and coal.424 The 
weights of market-determined prices jumped to 93.0 per cent of the total volume of retail 
sales in 1992 and 95.8 by 2000, 81.8 per cent of the total value of agricultural product 
procurement in 1992 and 92.5 by 2000, and 73.8 per cent of the total volume of sales of 
                                                      
421 GERARD ROLAND, TRANSITION AND ECONOMICS: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FIRMS (2000).  
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means of production in 1992 and 87.4 by 2000. See the following Table. The price 
liberalization of China is dramatic, since the government regulated price in Western 
countries would account for approximately 20 per cent anyway.425 
 
Table 2 Weights of Three Patterns of Price Setting 







97.0 20.9 5.9 4.1 3.2 2.8 
government-guided 
prices 
0.0 10.3 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.9 
market-determined 
prices 









92.2 22.2 12.5 9.1 4.7 1.2 
government-guided 
prices 
2.2 20.0 5.7 7.1 2.8 1.7 
market-determined 
prices 









100.0 36.0 18.7 9.6 8.4 5.6 
government-guided 
prices 
0.0 18.3 7.5 4.4 4.2 2.3 
market-determined 
prices 
0.0 45.7 73.8 86.0 87.4 92.1 
Source: Research Group of China Price Association (2008). 
 
As informed by Lin, the efficiency of a particular institutional arrangement cannot be 
assessed without referring to the other related institutional arrangements in that society.426 
In light of his approach, the achievement of the goal of the price reform, namely, the 
establishment of a price system that can reflect relationships between supply and demand 
cannot purely rely on price liberalization. To illustrate, purchasing personnel of the SOEs 
                                                      
425 Id, at 22.   
426 Justin Yifu Lin, An Economic Theory of Institutional Change: Induced and Imposed Change, 9 CATO J. 1 (1989).  
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may not pick up the target goods with the best prices if kickback is irresistible; national 
champions and regional blockades have discounted the efficacy of price liberalization and 
handicapped the signal function of price. Responding to these failures of price 
liberalization, price-related institution building was strengthened. The Price Law came 
into effect in 1998.427 Subsequently, a series of supporting rules regarding administrative 
penalties, predatory pricing, dumping, deception, whistle-blowing, and government price 
regulation were adopted.  
However, a gradualist approach is applied to the institutional building of price. The 
Price Law affirms the three patterns of price setting, and explicitly allows government 
price intervention in certain important sectors, including strategic commodities that have 
crucial relationship with economic growth and people’s livelihood, natural resources, 
natural monopolies, and important public utilities.428 This means that government can 
directly set prices, or guide prices to limit the fluctuation scope within a specific time 
window. In 2001, an updated price catalog was issued by the central government. The 
government-set or guided prices were reduced from 141 of 1992 to 13.429 However, three 
aspects decide that the state control of prices in China would be greater than the small 
number suggests. One is that many of the controlled prices are in such strategic and 
infrastructural sectors as electricity, basic telecommunications, gasoline, transportation, 
and financial settlement and transaction services, so the state power can be readily 
distributed to a broader area of the entire economy. 
Another aspect is that pursuant to art. 19 of the Price Law, provincial governments 
shall make their own price catalogues. The local price catalogue shall comprise two parts: 
one is the content of the catalog made by central government; the other includes the items 
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fixed in accordance with Price Law and local conditions.430  That means that the 
controlled prices in reality will be an uncertain number on top of the claimed 13 items. 
Although the government officials presented a nice vision of price administration when 
introducing the catalog, which may include increasing transparency, encouraging the 
participation and involvement of experts, and establishing regular price examinations 
mechanism to adapt to changing macro-economic and micro-economic conditions, it is 
no more than a symbolic declaration; no supporting measures have been brought about.  
The last aspect is that there can be messy inter-ministry coordination. Among the 13 
pricing agencies responding to the 13 government-regulated or guided prices, four are the 
State Planning Commission plus other related agencies, and the pricing authority over 
basic telecommunication services is granted solely to information industry agencies. 
There are no solid measures to secure efficient and effective cross-agency cooperation 
and coordination.  
3.6.2 Reform of SOEs: Still on The Way 
Prior to the reforms, governments at various levels de facto exercised the ownership 
of SOEs despite that, in principle, the SOEs belong to the “whole people.”431 The 
governments furnished the needed capital, input materials to the SOEs, and took delivery 
of their output at a pre-fixed price by the governments. All major decisions of the SOEs 
were made by the governments and virtually all profits or losses went to the governments’ 
coffers. The governments were the major employers of urban industrial labor, assigned 
managers and average workers to SOEs, and set up standards for their wages and welfare 
which essentially had nothing to do with an individual or firm’s productivity performance. 
The managers of SOEs had no say regarding business operations, and their career paths 
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depended on the fulfillment of the state plans that were usually fixed on the basis of 
previous performance. Consequently, managers had a strong incentive to obtain more 
input than necessary to secure meeting the plan tasks, but meanwhile carefully avoiding 
overfilling the tasks so that the tasks would not inflate the following year.432  
There were not a large number of SOEs due to rounds of fiscal decentralization that 
is to be accounted in the following discussion, but played an undoubtedly significant role 
during this period. By 1978, output value of SOEs accounted for 80.8 per cent of the total 
industrial value in China, while their number accounted for 24 per cent.433  
Nevertheless, the informational asymmetry and absence of effective incentive 
mechanisms that was more salient in a large state such as China had resulted in severely 
low efficiency. The plans formulated by the governments were impotent in dealing with 
failures they created, so the state had to resort to political movements. From 1951, the 
movements calling for increasing production and practicing economy were launched 
almost every year, and the rectification movements condemning bureaucracy were 
employed every few years. Nonetheless, low efficiency and massive waste were 
persistent. Take the steel industry for instance: the project of the Jiuquan steel plant had 
changed six times from 1958 to 1980 but was still undecided. Its proposed scale 
fluctuated from 4,000,000 to 500,000 tons. By 1980, only one blast furnace was working. 
The productivity and scale of the newly established or expanded large steel plants in 
Benxi, Anshan, Wuhan and Taiyuan in the First and Second Five-Year Plans, were 
lingering at their original levels; some of them even had not reached the designed level by 
1980. Moreover, due to the Great Leap in the late 1950s and decentralization movements 
in early 1970s, vast resources had been diversified in the construction of local 
independent industrial systems without achieving the economies of scale and enhancing 
efficiency. From 1957 to 1976, the average cost of producing steel was $920 per ton, 37 
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per cent higher than that of Russia in the corresponding period.434 Industrial productivity 
had been almost stagnant. The total factor productivity grew at an annual rate of only 0.4 
per cent between 1957 and 1978435 
When confronted with the rigid central planning system of the SOEs and the 
resulting inefficiency, the reforms of SOEs were put on the agenda from the beginning. 
But somewhat different from the farming institution reform that was bottom-up in nature, 
the reforms of the SOEs were largely initiated by the government, though of course, in 
their duration implementation local experiments played an important role as well.  
Largely speaking, the reforms of the SOE can be divided into four stages surrounding 
four foci in respective stages: 
The focus of the first stage, from 1979 to 1983, was the expansion of enterprise’s 
autonomy. There were early calls for privatizing the SOEs, but the government’s initial 
option was merely to boost performance by changing the SOEs’ internal governance and 
improving the market environment in which they were operating.436 It was officially 
pointed out at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC that 
“one of the serious shortcomings in the structure of economic management in our country 
was the over-concentration of authority, and it is necessary to shift it under guidance from 
the leadership to lower levels so that the local authorities and industrial and agricultural 
enterprises would have greater power of decision in management under the guidance of 
unified state planning.”437 In 1979, the State Council issued five rules438 and selected 
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Sichuan as a pilot province and several SOEs as pilot enterprises to experiment with the 
expansion of enterprises’ autonomy. The power over production, acquisition of raw 
materials, hiring, output sales, pricing, acquisition of other materials, use of funds, and 
establishment of institutions were gradually transferred to enterprises. Additionally, 
enterprises were allowed to retain as much as 20 per cent of the profits. 439 
The relaxed regulation unleashed productive forces, aroused the enthusiasm of 
enterprises and their employees, and immediately enhanced the economic aggregate. The 
profits and taxes of 1979 was 10.1 per cent higher than those of 1978, and the growth rate 
was higher than the average from 1957 to 1978; the real wages increased by 7.5 per 
cent.440 The productivity of the state sector rose by 4.7 per cent annually from 1978 to 
1982.441 
The SOE reforms at this stage are alleged to be a Pareto improvement with virtually 
no loser. 442 
The focus of the second stage, from 1984 to 1991, was separation of the right of 
management from the right of ownership.  
The swift revival of the economy has aroused more profound reflections on the 
relationship between government and enterprises. The “中共中央关于经济体制改革的
决定”[Decision of The Central Committee of the CPC on Economic Restructuring] 
issued at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the CPC 
acknowledged that “one important cause of the rigid control of enterprises by government 
was mistaking ownership by whole people for direct management by government.”443 
Subsequently, inspired by the success of the rural household responsibility system, the 
contract responsibility system which attempted to clarify the authority and the 
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responsibilities of enterprises, started to emerge in 1987. Under this system, the SOE 
managers were required to meet targets for sales, profitability, and capital accumulation 
in exchange for a share of the profits. The new institution was soon getting widely 
adopted. By the end of 1988, 91 per cent of the large and medium-sized SOEs engaged in 
this system. In 1990, the state signed so-called “bi-direction contracts” with 234 
state-owned backbone enterprises, that is to say, the state would guarantee the supply of 
energy and major input materials, while the enterprises would achieve some goals 
regarding remittance of profits and taxes, enterprises development, and management. By 
early 1991, 95 per cent enterprises that engaged in the first round of responsibility 
contract renewed their contracts.  
The energized production brought up more commodities at market prices, so the SOE 
reforms naturally resulted in the “dual-track” system discussed above. The categories 
directly controlled by the state dropped from 120 in 1979 to about 60 in 1992; the 
categories of materials distributed exclusively by the government decreased from 126 to 
26, and categories of commodities acquired by the government fell from 188 to 23.444  
Riding the ignited enthusiasm of enterprises and their employees, the improvement 
of enterprise efficiencies continued. The productivity of the state sector rose by 4.6 per 
cent annually from 1983 to 1987.445 The industry growth rate of 1987 was 14 per cent, 
and that of 1988 was 20.7 per cent. The profit and remitted tax of enterprises in 1987 and 
1988 were respectively 8.0 per cent and 18.2 per cent.  
However, an important problem was that managers were rewarded for their successes, 
but not credibly punished for their failures. To some degree, the SOEs were still facing 
soft budget constraints and opportunism prevailed.  
While the contract responsibility system tremendously contributed to economic 
growth and efficiency improvement, this time it was no longer Pareto improvement, 
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given that government revenue was declining. This decline could be ascribed to several 
reasons: 1) the number of SOEs that were running at a loss and the loss amount were both 
rising. In 1993, the total loss made by SOEs was 45.3 billion RMB, about fourteen times 
of that of 1985. The loss-revenue ratio was 0.8 per cent in 1986, but jumped to 2.1 per 
cent in 1992. In contrast, the loss-revenue ratio of collectively-owned enterprises and 
other non-state sectors were only 0.4 and 1.4 per cent. 2) The SOEs’ contribution to 
revenue has been dropping. The ratio of profit plus tax over sales revenue for the SOEs 
dropped from 26.5 per cent in 1980 to 11.7 per cent in 1992, and the ratio of profit plus 
tax over total output value dropped from 24.2 per cent in 1980 to 11.4 per cent in 1992.446 
The side effects of the contract responsibility system have prompted the consensus 
on further SOE reforms: property rights reform is the key. Again privatization was not the 
focal point. Joint-stock enterprises came onto the horizon and were experimented with in 
1986. This year the pioneer private shareholding took place in three Guangzhou SOEs, 
when the employees bought 30 percent of their firms’ shares. Subsequent, several 
experiments were conducted but were constrained in small and medium-sized SOEs; the 
design of these experiments was not mature, so its influence and effect were limited.447 
Modernization was the theme of the third stage, from 1992 to 1996. Encouraged by 
Deng Xiaoping's inspection tour to south China speech, the “中共中央关于建立社会主
义市场经济体制若干问题的决定” [Decisions on Some Issues about The Establishment 
of A Socialist Market Economy] adopted at the Third Session of the Fourteenth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1993 required that the SOEs establish a 
modern enterprise system that fit into a market economy, and from then on, the emphasis 
of SOE reforms was shifted to enterprise institutional innovations and the core of the 
SOE strategic restructuring was property rights reform. In the same year, Corporation 
Law was adopted which accentuated a level playing ground for different ownership 
structure.  
                                                      
446 See Lin, Cai & Li, supra note 433, at 65. 
447 See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 271; Garnaut, Song & Yao, supra note 437, at 37. 
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With respect to enterprises’ institutional innovation, in 1994, 100 SOEs of various 
sizes were selected by the central government as pilot enterprises for modern enterprise 
experiments; still another 2, 343 SOEs were selected by subnational governments in 1995. 
By 1996, although one of the 100 pilot SOEs was dismantled and another was merged, 
the rest had finished incorporation. After the reforms, the total assets value increased by 
27.6 per cent; the asset-liability ratio dropped by 2.32 per cent.448 
 Among the 2, 343 locally selected SOEs, 23 per cent were transformed to 
joint-stock companies, 23 per cent to limited liability companies, 38.8 per cent to wholly 
state-owned companies, and 13.2 per cent had not finished the reforms. The asset-liability 
ratio dropped by 2.4 per cent. 449  
As far as restructuring is concerned, the government proposed a far-reaching strategy 
for SOE reforms in 1995 which was known “抓大放小” [grasping the big and letting go 
the small]. In line with this strategy, the state determined to retain 500 to 1, 000 large 
SOEs and lease or sell out smaller ones. This decision was not that aggressive in that 1) 
the state sector was indeed a debt builder, especially in small cities. For example, in 
Zhucheng County, Shandong province, 103 of the 150 SOEs were in the red by the end of 
1992, with losses amounting to 147 million RMB, which were equivalent to the city 
government’s revenue over 18 months.450 So it was not surprising when most of the 
subnational governments merely chose to privatize small and medium-sized SOEs; 
Zhucheng went so far as to sell almost all of its state and collective enterprises.451 2) The 
control of the 500 largest SOEs could adequately ensure the control of a large segment of 
the Chinese economy, given that the best SOEs were concentrated among the 500 largest 
ones. In 1997, the 500 largest state firms held 37 per cent of the state’s industrial assets, 
contributed 46 per cent of taxes collected from state sectors, and earned 63 per cent of the 
                                                      
448 See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 272. 
449 Id. 
450 Xiao Zhao, Competition, Public Choice and Institutional Change (CCER Working Paper No. C1999025, 1999) 
451 黄少安，魏建，国有中小企业产权改革及政府在改革进程中的角色—山东诸城国有中小企业改革[J] 经济研
究，2000（10）[Huang Shao’an & Wei Jian, The Reform of Property Right in Medium and Small-sized State-owned 
Enterprises and the Role of Governments in the Process of the Reform—A Study of the Reform of Medium and 
Small-sized Enterprises in Zhucheng City, Shandong Province, 10 ECON. RES. J. 14 (2000)].  
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state sector’s profits. By contrast, small firms owned by local governments had evidently 
been performing more poorly. In 1995, 72.5 percent of local firms but only 24.3 percent 
of central government firms were unprofitable.452  
The large-scale implementation of the “grasping the big and letting go the small” 
strategy was executed in the fourth stage beginning in 1997. 
The focus of the fourth stage, from 1997 until the present, is strategic SOE 
restructuring. In 1997, the 15th CPC National Congress reemphasized the “grasping the 
big and letting go the small” strategy encouraging the retreat of state capital from 
competitive industries and the furtherance of gaizhi. A national survey in 1998 showed 
that a quarter of China’s 87,000 industrial SOEs had been through gaizhi, namely, 
changing the system, 453 and another quarter planned to take some measure of gaizhi. 
Among the gaizhi firms, 60–70 percent had been partially or fully privatized.454 
In 2002 and 2003, the 16th CPC National Congress and Third Plenum of the 16th 
Central Committee of the CPC further clarified the importance of the SOEs’ 
incorporation and enhanced corporate governance. In 2003, the central government 
created the SASAC to supervise most of the SOEs controlled by the central government 
(central SOEs).455 Local-level SASACs were also created and charged with consolidating 
SOEs controlled by local governments (local SOEs) 
More recently, in order to cater to the policy of concentrating state capital in strategic 
sectors, national-security-related sectors, sectors with competitive advantages and leading 
sectors for the future, combinations have been encouraged. Consequently, 331 out of 
                                                      
452 See Zhao, supra note 450.  
453 Gaizhi is used to mean any structural change to a firm, including public offering, internal restructuring 
(incorporation, spinning off, introducing new investors, and debt–equity swaps), bankruptcy and reorganization, 
employee shareholding (limited liability companies or cooperatives), open sales (to management, employees, outside 
private firms, or another SOE), leasing (to management, employees, outside private firms, or another SOE), joint 
ventures, or a combination of the above. See Garnaut, Song & Yao, supra note 436, at 39, fn 15. 
454 Unpublished report of the National Bureau of Statistics, cited by Garnaut, Song and Yao. See Garnaut, Song & Yao, 
supra note 436, at 41-2. 
455 It is noteworthy that for historical reasons, the SASAC merely supervises“industrial” SOEs. The largest SOEs in 
the financial sector (such as the four state-owned commercial banks) are supervised by Central Huijin Investment Ltd., 
a holding company that reports directly to the State Council. 
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China’s 500 largest companies by revenues were SOEs in 2009;456 in 2010, thirty-eight 
of China’s largest SOEs appeared in the Fortune Global 500, with three of them 
appearing on the top ten list.457 
All of these reforms notwithstanding, China’s SOEs still differ in material respects 
from profit-maximizing firms in market economies. Although most SOEs are now 
generally responsive to market signals, profit maximization is not the sole objective of 
SOEs and often gives way to other objectives, such as the provision of employment and 
social services and the generation of tax revenues. Every SOE in China still carries a 
political rank, and many of the largest SOEs, such as the central SOEs supervised by 
SASAC, are very politically powerful. Finally, China’s SOEs still have implicit, and 
sometimes even explicit, financial backing from the government. The “soft budget 
constraints” of SOEs—i.e., SOEs’ abilities to turn losses over to the government—give 
rise to the moral hazard problems typically associated with not having to be fully 
responsible for operating failures. 
3.6.3 Fiscal Decentralization: A Key Source for Regional Protectionism 
The combination of political centralization and economic decentralization is a 
two-sided incentive system. It has invigorated subnational governments of China to 
promote local economies, but meanwhile, it has also provoked harmful tax competition 
and resulted in chronic regional protectionism. The attendant relative evaluation of 
government officials has further strengthened the distortion.458 The duplicity of public 
                                                      
456
 中国企业联合会、中国企业家协会课题组, 2009中国大企业发展的趋势、问题和建议 [Research Group of 
China Association of Enterprises & China Entrepreneur Association, The Development of China’s Large Enterprises: 
Trend, Problems, and Suggestions], http://www.cec-ceda.org.cn/c500/chinese/content.php?id=100&t_id=1, cited by 
Zheng. See Zheng, supra note 344.  
457 See Global 500 2010: Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Corporations, CNN MONEY, July 26, 2010, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).   
458 For a comprehensive retrospect on this process, see王永钦、张晏、章元、陈钊和陆铭，中国的大国发展道路--
论分权式改革的得失 [J]经济研究，2007 （1）[Wang Yongqin, Zhang Yan, Zhang Yuan, Chen Zhao & Lu Ming, On 
China’s Development Model: The Costs And Benefits of China’s Decentralization Approach to Reform, 1 ECON. RES. 4 
(2007)]; Jing Jin & Heng-fu Zou, Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in China, 
16 J. ASIAN ECON. 1047 (2005); 徐孟洲，叶姗，论地方政府间税收不当竞争的法律规制 [J]政治与法律，2006 （6）
[Xu Mengzhou & Ye Shan, On The Regulation of Inter-government Harmful Tax Competition, 6 POL. & L. 52 (2006)].  
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policies has manifested itself throughout the whole process of Chinese reform. 
A. Decentralization: A path to unbalanced central-local fiscal relations 
The conventional wisdom is that decentralization will increase economic efficiency 
because local governments are better positioned to deliver public services that match 
local preferences and needs than the national government so it can generate more 
allocative efficiency.459 This belief is commonly exercised in many advanced economies 
at various levels460 and more recently in transitional China.  
Whether the Chinese version of fiscal decentralization without substantive 
constitutional transition has contributed to China’s economic boom is an open 
question,461 whereas the rounds of centralization and decentralization have indeed left 
unbalanced central-local relations in the sense of mismatched fiscal capacity and 
responsibilities.  
It is generally believed that China’s decentralization approach to reform is essentially 
a Chinese style federalism462 that can help to alleviate soft budget problems by virtue of 
creating competition and allowing more institutional experiments; hence it has preserved 
market and enhanced efficiencies.463 The fiscal decentralization also explains, at least in 
                                                      
459 WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (Gregg Revivals 1993). However, this argument is confronted with 
challenges due to the advancement of research and the intricacy of realties, and it becomes more open to debate. In 
particular, the indirect impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is far undeveloped. See e.g., Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez & Robert Martin McNab, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth (Georgia State Andrew 
Young School of Policy, Working Paper No. 01-01, 2001).   
460 Decentralization of expenditure and revenue decisions of the central government is seen as part of a package to 
improve the efficiency of the public sector, cut the budget deficit, and promote economic growth. For country specific 
analysis see e.g., Danyang Xie, Heng fu Zou & Hamid Davoodi, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in the 
United States, 45 J. URB. ECON.228 (1999); Ulrich Thießen, Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in high 
income OECD countries (2003), http://www.eea-esem.com/papers/eea-esem/2003/182/FisDecThiessen0103pdf.pdf;  
461 Fiscal decentralization may indeed have a direct impact on economic growth, but the theoretical underpinnings for 
this relationship remain largely undeveloped. The absence of an adequate theoretical framework has undermined the 
validity of the empirical work on this subject. A fair summary of the empirical search for a direct relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth is that it remains an open question. Much less attention has been devoted 
in the literature to the indirect channels through which fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth, through the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on economic efficiency, the regional distribution of resources, and macroeconomic 
stability. See Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, supra note 459.   
462 The notion of China’s federation-like central-local relations began to catch people’s eyes in Qian and Weingast’s 
well-known paper of 1997, but this insight had come into being as early as in 1990. See Yingyi Qian & Barry R. 
Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (1997); WORLD BANK , 
REVENUE MOBILIZATION AND TAX POLICY (1990). 
463 Qian, Roland and Xu suggest that the China’s M-form organizational structure of central planning more flexible 
because it makes local experiments possible, contrary to the U-form where this would give rise to major complications 
in coordination. See Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland & Chenggang Xu, Why Is China Different from Eastern Europe? 
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part, why reform without constitutional transition in China can succeed in contrast to that 
of Russia.464  
Others hold that fiscal decentralization has not assisted economic growth of China at 
all, but has rather created a series of tough issues, in particular regional protectionism.465 
The first empirical attempt to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth in China delivers a finding of the negative effect of fiscal 
decentralization on provincial economic growth.466  The attachment of tax revenue 
allocation to ownership provided a strong impetus to establish the most lucrative 
enterprises within each tax jurisdiction regardless of its comparative advantage and 
endowment, which lead to the so-called “backward specialization”467 and reinforced the 
already highly duplicated industrial structure formed in Mao’s time.  
 Actually even those articles that give positive assessment of fiscal decentralization, 
or at least to part of it, also acknowledged the downside. Chen, Hillman and Gu found 
that before the 1994 tax reform, subnational governments acted as a helping hand to local 
firms by hiding wealth in enterprises,468 but the incentive to extract more revenues from 
local firms has led to regional blockade policies, so regional protectionism and low level 
redundant development were rampant.469  
In the context of China, regional protectionism is a natural response to unbalanced 
central-local fiscal relations.470 Specifically, the unbalanced fiscal relations exert an 
effect on the formation of regional protectionism essentially in two ways: 1) the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Perspectives from Organization Theory, 43 EURO. ECON.REV. 1085 (1999). See Qian & Weingast, supra note 462.   
464 See Qian & Weingast, supra note 462.  
465 DALI L. YANG, BEYOND BEIJING: LIBERALIZATION AND THE REGIONS IN CHINA (1997).  
466 Tao Zhang & Heng-fu Zou, Fiscal Decentralization, Public Spending, and Economic Growth in China, 67 J. PUB. 
ECON. 221, 240 (1998).  
467 See Yang, supra note 465.  
468 They can achieve this goal by means of granting tax breaks or immunity. But meanwhile, they collect the money 
through various fees and donations, which has created serious corruption and state opportunism. They also criticize the 
1994 tax reform in that it has converted the subnational government into a grabbing hand to local firms, because their 
financial means cannot support for their needs. 
469 Kang Chen, The Failure of Recentralization in China: Interplay among Enterprises, Local Governments, and the 
Center, in MARKETS AND POLITICIANS: POLITICIZED ECONOMIC CHOICE 209-29 (Arye L. Hilman, ed., Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1991).   
470 黄肖广，财政体制改革与地方保护主义[J] 经济研究， 1996 （2）[Huang Xiaoguang, Fiscal Reform and Regional 
Protectionism, 2 ECON. RESEARCH J. 37 (1996)].  
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mismatch of responsibilities and financial capacity of local governments; 2) short-sighted 
actions resulting from term limit and assessment mechanisms of local government 
officials. These are also agency problems from two perspectives: namely, whether the 
regional interest is aligned with the national interest, and whether powerful local leaders’ 
personal interests are aligned with regional and national interests. 
The delineations of power and responsibility between the central and local 
governments has never been clearly specified in China, even after four rounds of 
amendments to the Organic Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Local People’s 
Congresses and Local People’s Governments.471 Party and government policies have 
pointed to the general trend to shift from a centralized and omnipotent government to a 
decentralized and service-oriented government that can satisfy the requirement of a 
market economy in the reform era.472 Nevertheless, after rounds of decentralization and 
recentralization, the mismatch between arbitrarily mounting subnational government 
responsibilities and dire local fiscal realities and the relative evaluation based incentive 
schemes have pushed in different directions, resulting in a counter-effective impact on 
regional and national economic development.473  
From the unified fiscal administration under a centralization model, to the fiscal 
contract system under an administrative decentralization model, and then to the current 
                                                      
471 Art. 59 of The Organic Law of the People's Republic of China on the Local People’s Congresses and Local People's 
Governments does not mention the public service that a local government shall supply and what conduct local 
government is not supposed to do. The Organic Law of the People's Republic of China on the Local People’s 
Congresses and Local People's Governments was adopted in 1979, and afterwards underwent four amendments 
respectively in 1982, 1986, 1995 and 2004. Di fang ge ji ren min dai biao dahui he di fang ge ji ren min zheng fu fa 
[Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July. 1, 1979, effective July. 1, 1979, amended Oct. 27, 
2004) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
472 In 1985, for the first time the Party brought about the initiative for a transformation of government responsibilities 
at the Twelfth Plenary Sessions of the Fourth Central Committee; in 1987, the Party expressly announced that the 
transformation of government responsibilities was key to the reform of the administrative system at her Thirteenth 
Party Congress. In the past thirty also years, there are six rounds of reforms of the State Council in total, which took 
place respectively in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008. See改革开放 30 年：政府体制改革 6 大调整与未来走
向[Six Reforms and Future Trend of Administrative Systems in the Past Thirty Years], PEOPLE’S NETWORK, Dec. 24, 
2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-11/24/content_10404923.htm.  
473 For instance, in 1992 when many government institutions were short of revenue, they tended to find lucrative 
businesses to subsidy their expenses. Many new government enterprises and businesses were established very quickly, 
so that 60-90% of government institutions run commercial businesses. See文明，中国有产者报告，中华工商联合出
版社（1999）[WEN MING, REPORT ON CHINA’S PROPERTY OWNERS (1999)].  
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revenue assignment system under an economic decentralization model, the evolution of 
central and local fiscal relations could be roughly divided into three periods:474 
Pre-1979 
Before reforms, the fiscal system was primarily based on non-tax revenues. The 
major sources of government revenues were the super rent created by the low price of 
agricultural and sideline products and labor,475 profit remittance of SOEs, and remittance 
of depreciation of SOEs’ fixed assets.476 Tax revenues were in a secondary position. 477 













                                                      
474 See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 36.  
475 The Government Administration Council issued “关于实行粮食的计划收购和计划供应的命令” [Order on The 
Planned Procurement and Supply of Food] and “国营企业、事业和机关工资等级制度” [Wage System of The 
State-Owned Enterprises, Institutions and Government Agencies] respectively in 1953 and 1956. Under this 
institutional arrangement, peasants had to sell their agriculture products to the government at a fixed low price, then the 
government supplied the agriculture products to industrial and commercial units and urban residents at a low price. In 
this way, the artificially low price minimized the cost of industrial and commercial units, as well as the living cost of 
urban residents, which further lowered the cost of industrial and commercial units. The government reaped the super 
rents by means of profit remittance. The regular wage promotion of urban workers ceased for 20 years from 1957 to 
1977; at the same time, the peasants were implicitly taxed approximately 0.6 trillion RMB. For historical background 
of the planned procurement and supply of food, see 统购统销政策的基本内容[Basic Content of Unified Procurement 
and Sales Policy], May 7, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/82819/122120/122128/7208108.html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012).  
476 See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 25-7. 
477 Statistics indicate that in the period from 1951 to 1978, the percentage of enterprise revenue to national revenue was 
52.45 per cent, while that of the tax revenue was merely 46 per cent. See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 27. 
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Table 3 Sources of Revenue by Type (in percentages) 
Year Enterprise 
income 
Tax revenue Debt revenue Others  
1950 13.4  75.1  4.6 6.9  
1955 41.4  46.9  8.4 3.6  
1960 63.9  35.6  -- 0.5  
1965 55.8  43.2  -- 1.0  
1970 57.2  42.4  -- 0.4  
1975 49.1  49.4  -- 1.5  
1980 40.0  52.7  4.0  3.2  
1981 32.5  57.8  6.7  3.0  
Source: “China Statistics Yearbook” compiled by Jia and Zhao (2008). 
 
Quite contrary to the whole-sale concept of central-planning in China, before the 
reforms, the strict Stalinist “tongshou tongzhi” [unified revenue collection and budget 
appropriation] was in operation for approximently one and a half years to meet the 
special needs of a newly founded PRC;478 then the guiding ideology of “tongyi lingdao, 
fenji guanli” [unified leadership and decentralized administration] was introduced in 
1951 and in place till 1979,479 despite that the operation in practice was nearly “tongshou 
tongzhi” ascribed to serious mistakes in work guidelines and the extreme leftist thoughts 
as well as the ten-year long Cultural Revolution.480    
Unified leadership should be interpreted: 1) the central government would set up 
                                                      
478 The Government Administration Council issued “关于统一管理 1950 年度财政收支的决定”  [Decision on The 
Unified Administration of Revenue And Expenditure of 1950]. See the text and background of the Decision in 陈云，统
一财政经济工作[Chen Tun, Vice Primer and Director of the Financial and Economic Board, To Unify Fiscal And 
Economic Work], Mar. 3, 1950, available at http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/48809/48816/3431426.html.  
479关于 1951 年财政收支系统划分的决定[Decision on The Division of Revenue And Expenditure of 1951] 
(promulgated by Gov. Admin. Council, Mar. 29, 1951), XINHUA NETWORK, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/17/content_2346892.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). For the 
background of this Decision, see 陈云，一九五一年财经工作要点 [Chen Yun, Major Points of Financial And 
Economic Work of 1951), available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/chenyun/879409.htm.  
480 See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 22.  
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unified lines, principles and policies, and they would be carried out all over China; 2) the 
central government would create, implement and settle budgets under unified 
management; 3) it was the central government that was in charge of tax-related 
legislation, tax rate adjustment, and tax breaks.481  This financial arrangement was 
extended to SOEs, as they were required to remit all profits or financial surpluses to the 
state, and the state covered all their expenditures by fiscal appropriation. 482  
Decentralized administration referred to the idea that every administrative region, 
government sector and unit would be allowed to hold the over purse strings and remain 
autonomous at various levels in order to arouse their initiative. 483 
Decentralized administration had the advantage of using locally available 
information more efficiently, allowing local preferences’ greater influence on local 
expenditures, and providing incentives to local governments and enterprises to pursue 
economic growth, since they remained the primary beneficiaries of increased revenue. 
With the understanding of the motivating function of decentralization that was further 
reinforced by the idea of the Yan’an Line and War thinking, Mao tried to devolve fiscal 
administration to local governments at various stages, but eventually all failed.484 
Mao addressed the relationship between central and local governments, and 
emphasized the importance of granting more autonomy to local governments in his 
famous On Ten Major Relations in 1956. It was directly grounded upon the realization of 
deep flaws of the rigid system of the former Soviet Union through the experience of three 
years’ exercise of Stalinist socialism from 1953 to 1956, and it was meant to arouse local 
governments and the masses initiatives.485 In 1958, as an integral portion of the Great 
                                                      
481 Id.  
482 Id.  
483 Id.  
484 FRANZ SCHURMANN，IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (University of California Press 1969) 
(discussing the strategy choice of the China between the Soviet Union Line which highly relies on technologists, and 
the Mass Line successfully practiced in Yan’an, which believed in the power and creativity of the masses; considering 
that peasants and workers were the broad and firm political foundation of the then young PRC, and there were very few 
technical personnel, Mao picked up the Yan’an Line instead).  
485 Id (stating that Mao’s choice of decentralization was based on the basic social structure and classification in the 
early days of the foundation of the PRC. That is, there were very few technical personnel, and the social and political 
foundation of the PRC were not technologists, but rather peasants and workers; furthermore, aid from the former Soviet 
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Leap, the first administrative decentralization was launched. Under the banner of 
decentralization, the autonomy for planning and enterprise administration was granted to 
local governments; in addition, some fiscal and tax authority was devolved to lower level 
governments as well. Consequently, the control of over 88 per cent of enterprises was 
transferred to local governments, and every province, region, and even country had their 
own set of industries. It was vividly described as “small as it is, the sparrow has all the 
vital organs”.486  However, this decentralization was reversed when the background 
movement of Great Leap failed in 1961 because of a chaotic economic order.  
Mao had never given up the ideas about decentralization, which entailed another 
several rounds of decentralization movements seeking a balance within a unified planning 
regime after 1962, but all these plans were reversed for lack of experience and ideological 
as well as political reasons. Hence the fiscal administration before reforms was still 
highly centralized; even so, it’s noteworthy that the general trend of central-local relations 
was re-centralization, which was summarized as “integrating departments and regions at 
different levels with regions enjoying priority.”487 For instance, the central government 
of China only controlled the production and distribution of less than 600 categories of 
products even at the highest level of central-planning; while the former Soviet Union 
controlled approximately 5, 500 categories. 488  Before reform, only 3 per cent of 
enterprises were under the control of the central government with the rest of them 
belonging to local governments at different levels, and most of the profit of local 
                                                                                                                                                              
Union, including technical aid, was sensitive to the relationship between the two giant socialist countries and not stable 
enough to secure long-lasting economic support. With the belief in the masses as a firm political foundation and the 
power of mankind, Mao eventually chose the so-called “Yan’an Path,” a decentralized socialist modality instead of the 
former Soviet Union Path of strict central planning) 
486 Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, China’s Transition to Markets: Market-preserving Federalism, Chinese Style, 1 J. 
POL’Y REF. 149 (2007) (explaining the historical process of decentralization in China and the current marketization as a 
result of decentralization); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 21–24 (1995) (analyzing the factors surrounding 
economic growth in China). See generally Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism, Chinese 
Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995) (discussing how China 
implemented successful economic reforms). 甘阳.中国道路：三十年与六十年[J].读书,2007(6) [Gan Yang, The Path 
of China: Thirty Years v. Sixty Years, 6 READING 3 (2007)]; 张军.改革前期的分权周期[N].经济观察报(2008) [Zhang 
Jun, The Decentralization Circle in the Pre-reform Era], ECON. OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/observer/special/2008/03/26/95031.shtml. 
487 See Zhang, supra note 486.  
488 See Shirk, supra note 378.   
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enterprises was reaped by local governments. By 1978, there were 348, 000 or so 
enterprises in China, but in the former Soviet Union, the number was about 40, 000.489  
In short, the Soviet Union’s rigid central-planning economic model was gradually 
destructed by such radical political movements like the Great Leap and the Cultural 
Revolution. The legacy of highlighting regional initiatives resulted in a multi-leveled, 
regionalized, and localized economic system, and subnational governments with some 
sources and managerial skills. It was less dependent on national champions and less 
interdependent, and the system therefore proved to be more adaptive to transition 
conditions, sowing the seeds for future successful reforms.490  
The multi-leveled and localized economic system did not eventually result in 
regional protections, if the profit-seeking capacities, activities, and their impact on the 
society were taken into account, given that all profit-seeking activities were constrained. 
In the command and control society, the scale and structure of urban residents’ 
consumption were fixed by the rationalization system; the income level of peasants was 
doomed by the disproportionate sales price of agriculture product and agricultural means 
product; the highly controlled financial system had depressed investment activities of 
both urban and rural residents. 
Nevertheless, when Chinese people enjoyed the relative smooth transition in relation 
to other communist fellows in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the self-sufficient 
economic system had already sowed the seeds for regional protectionism.  
1979-1993 
Under the reforms, the changes in China’s fiscal system came to the agenda of a 
market-oriented government on account of the following driving forces:491 
First, the relative size of government revenue shrunk quickly, because 1) the 
                                                      
489 See Gang, supra note 486.. 
490 See Shirk, supra note 378.  
491 No exception to other reforms, the fiscal reform started as an experiment. As early as 1977, Jiangsu province was 
chosen to try out an alternative fiscal arrangement with the central government. Under this arrangement, the province 
was contracted to remit a share of its total revenue each year to the central government. The share was determined 
according to historical records of local revenues and expenditures of the province. See Justin Yifu Lin & Zhiqiang Liu, 
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1 (2000).  
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government allowed SOEs to retain a higher fraction of their profit; 2) much of the 
growth in the Chinese economy in early stages of reform took place in sectors that were 
less heavily taxed, particularly agriculture; 3) SOEs had become a great drain on the 
fiscal system due to the keen competition of non-state-owned enterprises, especially 
township and village enterprises (TVE), and the understatement of firms by virtue of 
complicated barter transactions between firms. So the government had to locate new 
revenue sources. 
Second, in spite that the original intention to secure the revenue of the central 
government, the fiscal contract system created the vested interests in local governments, 
who were willing to support the reformers in the central government in exchange for 
more autonomy.492 
Last but not the least, the local governments need incentives to step up the efforts to 
collect revenue and promote economic growth. 
The new fiscal contract system operated under the principle of dividing revenues and 
expenditures with each level of government that was responsible for balancing its own 
budget. With this arrangement, revenues were classified by source and divided into 
central fixed revenues (including customs duties and revenues remitted by centrally 
owned state enterprises), local fixed revenues (including salt taxes, agricultural taxes, 
revenues remitted by locally owned state enterprises, and other taxes and levies of a local 
nature), and central-local shared revenues (including profits of large-scale enterprises 
under dual leadership by the central and local government, industrial and commercial 
taxes, and turnover taxes). However, contrary to the original promise of keeping the 
sharing schemes unchanged for five years, there were frequent changes made to the 
sharing rules to accommodate concern over revenue stabilization, to account for different 
local conditions, and to balance central and local interest.  
From 1983 onward, a two-phased reform change occurred with the replacement of 
                                                      
492 KANG CHEN, THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN TRANSITION: MICRO CHANGES AND MACRO IMPLICATIONS (Singapore 
University Press 1995).  
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state enterprises’ profit remittances with income taxes (the so-called “利改税 ”, 
tax-for-profit).493 Although revenues were still divided into three categories—central 
fixed, local fixed, and shared—the criteria for the divisions changed. Whereas the 
previous divisions were based primarily on the ownership of state enterprises, the new 
divisions were related primarily to tax categories.494 
The 1985 fiscal arrangement meant that central and local fixed revenues accounted 
for a relatively small part of the total government budget, and the main portion was 
specified as shared revenue. This implied that the central government now relied on local 
governments to collect nearly all revenues495  and provide resources to the central 
government, and both central and local governments heavily counted on industry to 
generate revenue. Because local governments could retain some of the shared revenues, it 
was in their interest to increase these revenues. In 1988, the arrangements were changed 
again under fiscal contracting. Five types of sharing schemes were established, adding 
one type based on the four types during 1985–87.496 In any event, industry-generated 
revenue continuously remained the bulk of the revenue.  
On the spending side, during this period of time, the central government did not issue 
                                                      
493 According to the Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Economic System 
Reform adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee, the tax-for-profit scheme was to 
replace SOE profit remittance with a series of taxes. There were two underlying objectives: 1) to reduce the 
negotiability of enterprise financial obligations to the state by formalizing these obligations in the form of taxes, whose 
rates would be uniform nationwide and not subject to bargaining; 2) to weaken the financial linkage between enterprise 
ownership and budgetary revenues. By replacing profit remittances with taxes whose revenues were to enter a pool to 
be shared between the central and local governments, this scheme was ambitiously expected to undo the close ties 
between local enterprises and local governments to prevent the accompanying side effects including regional 
protectionism. The tax-for-profit scheme was conducted in two steps respectively from June 1, 1983 accompanied by 
the promulgation of the “关于国营企业利改税试行办法” [Administrative Measures for the Tax-for-Profit Scheme of 
the State-owned Enterprises (for Trial Implementation)], and October 1, 1984 accompanied by the promulgation of the 
“国营企业第二步利改税试行办法” [Administrative Measures for the Tax-for-Profit Scheme of the State-owned 
Enterprises in the Second Stage (for Trial Implementation)], “中华人民共和国国营企业所得税条例（草案）” 
[Regulations of the People's Republic of China On State-owned Enterprises Income Tax (Draft)] and the “国营企业调
节税征收办法” [Measures for the Collection of the State-owned Enterprises Adjustment Tax]. See Christine Wong, 
Fiscal reform and local industrialization: the problematic sequencing of reform in post-Mao China, 18 MOD. CHINA 
214 (1992); 项怀诚 姜维壮, 中国改革全书（1978-1991）--财政体制改革卷，大连出版社（1992）[Xiang Huaicheng 
& Jiang Weizhuang, Encyclopedia of China's Reform1978-1991—the Volume of the Reform of Fiscal System (Dalian 
Publishing House 1992)]. 
494 Some taxes, such as the state-owned enterprise income tax, are still divided based on ownership; that is to say, the 
enterprise income tax of the national SOEs would go to the central government’s coffer, while that of the regional SOE 
would belong to the subnational government. This is still the case.  
495 At this time, the central government did not have its own tax bureaus to collect taxes. 
496 See Lin & Liu, supra note 491.  
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mandatory targets; subnational governments could decide on the scale and structure of its 
fiscal expenditure. The central government had a 46.89 percent share of the total 
government budgetary spending in 1978. This share became 42.60 percent in 1992, 
indicating slow progress in budgetary decentralization.497 
Subnational governments had every incentive to promote local industries and extract 
more revenues, given the division of the enterprise income tax based on ownership 
(locally owned or not), the division of turnover tax based on territorial principle, and the 
heavy reliance on industry-generated revenues as indicated in Table 3. Empirical 
evidence also indicates that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives, measured by the 
contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue, 
are associated with faster development of the non-state sector as well as more reforms in 
the state sector in the provincial economy.498 In the early stage of transition from a 
command and control economy, subnational governments indeed possessed the advantage 
and power to perform as a “helping hand,” assisting local firms to overcome systemic 
impediments: 1) they could finance investment through intervention in banks’ decisions, 
administrative mandates, or even directly out of their own pocket. During the wave of 
decentralization, the management of state-owned banks also devolved. The heads of 
regional branches of those banks were appointed by subnational governments with 
nominal consultation with the bank’s head office. So subnational governments could 
easily intervene in local banks’ decisions on credit extensions, but the losses ultimately 
were borne by the central government. Operations on loans garmented by subnational 
governments were the prevailing practices at that time. Capital transfer by administrative 
mandate was another way. Subnational governments often extracted profits directly or 
through an informal process of “borrowing” from TVEs given their retention of property 
rights and freedom in investment. 499 2) Subnational governments helped to overcome 
                                                      
497 See Zhang & Zou, supra note 466, at 11.   
498 Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, 
Chinese Style, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1719 (2005). 
499 For a substantially long time, the PBOC had been the only banking organization and implemented the unified 
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market entry barriers. Though there were rigid restraints on market entry for non-state 
firms or event SOEs affiliated to different authorities,500 those restraints had little effect 
on subnational governments who had more negotiating power. 501  3) Subnational 
governments used bureaucracy to facilitate market production through the acquisition of 
information, technology, and production material, in a still infant market economy. 502 4) 
More broadly, the robust institutional innovation of subnational governments and 
experimentation approaches to reforms could make it possible to circumvent the 
institutional hurdles and secure institutional benefits for pioneers on the account that the 
subnational government could negotiate face to face with the central government, or it 
could directly initiate its experiment and ask for formal confirmation from the central 
government. On the one hand, local firms would benefit from the first mover advantage; 
on the other hand, the success of local firms would help to secure the ex post positive 
response.  
Interestingly, under the umbrella of regional protectionism, those who were most 
likely to receive this assistance were not necessarily the SOEs, but rather the ones 
deemed most capable of generating maximum benefits; though of course, at that time, 
there were very few privately-owned enterprises. Local SOEs and TVEs were the biggest 
beneficiaries, because all of their taxes would go to the coffer of the subnational 
governments.503  In any event, the non-state sectors represented by the TVEs had 
achieved unparalleled development ever since the foundation of PRC.504  
                                                                                                                                                              
deposit and loan policy. After 1979, decentralization was extended to the People’s Bank of China as well. See Chen, 
supra note 469, at 209-29. .Chen, Kang (1991). 
500 方流芳，公司审批制度与行政性垄断--兼论中国公司法的走向 [J] 中国法学，1992（4）[Fang Liufang, 
Corporation Approval System and Administrative Monopolies—The Trend of China’s Corporation Law, 4 CHINA LEGAL 
SCI. 55 (1992)].  
501 In some cases, officials of local governments could accompany firms to negotiate with various departments of the 
central government. 
502 After 1979, the decentralization was extended to banking system as well. The subnational government gradually 
took the control over See e.g., Jean C. Oi, The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy, 144 CHINA Q. 
1132 (1995); 陈抗，Arye L. Hillman，顾清扬, 财政集权与地方政府行为变化--从援助之手到攫取之手[J] 经济学
（季刊)，2002（10) [Chen Kang, Arye L. Hillman & Gu Qingyang, Fiscal Re-centralization and Behavioral Change of 
Local Governments: from the Helping Hand to the Grabbing Hand, 2 CHINA ECON. Q. 111 2002]. 
503 Generally speaking, local firms could enjoy more preferential policies relative to SOEs owned by the central state, 
such as social welfare, infrastructure, land supply, children education. See Huang, supra note 111, at 191. 
504 Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township Village--Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, 
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Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the incentives to promote local economies did not 
necessarily lead to increased efforts to collect budgetary revenues or to unconditioned 
protection. Tax breaks were widely abused, because the turnover taxes as the bulk of tax 
revenue had to be split between governments, and the enterprise income tax, another 
important portion, would be reaped according to administrative affiliation. So a popular 
trick of subnational governments was to grant more tax breaks than necessary, which is 
also ironically called “hiding wealth in enterprise,” and collect revenues from enterprises 
in the form of “unregulated revenues,” namely, arbitrary charges, fundraising quotas, and 
fines. 505  These governments became the hotbed of serious state opportunism and 
corruption. On the side of the enterprises, they would choose to pay the price, as long as 
the benefits of the protection plus assistance furnished by local governments outweighed 
the costs. A conspiracy between subnational governments and enterprises in their 
jurisdictions subsequently followed. The total welfare of the nation was the biggest loser. 
While as Naughton noted that the diminished central and relaxed industrial control 
have brought greater competition and some equalization of profit rates across 
industries, 506  the competition among subnational governments for revenue have 
unfortunately been converted into competition for enterprise turnovers. This alienation 
was worsened by lagging political reform where government agencies still held 
substantial resources and were able to wield tremendous power to maximize local 
interests at the cost of national welfare.  
Subnational governments were racing to establish a large number of firms within 
their jurisdictions without considering comparative advantages and natural endowments, 
                                                                                                                                                              
18 J. COMP. ECON. 121(1994).  
505 樊纲，论公共收支的新规范—我国乡镇“非规范收入”若干个案的研究与思考[J]经济研究，1995(6) [Fan Gang, 
Analysis on the New Rules of Public Revenues And Expenditures: Cases Studies of “Unregulated Revenues” of Chinese 
Towns And Villages, 6 ECON. RES. J., 34（1995）]. The “unregulated revenues” are also called extra-institution revenues.” 
See 孙潭镇、朱钢, 我国乡镇制度外财政分析 [J]经济研究, 1993(9) [Sun Tanzhen & Zhu Gang, Analysis on The 
Extra-Institution Revenues of China, 9 ECON. RES. J. 23 (1993)]; or “informal revenues,” see李扬, 杨之刚, 张敬东, 
中国城市财政的回顾和展望[J]，济研究参考, 1992 (Z5) [Li Yang, Yang Zhigang, & Zhang Jingdong, Review And 
Outlook on China’s Urban Finance, Z5 REV. ECON. RES. 1056 (1992)].  
506 Barry Naughton, Implications of the State Monopoly over Industry and Its Relaxation, 18 MOD. CHINA 14 (1992).  
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especially in high profit or high tax industries, among which processing, brewing, and 
tobacco industries were the most popular. So what followed was low-level repeated 
construction and similar industrial structures. In order to gain the upper hand in fierce 
competition, subnational governments have a complete set of tricks; for instance, they 
could block the export of raw materials and the import of goods from other regions, issue 
mandate about consuming local products, collect more fees, carry out more inspections, 
examinations, and verifications, and/or set up more approval procedures. Additionally, 
even if a firm is a money loser, it could still get back up from banks under the patronage 
of subnational governments. In this way, the firm could continuously provide public 
goods like employment, healthcare, education, housing, pensions and thereby social 
stability, and taxes based on turnover rather than profits; after all, the losses were to be 
borne by state-owned banks. The Tentative Enterprise Bankruptcy Law adopted in 1986 




















                                                      
507 See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at 76. 
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Table 4 Comparisons about Economic Development and Levels of Centralization 
Regional difference of GDP per capita Comparison of centralization (1989) 





Fiscal revenue of central 
government/total fiscal 
revenue (%) 
Fiscal revenue of 
central 
government/GDP (%) 
China 1993 9.5 70.9 39 5 
US 1983 1.43 11.1 60 21 
UK 1988 1.63 15 86 36 
France 1988 2.15 26 88 41 
Western 
Germany 
1988 1.93 13 64 29 
Canada 1988 2.3 28.1 48 19 
Australia 1978 1.13 4.7 72 27 
Japan 1981 1.47 11.9 65 27 
Source: Huang (2001), at 185. Original source is from Wang Shaoguang at王绍光，分权的底限，
中国计划出版社（1997）[WANG SHAOGUANG, THE LIMITS OF DECENTRALIZATION 50, 66 (China 
Planning Press 1997)]. 
  
After realizing the handcuffs imposed on enterprises, the ever increasing regional 
protectionism, the still unregulated and unstable central-local relations, the subnational 
governments’ lack of stable tax sources, and the central government’s lack of instruments 
for macroeconomic control, a new round of tax reform concerning the reconstruction of 
central-local relations came to the agenda of the Third Session of the Fourteenth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China.  
1994-present 
Intended to overhaul the foregoing problems and the two low ratios (ratio of fiscal 
revenue to GDP; ratio of central revenue to total revenue)508 arising in the first stage of 
                                                      
508 The various tax breaks for seeking regional interest had made the ratio of fiscal revenue (excluding foreign debt) to 
GDP fall from 28.4 per cent of 1979 to 12.6 per cent of 1993; on the other hand, the fiscal decentralization had led to a 
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fiscal decentralization under the banner of the fiscal contract system, the 1994 reform was 
virtually a re-centralization process, which aimed at 1) converting the contract system 
into a tax assignment system based on an appropriate division of responsibilities and 
powers between the central and local governments, and establishing the central and local 
taxation systems, respectively; 2) reforming and completing the taxation system in line 
with the principles of unity, fairness, simple rules and appropriate decentralization;509  
According to the “国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定” [State Council 
Decision on The Tax Assignment System],510 three arrangements were to be put in place:  
1) The consolidation of the central and local taxation system supported by the 
establishment of the State Administration of Taxation, which would be in charge of 
collecting central taxes and shared taxes.511 Such taxes that should go to the central 
government included taxes that were necessary to protect national interest and implement 
macro-economic policies. The shared taxes included taxes that were directly associated 
with economic growth. As an effective measure to solve the two low ratio issues, 75 per 
cent of the shared taxes were to go to the coffer of the central government, while 25 per 
cent was to go to the subnational governments. In spite of the original projection to 
incorporate the enterprise income tax into the shared taxes, thereby breaking away the 
administrative subordination of enterprises, the status quo of the income tax remained 
unchanged. 
2) The division of central and local responsibilities and correspondent fiscal 
expenditures. No significant improvement was presented because the division was 
                                                                                                                                                              
plunge of the ratio of the central revenue to total revenue from 46.8 per cent of 1979 to 31.6 per cent of 1993. See Jia & 
Zhao, supra note 434, at 77.  
509 中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定 [Decisions on Some Issues about The Establishment 
of A Socialist Market Economy] (promulgated by the Third Session of the Fourteenth Cent. Committee of the CPS, Nov. 
14, 1993), XINHUA NETWORK (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 八届全国人大一次会议政府工作报告
(1993)[Government Work Report at the First Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress, 1993）(stressing that 
the reform is to streamline the central-local relationships and the relationships between government and enterprise, and 
the goal is to establish a tax assignment system and the separation of profit and tax) , available at 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_200926.htm  
510国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定 [State Council Decision on The Tax Assignment System] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Dec. 15, 1993, effective Dec. 15, 1993), PEOPLE DAILY, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/gwy/czjr/s931225.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
511 Previously all taxes should be collected by the local taxation bureaus with few exceptions like  
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overwhelmingly rough and general, in particular the authority in investment. 
3) The maintenance of transfer payment system. It indicated salient characteristics of 
path dependence in that the rules were fixed in accordance with the status quo of the 
interest structure in 1993 in exchange for subnational governments’ support of the reform. 
512 
Has the new reform regime mitigated regional protectionism? As Huang (1996) 
noted, regional protectionism is essentially regional conflict of fiscal allocation arising 
from unbalanced central-local relations. Accordingly, without an effective mitigation of 
this conflict, the solution to regional protection is not optimistic.513  
First, delinking the affiliation of enterprises from central and local governments with 
their income taxation through the introduction of an income tax sharing system has had a 
limited effect, because income taxes account for a rather small fraction of local revenues 
relative to turnover taxes, not to mention that the real action on delinking was launched in 
2002 seven years after the 1994 reform.514 To illustrate, the sum of the shared turnover 
tax revenue of thirty provincial governments in 1990 was 17.96 billion RMB, which 
accounted for 91 per cent of the 19.72 billion RMB of total subnational fiscal revenue.515 
It was determined that in order to secure more revenue, the subnational governments had 
incentives to protect all locally located firms, including those owned by central 
governments. Before delinking the administrative affiliation, subnational governments 
might have further incentives to favor firms with local ownership given limited resources 
at hand, on account that income tax of these firms would not be reaped by the central 
                                                      
512 Transfer payment includes two components: tax returns and special grants. The tax return mechanism recognized 
the vested interest of subnational governments, but at the same time, left the incremental interest to the central 
government. The special grant was meant to implement macro-economic policies.  
513 See Huang, supra note 470.  
514 The shared income tax reform was eventually launched on Jan. 1, 2002, and covered both enterprise and personal 
income tax, according to “所得税收入分享改革方案” [Notice about The Income Tax Sharing Reform] (promulgated 
by St. Council, Dec. 31, 2001, effective Dec. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61880.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). In 2002, the central 
and local governments respectively enjoyed 50 per cent of income tax revenues; since 2003 and onwards, the share of 
the central government has risen to 60 per cent, but all increased revenues of the central government thanks to the new 
income tax sharing system shall be used to general transfer payment to subnational governments, in particular those 
situated in central and western regions. See Jia & Zhao, supra note 434, at87.  
515 See Huang, supra note 470, at 37-8.  
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government. 
Second, the fiscal re-centralization substantially constrained the subnational 
governments’ capacity to grant tax breaks, which in turn was likely to weaken the 
bargaining power of subnational governments aspiring to extra-budgetary and 
unregulated revenues. Banks were restructured and modeled on the United States Federal 
Reserve, so that the extension of credit will have to be approved by the Credit Evaluation 
Committee which is supposed to be immune from local intervention.516  All these 
measures have significantly reduced the fiscal capacity of subnational governments, and 
they are carried on in the absence of a timely and effective accompaniment of 
government functions and enterprise transformation. The arbitrarily mounting 
responsibilities thus have even worsened the fiscal starving of subnational governments. 
They have to continue selling their product—regional protectionism—in exchange for 
various non-budgetary revenues (extra-budgetary plus unregulated revenues), which 
would not be exploited by the central government. What is different is that they do not 
have the same sufficient stock in their armory as before, so innovation becomes 
necessary.517 As opposed to the conventional explicit regional blockade, the new implicit 
regional blockade measures may include: 1) limiting or excluding non-local firms during 
the course of bidding through no disclosure of information, delayed disclosure, and 
disclosure of false, inaccurate, or incomplete information; 2) discriminatory treatment of 
non-local firms in terms of registration, collection of taxes and fees, health quarantine, 
land use approval, and other market regulations; 3) illegal subsidies and tax breaks for 
                                                      
516 Head of local branches of banks will no longer in the hand of subnational governments. See Chen, Hillman & Gu, 
supra note 503, at 116, fn 12. Ironically, as long as the cost-benefit analysis still makes sense, subnational governments 
will explore everything possible to acquire credit from banks, so very swiftly the direct administrative intervention has 
been replaced by administrative rewards. Some subnational governments even induced local banks to write off bad 
loans of local firms. See廖晓燕，瞿梦杰，乡镇企业兴衰: 基于行政分权与经济分权的解释 [J]湖南财经高等专科
学校学报，2010（1）[Liao Xiaoyan & Qu Mengjie, The Rise and Fall of Township and Village Enterprises: the 
Interpretation of Administrative Decentralization and Economic Decentralization, 26 J. HUNAN FIN. & ECON. C.118 
(2010)]. 
517 308件地区封锁性’红头文件’已被修改废止 [308 Subnational Policies Regarding Regional Blockade Have Been 
Modified or Abolished], LEGAL DAILY, Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://news.sohu.com/20051229/n241188832.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012). It is said that regional protectionism is moving towards some extreme forms, such as tax 
evasion, conniving or encouraging the violation of IP rights, production of forged and fake commodities, and 
smuggling. See Huang, supra note 111, at 197, 202. 
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local firms; 4) unequal law enforcement. More seriously, subnational governments may 
hold a laissez faire position in the face of local firms’ violation of laws.518 With the 
market system getting more mature and less dependent on government to secure 
resources for economic activities, resistance towards price protection is gradually rising, 
and the “helping hands” are becoming “grabbing hands.”519 
B. Incentive mechanism: Another driving force for regional protectionism 
Government fficials respond to incentives, however, local-interest is not the only 
factor that local officials would consider. What has made local officials sensitive to local 
economic conditions? Why the great room for rent-seeking during the course of regional 
protection has not left the subnational governments completely captured by the SOEs and 
TVEs, given their close ties with subnational governments? And why the competition for 
rents among local official has not been so serious as to prevent investment in new firms at 
all? The answers to these two questions rest on the degree of political centralization in 
China, another important backdrop of fiscal decentralization. Three characteristics will 
help to examine this issue: local government officials’ appointment, evaluation and 
promotion. 
Change in China is progressing without a substantive constitutional component.  
The ruling party has held a political monopoly ever since the foundation of the PRC. 
The monopoly has left the central government in a strong position to reward or punish 
local administrations, which objectively reduced the risk of local capture by incumbent 
firms or the scope of competition for rents in the post-reform period.520  
                                                      
518 云南曲靖有毒铬渣仍未处理 工厂获批顶风复工[The Factory Was Allowed to Restore Production without 
Disposal of Poisonous Chromium Residues], BEIJING NEWS, Nov. 6, 2011, available at 
http://env.people.com.cn/GB/16147063.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); 宣华华, 警惕地方保护主义干扰食品安全
事件 [Xuan Huahua, Be wary of the Impact of Regional Protectionism on Food Safety Event], CHINA.COM.CN, Sep. 14, 
2008, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2008-09-14/091316289458.shtml(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (disclosing 
the hiding of the tainted milk powder by local government); 黄利明, 证监会遭遇地方保护主义[Huang Liming, 
Impact of Regional Protectionism on China Securities Regulatory Commission], EEO.COM.CN, 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/observer/pop_commentary/2011/04/10/198427.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (disclosing the 
protection of local firms and their executives by local government for fiscal reasons, and the selective law enforcement 
with the criteria of whether it is beneficial for local parties)。 
519 See Chen, Hillman & Gu, supra note 502. 
520 Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia, 
48 PALGRAVE MACMILLAN J.8 (2000).  
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Before reforms, political centralization was demonstrated by the direct appointment 
and supervision of local government officials by upper level leaders. In the post-reform 
era, the generation mechanism of local officials has changed to a two-step process: 
nomination by the upper level government, and ratification voting by local a people’s 
congress. Though the people’s congress has notoriously been dubbed “rubber stamp,” this 
change did stir the pot. At least two vetoes have been recorded.521 Currently, local 
officials have to reconcile central and local interests. Particularly the government officials 
below the provincial level are not even nominated by central government, which makes 
them respond to local interest more actively. However, in any event, the upper level 
government still plays a primary role in shaping local government’s behavior.  
Posts for upper level government leaders are always a scarce resource relative to 
their seekers It is a zero-sum game. In the so-called political tournament, government 
officials of same level will compete against each other to reach the promotion criteria set 
up by upper level government. Ever since the reform and opening policies started, the 
promotion criteria has shifted from pure political requirements to a combination of 
political and economic indexes, with GDP growth the leading parameter. Empirical 
evidence indicates that the likelihood of a provincial leader’s promotion increases with 
the region’s economic performance.522Aside from the measurable and explicit economic 
index, the control and governance of provincial personnel also lies in immeasurable or 
implicit dimensions, such as holding positions in Politburo, direct assignment by the 
Central Committee of CPC, and taking office outside of one’s hometown. It is noteworthy 
that such parameters as social stability, public safety, provision of public goods, and birth 
control are always in the matrix of officials’ evaluation at various levels. They are 
measurable and open (among the officials) and are usually regarded as components of 
political requirements for officials, but they are selectively highlighted in different stages 
                                                      
521 沈立人，地方政府的经济职能和经济行为，上海远东出版社（1998）[SHEN LIREN, ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS AND 
BEHAVIORS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Shanghai Far East Publishers 1998).  
522 Hongbin Li & Li-an Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control 
in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743 (2004).  
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and periods. With aggravating social tensions accumulated during the course of reform, 
social stability is climbing to a position closer to GDP growth. If economic indexes are 
primarily employed to prompt economic growth, the non-economic approaches would 
help to prevent corruption and disloyalty.523 
In China’s political tournament, the yardstick competition functioned in a top down 
pattern, given the upper government-oriented political order.524 In order to overcome the 
political agency problem, the upper level government not only look at the absolute 
number of GDP growth and other economic parameters, but also the relative performance 
of each lower government compared to similarly-conditioned governments. This has 
incentivized local officials to keep a close eye on competitors to learn and also to monitor, 
and it has resulted in a spillover effect of the behavior of a given official. What is 
particularly destructive and also differentiates this spillover effect from externality issue 
is that the officials in the political tournament only care about the relative rank.525 For the 
purpose of “lifting” one’s relative position among competitors, learning from others’ good 
experience so as to promote the local economy or at least not to be left behind is not the 
only option; as long as cost permits, depressing the performance of competitors is in the 
toolbox of local governments as well given the zero-sum game in nature.  
As noted by Zhou, the relative-evaluation-based and GDP oriented incentive 
mechanism had played a positive role in the pre-reform and early stage of reform 
periods,526 but its negative effect is becoming increasingly salient.527 If the duplicative 
                                                      
523 Yasheng Huang, Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective, 50 POL. STUD. 61 (2002).   
524 The concept of “yardstick competition” was first introduced by Besley and Anne. it is claimed that in a 
multi-jurisdictional world, voters are assumed to make comparison between jurisdictions to overcome the political 
agency problem. This forces the incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other 
jurisdictions are doing. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and 
Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995). For a analysis of China’s top-down functioning yardstick 
competition, see张晏，夏纪军， 张文瑾，自上而下的标尺竞争与中国省级政府公共支出溢出效应差异 [J]浙江
社会科学，2010（12）[Zhang Yan, Xia Jijun & Zhang Wenjin, Downward Yardstick Competition and Spillover Effect 
Differences of Provincial Public Spending in China, 20 ZHEJIANG SOC. SCI. 10 (2010)].  
525 As for externality, if it could be internalized, then one’s benefit could be aligned with others.  
526 For instance, it took China only thirty years to establish the Western style industrial system that the West spent 
hundreds of years on. 
527 周黎安，晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作：兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设长期存在的原因[J]经济研
究, 2004(6) [Zhou Li’an, The Incentive and Cooperation of Government Officials in the Political Tournaments: An 
Interpretation of the Prolonged Local Protectionism and Duplicative Investments in China, 6 ECON. RES. 33 (2004)].  
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investment and repeated construction due to the super profit generated by price 
distortions in early stage of reforms, this cause would not hold the water as the market 
system becomes more mature and the demand for regional division of labor and 
coordination is rising. Many local firms are especially de facto money losers. 
C. Cellular market: Result of regional protectionism 
Due to Mao’s movement of decentralization, China’s industrial structure already had 
a cellular pattern before reforms. There would be a copycat of a specific industry in each 
province.528 In the post-reform era, the prolonged regional protectionism arising from the 
combination of tax competition and political tournament has greatly encouraged 
duplicative investments and furthered this pattern. A World Bank study comparing the 
structural differences in different countries study indicates that industrial structures across 
regions in China were much lower than in the United States or the European 
Community.529 They also found that each major industrial group was located in virtually 
all provinces.530 Local governments were rushing to the same or similar industries and 
key state projects, thus as of 2001, 23 provinces manufactured washing machines, 29 
made television sets, 23  produced refrigerators, and 27 assembled automobiles.531 This 
kind of low-level duplicative investment has led China towards a “backward 
specialization”532 and a loss of economies of scale. 
Unsurprisingly, a segmented market would lead to low market concentration ratios. 
Official statistics indicate that market concentration ratios in China have been unusually 
low when compared to both developed and developing economies.533 Between the 
                                                      
528 Audrey Donnithorne, China’s Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution, 52 CHINA 
Q. 605 (1972) (discussing the development and implications of China’s cellular economy). 
529 World Bank, China: Internal Market Development and Regulation 20 (1994), 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/1994/12/697822/china-internal-market-development-regulation.  
530 Id.   
531 See Pei, supra note 115, at 126. 
532 See Yang, supra note 465. 
533 In China, the concentration ratio of the largest four producers in 1984 was 17% for automobiles, 15% for cigarettes, 
17% for plate glass, and 2% for cement. By contrast, in the United States, the concentration ratio of the largest four 
producers in 1982 was 97% for automobiles, 90% for cigarettes, 78% for plate glass, and 31% for cement. In India, the 
concentration ratio of the largest four producers in 1968 was 57% for automobiles, 64% for plate glass, and 60% for 
cement. See 戚隶东, 中国现代垄断经济研究, 经济科学出版社 (1999) [QI LVDONG, MONOPOLY ECONOMICS IN 
MODERN CHINA (1999)].  
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mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the average market concentration ratio for the largest 100 
firms in various sectors hovered between 10 and 16 per percent.534 In the mid-1990s, in 
18 out of 39 major sectors, the largest 8 firms in each sector accounted for less than 10 
percent of the market share.535 
The cellular market is further exaggerated by the lack of incentive to cooperate 
between regions with different endowments. One major barrier lies in the difficulties in 
reconciling local interests. This dilemma broadly exists in areas with large cooperative 
potential, such as the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Beijing-Tianjin-Tanggu 
region, and Bohai Gulf area, just to name a few. Many of these issues have been 
discussed for twenty years without any solutions. The central government cannot come 
up with a strong macroeconomic policy and institutional innovation within the current 
unbalanced central-local relationship.536  
Another concern arising from the cellular market and duplicative construction is their 
possible curb on antitrust enforcement targeting SMEs, either private or public.  
First, a popular point of view is that the key problem facing the SMEs is not the lack 
of competition but rather too much competition.537 The average life span of an SME is 
merely 3.7 years in China, but that number in Europe and Japan is 12.5 years, and 8.2 
years in the U.S.538 But the other side of excessive competition is the low relative SME 
number. This number is 11 per 1,000 people in China, which much lower than 45 per 
thousand people in developed countries, and also lower than 25 per 1,000 people in 
developing countries.539 
                                                      
534 Id.  
535 Id.  
536 蔡岚, 我国地方政府间合作困境研究述评[J]学术研究，2009（9）[Cai Lan, Studies of the Straits in Cooperation 
among China’s Regional Governments, 9 ACAD. RES. 50 (2009)].  
537 Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility (Stanford 
Law & Economics Olin Working Paper No. 295, 2006).   
538 民建中央专题调研组，后危机时代中小企业转型与创新的调查与建议[Special Reserach Group of the Central 
Committee of China Democratic National Construction Association, Survey and Advice on Transformation and 
Innovation of the SMEs in Post-crisis Era] (2011), http://lib.sgu.edu.cn/development/zxqy/201102/7117.shtml.  
539 中央经济工作会议释放 “五大信号” [Five Significant Signals from the Central Economic Working Conference], 
XINHUA, NETWORK, Dec. 7, 2009, available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-12/07/content_1482007.htm (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012).  
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Second, the government is grappling with a lack of effective macroeconomic policy 
tools to fine-tune the economy, so the Chinese policy makers tend to micromanage the 
economy by directly controlling the scale of investment at the local level. Due to the 
close ties of the SOEs with state-owned banks, the SMEs are always the most direct 
victims of the tightened monetary policy. A typical illustration is the very recent Wenzhou 
factory bosses who were caught in a dire credit crunch.540 This is likely to worsen the 
already entrenched unfair treatment of the private sector, most of which are SMEs. 
3.6.4 Institutionalized Unequal Treatment of Private Enterprises 
The reform and opening policies have embraced private domestic and foreign 
enterprises. They are small in average scale but large in number and contribution to the 
entire economy. A vast majority of the private enterprises are SMEs except for the 
presence of multinationals.541 In 1979, the non-state sector accounted for less than 1 per 
cent of the GDP, but now its weight has risen to about one third.542 By the end of 2009, 
there are 10, 231, 000 registered private firms excluding 31, 300, 000 individual 
businesses, accounting for 99 per cent of total registered enterprises. Private enterprises 
have created the market value of final goods and services equivalent to 60 per cent of 
GDP, and contributed to 50 per cent of tax revenue and 80 per cent of urban 
employment.543 
However, private firms have been subject to institutionalized unfair treatment. It has 
manifested both in pre- and post-entry phases. 
                                                      
540 Elaine Kurtenbach, Wenzhou Credit Crisis May Augur Wider Woes (Oct. 19, 2011), 
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542 两部门就国务院鼓励非公经济发展若干意见答问[Press Conference Regarding the Thirty-Six Measures on 
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A. Unfair treatment of private enterprises in pre-entry stage 
In the pre-entry phase, there are substantial entry barriers. In the case of domestic 
private capital, entry restrictions are imposed mainly through stringent licensing, 
minimum capital requirements, and non-transparent restrictions. As for foreign 
investment, the government periodically publishes a guidance catalog on the sectors and 
industries in which entry is prohibited or restricted.  
Before 1988, private investments were not allowed to establish enterprises.544 They 
could only exist in the form of individual businesses. Even so they had to obtain approval 
from different regulatory agencies hat varied according to their businesses, and their 
scope and scale of business were restrained.545  Ironically, the establishment of an 
enterprise was preconditioned on the approval of its department in charge or a 
subnational government; otherwise this enterprise could not be registered, that is to say, 
the department in charge or a subnational government was both the parent and regulator 
of the enterprises they approved.546 
It was only after the adoption of the“私营企业暂行条例”[Provisional Regulations of 
the People’s Republic of China on Private Enterprises]547 in 1988 that non-affiliated 
organizations were allowed to be registered as enterprises. But they still have to face 
entry barriers, such as government approval, difficulties in financing, abstract entry 
restrictions, and unfair competition between SOEs and private firms or between local and 
non-local firms. 
                                                      
544 See art. 2 (listing the types of organizations that could be registered, which did not include the full private capitaled 
enterprises), and art 20 (stating that the registration of indiviual businesses should be regulated pursuant to other rules) 
of “工商登记管理条例”（1982）[Regulation on Administration of Industrial and Commerical Registration] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Aug. 18, 1982, effective Aug. 18, 1982), PEOPLE’S NETWORK (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) 
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547 私营企业暂行条例 [Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Private Enterprises] 
(promulgated by St. Council, June 25, 1988, effective July 1, 1988), LAWTIME.CN (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
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In recent years, considering that the problems facing private capital could no longer 
be solved from a purely economic perspective, the central government issued new 
government documents to boost private firms. In 2005, based on broad consultation with 
private firms and the deep involvement of private entrepreneurs,548 the State Council 
issued a guidance opinion dubbed “Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public Economy,” the 
first government document with the theme of promoting the development of the private 
sector. The 2005 document presented the government’s intention to level the playing 
ground and relax market entry restrictions against private enterprises in a number of 
strategic sectors or monopolized industries, including public utilities and infrastructure, 
social services, financial services, national defense, electricity, telecommunications, 
railroads, airlines, and petroleum. It further explicitly stipulated that market entry would 
be permitted in sectors or industries where the law does not explicitly prohibit entry. 
Private capital was encouraged to participate in SOE restructuring, and more financial 
and tax support was promised. In an effort to reduce the uncertainty surrounding market 
entry, the 2005 document also commanded transparency of all institutions, requirement 
and procedures, and central government agencies and subnational governments were 
required to check up and amend rules, regulations and policies that restrict the entry of 
private enterprises.549  
However, for the lack of effective rule implementation, many complained that the 
2005 document has become virtually a dead letter. A new wave of state sector expansion 
accompanied by private sector contraction has been launched,550 the financial strains of 
                                                      
548 王信川, 揭秘非公经济 36条出台内幕[Wang Xinchuan, Disclosing the Inside Story of the Adoption of the 
“Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public Economy] , ECON., May 27, 2005, available at 
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expansion of the state sector with private sector contraction as a response to the 2008 financial crisis is very likely to 
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private sector are persistent, and state monopolies are entrenched. A survey conducted by 
the All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce (ACFIC) revealed that: 1) the degree 
of satisfaction of private firms towards the implementation of the 2005 document has 
dropped gradually.551  Only 51.3 per cent of private firms were satisfied with the 
implementation work by agencies of the central government, and the satisfaction 
percentage of the implementation work by subnational governments was 43.2 per cent. 2) 
The lack of rule implementation was regarded as the key cause of the sluggish 
implementation of the document. Enhancing the financial service, clarifying 
demarcations between the public and private sectors, and breaking up monopolies were 
the most important barriers to private investment.  
 In the wake of the economic meltdown, a new “Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public 
Economy” was introduced in 2010 as a crucial ingredient of the stimulus package to 
encourage private investment given the limitations of state capital. 552  The 2010 
document was meant to energize the 2005 document by clarifying the permitted 
industries for private investment, restraining the scope of public investment, and 
emphasizing the restructuring of SOEs. Nevertheless, it did not touch on such 
anti-monopoly issues as the involvement of private capital in natural monopoly 
                                                                                                                                                              
have resulted in five terrible results: 1) delayed or aborted economic transition from heavy reliance on export and 
investment on the basis of the false perception that an SOE dominated economy plus rigid state regulation is a viable 
formula for economic downturn; 2) declined employment because the state sector loses 1 million job annual in contrast 
with the contribution of 4-6 million jobs by the private sector; 3) negative effect on income growth due to lost jobs; 4) 
threat to industrial restructuring on account that more money in the hands of the state means more money would be 
invested in infrastructure and large project construction, especially high-pollution heavy industries; and 5) democratic 
and legal progression may come to a standstill considering that the stator sector usually enjoys explicit or implicit 
privileges when violating rules and regulations). However, different voices also exist,”国进民退” 不成立 个别国企
兼并私企不宜放大[The Allegation of “State Sector Expansion with Private Sector Contraction” Cannot Hold the 
Water; Acquisition of Private Firms by SOEs Should Not Be Exaggerated], XINHUA NETWORK, May 25, 2010, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-05/25/c_12140526.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (arguing that 1) statistics 
do not support the state sector expansion with private sector contraction, 2) nationalization is a popular approach to deal 
with financial crisis in the West, 3) the leading role played by the SOEs is inherent in a socialist market economy but it 
is achieved by self-improving rather than excluding or gobbling up private firms)  
551 Report on the Implementation of the Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public Economy, (2010), available at 
http://www.fjgsl.org.cn/NewsView.aspx?NewsID=5257 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
552  国家发展改革委负责人就《国务院关于鼓励和引导民间投资健康发展的若干意见》答记者问[Press 
Conference on New “New Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public Economy”] , SDPC.GOVE.CN, May 14, 2010, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20100514_346812.htm; see 国务院关于鼓励和引导民间投资 
健康发展的若干意见[New Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public Economy] (promulgated by St. Council, May 7, 2010, 
effective May 7, 2010), GOV.CN (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
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industries,553 and neither did it deliver any effective measures to mitigate credit hunger 
of private firms. So it is not surprising that one year has passed, the financial strain has 
killed many SMEs,554 and the penetration of private capital to financial, railway, energy, 
and public utility industries is fruitless.555  
The interest ties between regulatory agencies and their former affiliated SOEs have 
substantially hampered the efforts to break entry barriers. The persistent monopoly of the 
state-run Xinhua Bookstore in textbook distribution is a good illustration. It was reported 
that by 2005 the volume of the textbooks for elementary and middle schools accounted 
for 46.2 per cent of total volume, and the sale revenue generated from textbooks was 37.9 
per cent of total sales revenue. However, such a lucrative business has long been 
dominated by Xinhua Bookstore ever since the foundation of the PRC. In most provinces, 
there is more than 70 per cent of profit for Xinhua Bookstore extracted from textbook 
distribution; this ratio is as large as 90 per cent in many of its grassroots unit bookstores.  
In response to the foregoing problems, two government documents have been issued 
in 2001 and 2005 respectively, launching two rounds of textbook distribution reforms. 
They were intended to curb the monopoly of Xinhua Bookstore, regional blockades, and 
soaring textbook prices by introducing a cross-region bidding system. However, the 2001 
reform experimentation in three provinces fell greatly short of expectations given that the 
bid winner was still Xinhua Bookstore and the average decrease in textbook price was 
merely 1 to 7 per cent with the average being 4.7 per cent.556 An NDRC official revealed 
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556 新华书店何时不再垄断教材发行[When Xinhua Bookstore Would Stop Monopolizing Textbook 
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that a key cause for the result was inviting the bidding mechanism which restrained the 
bidders basically to the Xinhua Bookstore system and excluded all private distribution 
firms and many other SOEs.557 In order to strengthen the reform, the second document 
was put in place in 2005 to 1) expand the scope of reform experiment from 3 to 11 
provinces, 2) substitute public bidding for inviting bidding, 3) include all qualified 
bidders regardless of their ownership. These reforms were implemented across China in 
2008.558 Nevertheless, without clearing the blurry boundary of business on the market 
and government branches, the Xinhua Bookstore’s monopoly is intractable. It was 
reported that in 2011, the cost of study aids were several times of that the textbooks 
because Xinhua Bookstore enjoys the monopoly over textbook and study aid 
subscriptions.559 So until now the textbook and study aids distribution is still the cash 
cow of the national champion in the book distribution industry, and understandably, 
textbook prices continue to rise persistently rising which has been intolerably aggregating 
the economic burden of students and their parents, in particular those living in rural areas. 
It was reported that textbook expenses accounted for about 30 per cent of a student’s total 
costs; many rural students have to drop out because they cannot afford the textbooks.560 
Moreover, this persistent monopoly has resulted in corruption, and a number of Xinhua 
Bookstore managers have received term imprisonment, life sentences, or even the death 
penalty.561 
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B. Unfair treatment of private enterprises in post-entry stage 
In the post-entry stage, tax discrimination, financial discrimination, administrative 
charges, expenses social security expenses, discriminative allocation of resources, and 
lagged regulatory reforms are the major forms of unfair treatment that have hampered the 
development of private enterprises. 
1. Tax discrimination  
Before 2008, a dichotomous tax regulation system was applied to domestic and 
foreign-related enterprises to attract and encourage foreign investment. The taxation of 
Chinese firms was regulated by the “中华人民共和国企业所得税暂行条例 ” 
[Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China On Enterprises Income 
Tax].562 The tax rate for all Chinese firms was 33 per cent. The taxation of enterprises 
with foreign investment and foreign enterprises were regulated by the“中华人民共和国
外商投资企业和外国企业所得税法” [Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of 
China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises].563 The nominal 
tax rate for all foreign firms was also 33 per cent. Under the disguise of the same nominal 
tax rate, there was unfair treatment between domestic and foreign-related enterprises. A 
variety of tax breaks could be extended to enterprises with foreign investment and foreign 
enterprises in the name of regional capital allowances, productive foreign enterprises 
capital allowances, refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount, tax breaks for 
export enterprises and enterprises possessing advanced technologies, tax breaks for 
software and integrated circuit manufacturing enterprises, withholding income tax, tax 
credit for purchasing domestic equipment, and tax breaks for investment in the western 
region of China.564 Statistics indicated that the average real tax rate of domestic firms 
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外国企业的税收优惠制度[Zhu Daqi, China’s Foreign-Related Tax Preference Policy] (2007), available at 
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was about 25 per cent, but that of foreign-related enterprises was 15 per cent. This has 
directly increased the tax burden of domestic enterprises and substantially weakened their 
competitiveness.  
The dichotomous tax regulation system was increasingly losing its legitimacy when 
China entered the WTO, and trade barriers were substantially lowered. In order to level 
the playing field, China unified the enterprise income tax at 25 per cent in 2008. 
Meanwhile, the unification of small tax categories has also been completed. The vehicle 
and vessel tax, farmland occupation tax, and real estate tax respectively were unified in 
2007 and 2009. In 2010, with the official notice requiring foreign-related enterprises to 
pay city planning taxes and education surtaxes as all domestic firms, the last step towards 
a unified tax system was completed.565  
Fairly different from the national champions and international giants, most private 
firms are SMEs, but they have to bear the overloaded taxes, administrative charges, and 
social security expenses relative to their small scale. A scholar of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences summarized the six categories of explicit or implicit taxes and 
administrative charges that the SMEs have to pay: taxes which mainly include value 
added tax, sales tax and income tax; administrative charges which primarily include an 
education surtax, a water resources fee, and social insurance charges;566 fees for paid 
service of the government;567 arbitrary fund-raising quotas and fines by governments; 
cost forced by corruption; and compliance costs that are paid to cater for various 
administrative regulations. Zibin Li, president of the Small and Medium Enterprises 
Association of China, said that the real tax rate of SMEs is over 30 per cent. Several 
reasons would explain why under the same nominal tax, SMEs would have to bear high 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/Article/default.asp?id=48539.  
565 席斯, 完成统一税制最后一关 外企将缴城建税和教育费附加[Xi Si, Last Step for A Unified Tax System: 
Foreign-related Enterprises Will Pay City Planning Tax and Education Surtax], EEO.COM.CN, Oct. 21, 2010, 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/Politics/beijing_news/2010/10/21/183358.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
566 It is estimated that every 1 RMB tax would result in 0.5—0.7 RMB administrative charges. See 关注咱们的税负
②:中小企业税费有多重?[Attention on Aax and Ddministrative Charges II: How Heavy Are the SME’s Tax and 
Administrative Charges Burdens], PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 14, 2011, available at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/16231144.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
567 Some of it is not legal but has to be paid. Id.  
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burden: 
First, the profit of many SMEs is very thin because a majority of SMEs are 
concentrated in labor-intensive and competitive industries. Statistics indicated that in the 
first quarter of 2010, 36.1 per cent of medium-sized enterprises and 49.5 per cent of small 
enterprises were under the normal level of profitability, and 15.7 per cent of 
medium-sized enterprises and 17.6 per cent of small enterprises were in red ink.568  
Second, most of SOEs are in the strategic and monopolized industries such as public 
utilities, railway, telecommunications, and energy industries, and multinationals usually 
have economies of scale and better control of costs, so they are all likely to generate 
higher profits. Thus, the tax to profit ration is lower in SOEs than in SMEs. 
Third, the structure of the tax system in China has worsened the tax burden of private 
firms. The turnover taxes which include value added tax and sales tax, account for 60 per 
cent of tax income, but unlike enterprise income tax that can vary with the ups and downs 
of enterprise income, turnover taxes are based on sales of products and services, so even 
when profits change, the tax remains fixed. It further increases the burden of SMEs who 
often have less profit than large firms.  
Fourth, appraised collection of taxes is widely implemented to SMEs, because 
oftentimes they do not have well-established bookkeeping systems. So when the 
economy slows down and the appraised tax is not reduced in a timely manner, the tax 
burden would naturally be increased. 
Fifth, the ratio of compliance cost to profit of SMEs is evidently higher than that of 
large firms. 
2. Financial discrimination 
Financial discrimination can persistently exist from pre- to post-entry stage. Among 
the financing channels of private firms in China, the self-financing ratio is as high as 
90. 5 per cent, bank loan accounts for 4.0 per cent, non-financial institution loans account 
                                                      
568 See Special Reserach Group of the the Central Committee of China Democratic National Construction Association. 
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for 2.6 per cent, and other channels account for 2.9 per cent.569 The current Wenzhou 
credit crisis is exactly the explosion of the long aggregated problem of financial 
discrimination against private firms.570  
3. Discriminative allocation of resources 
The quick rise and fall of China’s private airline companies provides a good example 
of the discriminative allocation of resources. By 2007, 30 applications had been 
submitted by private airlines and among them 17 had been approved and put into 
operation.571 Upon entering the industry, the private airlines realized that they were 
already trapped by discrimination in route time allocations and government subsidies to 
SOE airlines.572 After about five years of weathering the financial crisis, most of the 
private airline companies that came into operation were liquidated, acquired by 
state-owned airline companies, or were in serious financial trouble, 573  while the 
state-owned airlines have been properly protected through direct capital injection or 
subsidies.574 
4. Lagged regulatory reforms 
 Market-oriented reform has been executed for thirty years, but the regulation has 
lagged far behind. Take the private hospital for example. Previously, there was only one 
type of ownership of hospitals: state-owned hospitals. With the burgeoning of private 
hospitals, the institutions found that they had to grapple with non-national treatment by 
regulatory agencies. They may have to illegally print their own invoices because they are 
not available from tax bureaus; they may not be ranked as a Class A hospital because one 
                                                      
569 中华全国工商业联合会，中国民营经济发展报告，社会科学文献出版社(2004) [ALL CHINA FEDERATION OF 
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, THE DEVELOPMENT REPORT OF NON-PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN CHINA (2004)].  
570 See Kurtenbach, supra note 540. 
571 2004年以来我国已有 17家民营航空公司投入运行[Seventeen Private Airlines Have Come into Operation since 
2004], GOV.CN, Sep. 6, 2007, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-09/06/content_6674874.htm (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
572 李金玲, 国航民企命折潜规则 “败局”背后的制度羁绊 [Li Jinling, Private Airlines Are Doomed by Institutional 
Trap], PEOPLE’S NETWORK, July 8, 2010, http://caac.people.com.cn/GB/114104/12089179.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2012). 
573 Id. 
574 三大航空集团有望获政府注资 总额有望达到 31亿[Government Capital is Expected to Be Injected into Three 
State-owned Airline Groups; Total Amount May Reach 3.1Bilion], SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS, July 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.chinanews.com/cj/cj-cyzh/news/2009/07-29/1794612.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
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requirement is to have obstetrical department. The hidden rules in many places, however, 
do not allow private hospitals to have obstetrical department for fear of medical 
accidents.575 
3.6.5 Emergence of the AML 
The emergence of Chinese competition law is a vivid reflection of the political and 
economic dynamics of transitional China, and also forecasts the subsequent issues 
encountered by public and private enforcers. 
Once it decided to develop the economy, the Chinese government soon recognized 
the importance of market order. In 1980, one year after the commencement of the reform 
and opening policy, the State Council issued ”关于开展和保护社会主义竞争的暂行规
定” [Interim Provisions on Staring and Protecting Socialist Competition].576 It prohibited 
various domestic anti-competitive practices by administrative monopolies and economic 
monopolies.  
Though the official preparation of the AML began in 1994, its fermentation can date 
back as early as 1987.  
At that time, foreign investment in China was warmly welcomed, but subject to 
certain constraints. Production by the state and collectively-owned sectors constituted 
about 75 percent of Chinese industrial output and foreign investment was seen as a means 
to obtain foreign technology, foreign exchange and foreign management expertise. At 
least initially, the AML probably was directed towards making the state-owned sector 
more efficient and market driven rather than towards regulating foreign investors, whose 
entry into the market was and still is regulated through a government approval process.577
 A few things have changed since 1994. First, China joined the WTO in December 
2001. This development impacted how China could regulate foreign investment, 
                                                      
575 业内人士称医疗市场不公平阻遏民营医院发展[Insiders Claim That Unfair Treatment Has Hampered the 
Development of Private Hospitals], OUTLOOK WKLY., Aug. 30, 2010, available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-08-30/115721001936.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).   
576 关于开展和保护社会主义竞争的暂行规定 [Interim Provisions on Staring and Protecting Socialist Competition] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Oct. 17, 1980, effective Oct. 17, 1980), LAWTIME.CN (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
577 Bing Song, Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT’L. 387 (1995). 
 156 
especially in the service sector and in terms of conditioning government approval of 
foreign investment on technology transfer or export quotas, which are not allowed under 
WTO rules. Second, foreign investment has grown, and with it, concern within some 
circles in China that this trend has injured Chinese companies.578 
This concern became evident in 2004, when news of a report by the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce hit the press, criticizing the monopolistic 
behavior of the large multinationals in China. 579 Around this time, there were calls to 
move the AML forward to protect the Chinese domestic industry from foreign investors. 
However, it appeared that questions as to who would be the regulator and what industries 
and companies would be subject to exemptions were delaying the AML. These questions 
were not entirely resolved in the final version of the law. 
As to the treatment of foreign-invested companies, the current AML is largely neutral 
on its face with the exception of certain exemptions for SOEs, and the provision on 
national security.  
3.7 Summary  
In summary, the public enforcement of the Chinese AML is fledging and cautious 
due to the lack of human resources, experience, expertise, and appropriate coordination 
between enforcement agencies and other government agencies and SOEs. Public 
enforcers are influenced by interest groups, but they did show an informational and cost 
advantage in the course of an investigation once they decide to act. They are particularly 
successful in combating monopolies not involving governments and SOEs, and receive 
great applause in cracking down anti-competitive behaviors that are most relevant to 
people’s everyday lives, such as in the pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, 
                                                      
578 Competition Law and Policy Developments in China (2008), 
http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/competition_law_and_policy_developments_in_China_October_2008_200
810235015.pdf.  
579 国家工商总局首次调查跨国公司限制竞争行为[SAIC Investigated Anti-competitive Behavior of Multinationals 
for the First Time], XINHUA NETWORK, Nov. 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/it/1066/2987079.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). See also 广东举办监管跨国公司限
制竞争行为研讨会[Seminar Regarding Regulation anti-competitive behavior of Multinationals Guangdong], Nov. 3, 
2003, available at http://www1.gdgs.gov.cn/news/gsglxx/show_content.asp?id=2251 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).   
 157 
private enforcement is handicapped by ineffective incentive mechanisms, technical 
hurdles, and judicial bureaucracies. Informed by theories, private enforcers do own better 
knowledge and information at the early stages and perform crucial roles as 
whistleblowers.  
Accordingly, in the face of the structural barriers and risk to retarding economic 
growth and creating more corruption, China may need a modestly enforced 
anti-monopoly law, but it need still be rigid in implementation in such cases where 
violation can be relatively easily proved, and closely related to people’s lives. In this way, 
on one hand, public and private enforcers can learn from doing and build up the 
reputation and confidence within a relatively short time; on the other hand, it can help 
China sustain healthy development.   
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIENCE OF REFERENCE COUNTRIES:                
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 The experiences of the five groups of reference jurisdictions demonstrate that no 
matter how a competition regime emerges and what the underlying policy goals are, 
competition law is only proactively implemented when economic growth has reached a 
certain level and anti-competitive practice has become a chief hindrance in achieving 
more sustainable and healthier social and economic development. Nonetheless, private 
antitrust enforcement may not become prevalent at the same pace as public enforcement; 
particularly because it is decided by legal traditions, institutional foundations, and current 
developmental stage. 
 The following jurisdictions were selected for reference because of the fact that during 
the past decades, the US and EU have become the dominant models for emerging 
economies who intend to introduce a competition law. China is definitely one of the 
importers of these models.580 Vietnam is virtually a smaller version of China in terms of 
economic and political contexts, but adopted competition law three years earlier than 
China which may provide some immediate lessons. Singapore, whose small economy is 
in sharp contrast to China’s, shares with China its strong state and SOEs. However, unlike 
China, Singapore has maintained a top rank in terms of competitive environments, which 
could provide significant insight. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are well-known for 
their state-driven economic miracles and restrained antitrust enforcement, in particular 
private enforcement, and now China is arguably employing the East Asian Model, so the 
experiences and lessons of these three jurisdictions are also eminently valuable.581 
4.1 U.S. 
The US is a pioneer in antitrust, and still unique in terms of private enforcement. 
 
                                                      
580 Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 211 
(2007).  
581 See Lin, supra note 390 (Saying that like the East Asian jurisdictions, China in the post-reform era also adopted an 
approach of relying on comparative advantage and improving exports to boost its economy). Some commentators hold 
different opinions believing that the China Model is different from any established models, e.g.: see Pan, supra note 11.  
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4.1.1. Emergence of Antitrust Law and Its Goals 
After the Civil War, the American economy had developed exponentially thanks to 1) 
the emergence of national markets for manufactured products attributed to the linking of 
smaller communities through national communications and rail networks, 2) the 
innovation of new technologies capable of manufacturing goods in larger quantities, and 
3) the generation of vast amounts of capital.582 By 1890, the US leaped ahead of Britain, 
becoming foremost in manufacturing output.583 
In response to this great opportunity and demand for expansion, firms followed either 
or both of two basic growth strategies—vertical integration and horizontal combination. 
Vertical integration could secure greater control over inputs or end-product distribution 
and to some degree solve problems confronted in expanding markets; horizontal 
combination arose mostly from a sense of crisis resulting from chronic overcapacity and 
cutthroat competition. Economic power concentration lasted even after the adoption of 
the Sherman Act and reached almost every industry. By 1900, the wealth of America was 
concentrated in the hands of seventy-three industrial complexes, the assets value of each 
exceeding $10,000,000. Many of these complexes monopolized over 50 per cent of 
market in their individual lines. By 1901, 1 per cent of the total firms produced 44 per 
cent of total output.584   
Opposition was initiated first chiefly by farmers, who had been afflicted by abuses of 
the railroads and finished-product pools and trusts for a decade. As laborers and small 
entrepreneurs joined these farmers, political opinions hostile to the trusts reached a peak 
in the late 1880s.585 Kansas enacted the first general antitrust law586 in 1889, and no less 
                                                      
582 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming. From? 
Where Are We Going, 62 N.Y.U.L.REV. 936, 937-8 (1987).  
583 See introduction to the history of this period at Digital History 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=188.  
584 钱满素,美国自由主义的演变，北京三联书店 (2006) [QIAN MANSU, AMERICAN LIBERALISM AND ITS 
TRANSFORMATION 66-7 (The Joint Publishing Company 2006)]. 
585 See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 582, at 940.  
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than eleven other states passed various forms of antitrust legislation before Congress 
approved the Sherman Act in 1890.587 At the federal level, both the Democratic and 
Republican parties included antitrust platforms in their 1888 election campaigns. This 
reaction led to the Sherman Act’s enactment. 
After the Standard Oil588and Terminal Railroad Association589 cases, concerns about 
judges unreasonably narrowing the statute and unchecked abuse of dominance inspired 
the adoption of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Actin (FTA) in 1914. 
The Clayton Act reduced judicial discretion by specifically prohibiting certain tying 
arrangements, exclusive dealing agreements, interlocking directorates, and mergers 
achieved by purchasing stock. The FTC Act also ended the executive branch’s monopoly 
on public enforcement of antitrust laws by forming an administrative body to make 
antitrust policy.590  
Worries about ever-increasing business powers deriving from asset or stock 
consolidation loomed large in the mid to late 1940s. Furthermore, people valued the 
diversity and economic mobility that could be retained by a stricter merger law, so 
Congress promulgated the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act in 1950.591 
Subsequently, in the Brown Shoe case,592 perhaps the most famous case under the 
Celler-Kefauver Amendment, the Supreme Court invalidated a merger and ruled that the 
parties’ market share, though low overall, could be deemed excessive in certain 
“submarkets.” Still this Court also announced that non-efficiency goals, such as the 
preservation of small firms, were relevant to the application of this statute.593  
Additionally, the American federal government enacted Robinson-Patman in 1936, 
                                                                                                                                                              
586 Act of Mar. 9, 1989, ch. 257, 1889. Sess Laws 389. 
587 David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 143 (1990).  
588 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).  
589 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (224 U.S. 383 [1912]).  
590 See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 75, at 54-8 (describing modern developments in U.S. doctrine for governing 
conduct of dominant firms). 
591 Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), as amended by Pub. L. 
No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1154 (1980)). 
592 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).  
593 See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 75, at 54-8.  
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and the Hart-Scott-Kefauver Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976. 
Although the US is the second country who adopted competition law, 594  the 
institutional construction of an antitrust regime in the U.S. was not completed within one 
day. This has resulted in a not-so-consistent understanding of the goals of antitrust laws. 
After more than 100 years’ conflicts and compromises, the mainstream belief of the 
academic circles in the U.S. is that the goals of antitrust law were as follows, addressing 
respectively economic, political and social perspectives:595  
(1). To produce the maximum of economic efficiency; 
(2). To block private accumulations of power and protect democratic government; 
(3). To establish and protect the competitive process as a kind of disciplinary 
machine for the development of character, and the competitiveness of the 
people—the fundamental stimulus to national morale. 
Among the three goals, the economic is the most important, while fairness or 
hostility towards vast concentrations of economic power that might be transferred to the 
political and social realms is modest.596  
4.1.2. Public Antitrust Enforcement 
Section 7 of the Sherman Act of 1890 and Section 4 of the Clayton Act of 1914 
entitle any firm to bring a lawsuit against a competitor for three times the damages 
suffered from any violation of antitrust laws, so from the beginning the U.S. has 
embraced a decentralized antitrust enforcement system with the broad participation of 
public and private parties. 
Amongst the public enforcers, at the federal level, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ 
and the FTC are the two primary players. The DOJ technically has jurisdiction to enforce 
the Sherman Act597 and alone investigates and prosecutes criminal antitrust violations. 
                                                      
594 Canada adopted antitrust laws in 1889, but they were largely ineffectual. 
595 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: AND OTHER ESSAYS 199-200 (Harvard 
University Press 1996). 
596 Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY (J.D. Richardson 
ed., 1997). 
597 The FTC Act§5 has been held to prohibit any actions prohibited by the Sherman Act, plus some practices not 
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The FTC is charged to with the enforcement of Clayton Act 7 and 7A (mergers) and the 
FTC Section 5 dealing with unfair trade practices. At the state level, the Attorney General 
of a given state, as the counterparty to the federal government’s Attorney General, is 
responsible for enforcing state antitrust laws. In addition, the state, authorized by 
Congress in 1976, can bring parens patriae actions, seeking treble damages on behalf of 
natural persons resident in the state under the Sherman Act.598   
As is criticized by Cole and Ohanian, public enforcement since the adoption of the 
Sherman Act has been highly erratic in the sense that it has been subject to the variation 
of administrative policies. 599  An article studying the relations between antitrust 
enforcement and firm’s behavior has identified four periods of time in which public 
antitrust enforcement was relaxed.600 
The first period extends from the enactment of the Sherman Act to the first quarter 
century after 1890. In this span of time, the Justice Department received no funds at all 
for antitrust enforcement for that first 13 years,601 and no serious enforcement was 
executed. 
The second period took place when Congress enacted the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, in force from mid-1933 to mid-1935. It allowed industries to develop 
“Codes of Fair Competition” which in practice immunized price-fixing actions from 
antitrust prohibitions.602 In the meantime, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the 
emergency conditions of the Great Depression, a large group of distressed coal producers 
could form an exclusive, joint selling agent—effectively, a cartel—notwithstanding 
antitrust laws.603 This lax attitude toward price fixing was not repudiated until the 
                                                                                                                                                              
caught by the Sherman Act: FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 US 683, 694, 68 S Ct. 793, 800 (1948). 
598 15 USC§15 c-h. 
599 Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 816 (2004).  
600 See Baker, supra note 119. 
601 HANS BIRGER THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 588, 590 
(Baltimore 1954). 
602 DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 
(1988). 
603 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 [1933]. 
 163 
Socony-Vacuum Oil case in 1940.604  
The third period of relaxed public antitrust enforcement is from 1918 untill now, but 
the focus is limited to export cartels. It is alleged that the United States has effectively 
repealed the antitrust laws as they apply to export cartels. 
The fourth period was in the mid-1980s; the relaxed attitude here was held not by the 
DOJ or FTC, but rather regulatory agencies that also take charge of merger review. This 
time, antitrust authorities wanted to prevent certain mergers, but two large acquisitions 
involving carriers with substantially overlapping route networks605were nevertheless 
permitted by the Department of Transportation. This reflected the inconsistency of 
antitrust policy arising from a decentralized enforcement institution.  
Studies of the behavior of firms in these four periods indicated that in the absence of 
antitrust laws, firms can and do wield market power to the disadvantage of consumers 
and other buyers. Granted, not every firm or industry performs anti-competitively without 
antitrust deterrence, but many do, and once this market failure occurs, the harm to 
competition can be substantial and long lasting.606  
4.1.3. Private Antitrust Enforcement 
Private enforcement is merely a component of American “adversarial legalism”, a 
legal style that emphasizes lawyer-dominated litigation in policy making, policy 
implementation, and dispute resolution. Kagan argued that the tension between two 
powerful forces, rising demands for what Friedman has called "Total Justice,"607 and an 
exceptionally fragmented governing structure that limits the capacity of the American 
state to satisfy these demands through centrally-coordinated administrative systems, has 
resulted in lawyer-dominated litigation608 
Accordingly, it has been observed that the private enforcement of laws in general is a 
particular characteristic of US law, because the U.S. does not maintain specialized 
                                                      
604 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 [1940]. 
605 Northwest’s acquisition of Republic and TWA's purchase of Ozark. 
606 See Baker, supra note 119.  
607 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (Russell Sage Foundation Publications 1994). 
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governmental agencies to the same extent as in Europe, and thus private enforcement 
tends to compensate for this lack of statutory control. When there are statutory agencies 
entrusted with the enforcement of the law, there is likely to be no need to grant equal 
powers to private parties.  
However, the prevalence of private enforcement was not established from the 
beginning. Private antitrust actions were rare before World War II, regardless of the 
formal legislative mandate established by the Clayton Act of 1914. In the years after the 
war, there was a rapid transition from a chiefly public enforcement approach609 to one 
relying principally upon private enforcers. The reason for this transition remains a 
mystery for U.S. antitrust historians. It was reported that, except for the sudden leap in 
1962 due to the electrical conspiracy follow-on cases, the ratio of private to public cases 
tended to be 6 to 1 or less until 1965. From the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, the absolute 
and relative number of private cases grew, private cases reaching a peak of 1, 611 in 1978, 
and the ratio of private to public reaching the record high of 20 to 1 in that same year. In 
the 1980s, both the absolute and relative number of private cases declined, and the ratio 
then stabilized at 10 to 1. As documented by Salop and White, the private claimants were 
typically downstream firms and competitors of the offenders. These private claimants are 
likely to have more detailed and accurate knowledge of what constitutes anticompetitive 
practices in specific industries, and often had commercial incentives besides expected 
damages to stop them. Despite the availability of a damage multiplier and relatively lax 
rules for the formation of class actions, Salop and White’s data suggested that end 
consumers did not play a significant role. This observation implies the weakness of the 
private enforcement mechanism, when the benefits of a particular action are concentrated, 
and the expense of prosecuting such an offense is dispersed across a large population 
                                                      
609 The antitrust laws fell into a period of limited use that last though the 1920s, the Great Depression, and WWII. The 
only development from the period that retains significant today was the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. 
See DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE INTRODUCTION 7 (Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
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facing high coordination costs to engage in collective action through the courts.610 Due to 
the asymmetry in organizational ability, and hence also financial means, to engage in 
legal action between consumers and large firms, it is more appropriate to regard private 
enforcement as a high-powered mechanism for the acquisition of information that 
complements public enforcers.611 
 
Figure 1. Number of Private and Government Antitrust Cases in the US, 1942-1995 
 
Source: Made from Table 2 Number of Private and Government Antitrust Cases in the United 
States—1942-1995, in Lin, Ping, Baldev Raj, Michael Sandfort, & Daniel Slottje, The U.S. 
Antitrust System and Recent Trends in Antitrust Enforcement, 14 J. ECON. SURV. 255, 261 (2000).  
Private antitrust actions constitute at least 90 per cent of all Federal antitrust cases 
despite great fluctuation in annual numbers.612 The attractiveness to private attorneys 
general comes mainly from the double lure of awards of treble damages613 and attorneys’ 
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Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 
311, 317-18 (1965). For a reflective analysis on the real value of treble damages awards conditioned on the American 
procedural context, see Jones, supra note 201, at 229. 
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fees, which is also known as “one-way fee-shifting.” 614  Furthermore, to those 
small-claims plaintiffs, class action is an additional powerful institutional device that may 
justify the total risk of litigations.615 
4.1.4. Tinkering with Private Enforcement 
In response to over 1,000 antitrust cases instituted annually and $200 to $250 million 
in legal costs per year, there has been profound reflection on structural determinants, and 
a series of improvements have now been undertaken, aimed at preventing private 
enforcement from going wild. 
A. Treble damage 
Due to the high ratio of private antitrust litigations relative to public enforcement, the 
private antitrust regime, in particular the treble damages remedy, has suffered great 
criticisms from the Chicago school for its high cost and over-deterrence effect.616 The 
defenders of private enforcement argue that, in general, economic-oriented critiques 
attempt to assess the treble damages policy primarily from a deterrence perspective, 
without giving substantial weight to the compensation goal of the policy; even on purely 
economic grounds, some scholars have shown that these attacks on the treble damages 
remedy are exaggerated, lack substance, and that private enforcement may be more 
efficient than public enforcement.617 Furthermore, due to the lack of pre-judgment 
interest in the U.S., some scholar even doubt whether treble damages are in fact single in 
nature.618 
Scholars further suggested a combination of a discretionary multiple and the 
                                                      
614 For a critical analysis of fee-shifting, see William H. Wagener, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on 
Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1887, 1898–1899 (2003). 
615 The costs to the members of the small claims class for organizing themselves so as to recover from the violators are 
prohibitively high, but the assistance of law to organize a class would enable the plaintiffs to proceed against the 
defendants and thus realize a significant personal and social benefit. 
616 See Elzinga & Breit, supra note 168. 
617 VALERIE SARRIS, THE EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: THE “ILLINOIS BRICK” DECISION 53-4, 63 
(New York 1984). In this book, Sarris argues that the best enforcement system is a dual public and private approach. 
618 See Lande, supra note 293. As a matter of fact, Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows, but does not mandates, the 
court to award a successful antitrust plaintiff simple interest on the amount of the single damages beginning from the 
date of the filing of the complaint. However, the court may do so only in specified circumstances involving abuse or 
delay by the defendants. The truth is that in practice successful antitrust plaintiffs have not been permitted to recover 
pre-judgment interest dating back to when they incurred their damages. See Broder, supra 
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decoupling of penalties and rewards, that is, that plaintiffs should receive a damage 
multiple that is different from what would be paid by the losing defendants, so that 
appropriate deterrence would be maintained, while at the same time nuisance suits may 
be prevented to some degree.619 
Apart from the theoretical debate, in practice, the 1982 Export Trading Company Act, 
1993 National Cooperative Research and Production Act, and the 2004 Antitrust Criminal 
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act have tried to de-treble damages. 
B. Standing to sue 
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.620 
rejected an antitrust challenge to a merger brought by a third party competitor to a large 
company’s purchase of a failing rival. The Supreme Court held that in order to have 
standing to sue, private antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate their suffering from an 
“injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”621 This is typically 
interpreted as a requirement that the plaintiff’s injury result from increased prices or 
decreased output.622 
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Cargill case,623 extended this “antitrust injury” 
requirement to private merger plaintiffs seeking solely injunctive relief. The antitrust 
injury doctrine also limits the ability of hostile merger takeover targets to challenge 
unattractive translation on antitrust grounds.624  
In Illinois Brick,625 the Supreme Court prevented “indirect” purchasers—buyers who 
                                                      
619 See White, supra note 610.  
620 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 490. 
621 Id. at 489. 
622 See, e.g.Ball Mem’l Hosp. v. Mut. Hosp. Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (staring that “antitrust injury” 
means injury from higher prices or lower output). 
623 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
624 A purchased company is not usually injured by the anticompetitive effects of an acquisition, instead, it will typically 
benefit from a higher profits. However the lower courts in the US appears to be split as to whether a hostile takeover 
target can invoke section 7 action after Cargill. In Anago Inc. v. Technol. Med. Prods. , Inc., 976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. Oct. 
1992), the Fifth Circuit rejected a target’s section 7 challenge on antitrust injury grounds, holding that “proof that a 
plaintiff will be adversely affected by the merger itself will not suffice in this Court, unless the injuries are related to the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger.” On the contrary, the Second Circuit, in Consol. Gold Fields PLC, held that the 
target company’s loss of independence is “causally related to the injury occurring in the market place” and has granted 
standing on that ground. 
625 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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purchased products subject to antitrust violations two or more levels below the 
defendants in the chain of distribution—from filing suit to recover damages, on the 
grounds that allowing such suits could lead to double recoveries and extraordinary 
difficulties in apportioning damages among different victims. However, the Supreme 
Court did acknowledge that indirect purchasers could bear some or all of the costs of an 
antitrust violation, because upstream distributors could often pass through overcharges.626  
In recent years, many states with antitrust laws modeled after federal antitrust 
statutes have not followed Illinois Brick. A number of state legislatures have passed 
“Illinois Brick repealers”, statutes expressly authorizing indirect purchaser damages suits. 
Other states have rejected Illinois Brick judicially. 
C. One-way fee-shifting 
The traditional American rule is that plaintiffs and defendants pay their litigation 
costs individually as opposed to the British rule, according to which the loser pays all 
costs. In the unique case of antitrust litigation, statutes entitle prevailing plaintiffs to 
recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. However, differing from the British rule, 
American fee-shifting is only one-way, so it is cited as one cause of frivolous or nuisance 
suits. Some commentators suggest the application of the British rule, but in the context of 
the U.S., it may discourage or encourage settlement, depending on the other 
characteristics of the cases.627  
D. Class action 
Class action is a policy tool somewhat special to the U.S, though it is a double-edged 
sword. It allows reduction of total costs, risk and time involved in litigation and the 
collection of evidence, and a better investigation of facts that would not be worthwhile in 
individual trials, and can overcome rational apathy and free-riding; the downside is that it 
may also exacerbate agent-principal problems and increase the risk of unmeritorious 
                                                      
626 Id. at 730-33. 
627 See White, supra note 610. 
 169 
problems.628  
The problem of perceived excessive litigation has recently led to the Class Action 
Fair Act 2005, which grants courts more judicial power to correct current problems with 
existing class action litigation, and largely occurs in state courts. Congress viewed major 
problems as those associated with “magnet” state courts and copy-cat litigation.629  
E. Contingency fee 
With the contingency fee mechanism, instead of receiving direct payment from the 
clients, the attorney, if successful, receives a portion of the award. It is regarded as one of 
the driving forces, among others, of private antitrust enforcement. The attorneys, in 
particular those who sue a defendant on behalf of a group of private individuals in a class 
action, are called “private attorneys general.” 
On the one hand, contingency fees are welcome because to a great extent they help 
injured parties who cannot afford legal services have access to justice;630 on the other 
hand, they are also criticized by many for resulting in the inflation of private 
litigations.631 Empirical studies indicate that even in cases where the courts engage in the 
lodestar calculation (the product of reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate), the 
client’s recovery generally explains the pattern of awards better than the lodestar.632 Now 
the US Supreme Court is considering the reformulation of the private attorney general 
model and allegedly placing more reliance on government enforcers.633 
In summary, the history and current landscape of American antitrust laws 
demonstrates the following:  
                                                      
628 Note, Class Actions: Market Models for Attorneys’ Fees in Class Action Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1829 
(2000). 
629 An Introduction to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, William C. Roedder, Jr. 
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/V56N4.pdf.  
630 See Jones, supra note 201. 
631 See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 283.  
632 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 284. 
633 See Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). For general discussion, 
see Hittinger & Bona, supra note 285.   
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(1). Political circles have appeared in antitrust enforcement, though it seems that 
these circles are operating as a response to economic circles and/or the evolution 
of antitrust economic thinking. In short, during times (such as War time or 
economic crisis) when in a given sector (such as international trade and 
innovation), the government was playing a more important role, antitrust policy 
and enforcement would be more interventionist; otherwise it would be more lax. 
Of course, intervention could take the form of authorizing War-time cartels, 
strengthening enforcement highlighting the per se rule, or allowing export 
cartels.  
(2). Despite the lingering of non-economic values such as the protection of small 
businesses and a fear of gigantism translating into political forces, there is a 
consensus that efficiency should be the primary goal of antitrust policies. 
(3). Political circles came to life chiefly through the restructuring of competition 
authorities, like the head of Antitrust Division of the DOJ, commissioners of the 
FTC, and the Supreme Court Justices. The DOJ, due to its status, more closely 
reflects the perspectives of the executive branch, while the FTC, as an 
independent commission, remains relatively consistent in its enforcement efforts. 
For example, antitrust enforcement by the DOJ under the Bush (Junior) 
Administration adopted a laissez-faire approach, but the FTC at that time still 
brought a number of cases against unilateral firm conduct. Even the Supreme 
Court could buckle under the administration under some circumstances. 
(4). Antitrust laws cannot demonstrate their power from the beginning of their 
implementation, even in a pure capitalist society with a fully-pledged court 
system, because it takes a while for the construction of institutions to take place 
(for example, in the formative years, there were almost no funds available to 
DOJ to carry out antitrust missions) and for both implementing agencies and 
private parties to understand and apply these laws.  
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(5). The time series on government filings leads the time series on private filings, but 
these two series are both reasonably well approximated as an integrated process. 
This means that largely speaking public and private enforcement both are 
influenced by the variation in policy goals, which translates to the number and 
kind of public enforcement, procedures for litigations, such as the rules for class 
action and burden of proof, and the analytical approach of the antitrust 
authorities and courts. 
There is no clear correlation between public and private enforcement, because an 
empirical study found that the 75 per cent of all treble damages actions filed before 1960 
were initiated after, and relying on, similar government enforcement actions;634 however, 
this percentage during 1973-1987 was unlikely to exceed 24 per cent. It is said that the 
most obvious explanation for the change in percentages is not a decrease in follow-on 
cases but an increase in independently initiated cases. Public enforcement activity held at 
relatively steady levels throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s.635  
4.2 EU 
4.2.1. Emergence of Antitrust Law and Its Goals 
Somewhat similarly to the emergence of antitrust law in the U.S., which enacted the 
Sherman Act under the circumstances of an enlarged market due to the development of 
railway and communication and anti-competitive practices that may have curtailed 
efficiency, the history of the supra-national competition law in Europe started with the 
1951 Treaty of Paris, jointly signed by Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux.636 This 
treaty was aimed at ensuring the availability of essential inputs in an expanded market 
and securing the efficient functioning of that market.637 
                                                      
634 Robert W. Stedman, Consent Decrees and the Private Actions: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 628 
n.7 (1965); John D. Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 747, 767-75 1965). 
635 Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on 
and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L. J. 1163, 1221 (1986).  
636 This treaty also created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
637
 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (2004).  
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The role of the EU in competition was officially carved out in the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. This granted the EU a wide range of powers to oversee and prevent activities that 
are detrimental to competition between firms. During the 1990s, the EU became much 
more active in its pursuit of breaches of competition law, increasing the number of 
prosecutions it brought. It also began to act against cases that were not strictly within the 
EU’s jurisdiction, such as the 1997 merger of two large U.S. aircraft manufacturers, 
Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas. In the late 1990s the European Commission started to 
conceive a complete overhaul of its competition policy in light of the imminent expansion 
of the Community to central and eastern Europe and the involvement of a great number 
of new MSs, the Commission feared that it would be less and less able to ensure a 
satisfactory degree of enforcement of European competition law. Responding to these 
fears, the Commission published a White Paper in the spring of 1999 that suggested an 
entirely new method for the enforcement of art. 81 and art. 82 EC. The most important 
effect of this change was that it replaced the previous monopoly of the European 
Commission to grant exemptions under art. 81(3) with a network of national competition 
authorities entitled to the direct application of art. 81(3) EC. This decentralization was 
accompanied by a change in the application of substantive rules and a clear shift to 
economic analysis, probably due to an increased American influence in Europe. Various 
Commission instruments give evidence of this trend and it is most clear in the new 
Merger Control Regulation 139/2004. A third dramatic change of direction became 
visible in late 2005, this time relating and relates to private enforcement of art. 81 and 82. 
The Commission had already hinted at the need for an increased use of private litigation 
in its early proposals for Regulation 1/2003. A Green Paper on this subject was published 
in December 2005,638 and subsequently a White Paper in 2008639, and the fruitlessly 
attempted “Proposal for a Directive on rules governing damages actions for infringements 
                                                      
638 COM(2005) 672 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#greenpaper.  
639 COM(2008) 165 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#link1.   
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of art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty,” the Draft Directive of 2009,640 were introduced. 
In the EU, the origin and development of competition law was in economic 
integration. In the absence of the American commerce clause provisions of the 
Constitution, the desire for a common market free of trade barriers had to be reflected in 
Community competition laws. In contrast to the U.S. approach, which makes efficiency 
the focal point, the goals of competition laws in the EU are multilayered, given that the 
EU is also concerned with social objectives, such as competitive opportunities for small 
and medium-sized firms, the economic levels of worse-off MSs, and general notions of 
fairness. As well, it is more accepted in Europe that collaborations may be necessary to 
enhance technological development and increase the competitiveness of European firms. 
As is explicitly stated in art. 101 (3) of the TFEU, otherwise-void agreements or 
combinations may be exempted as long as they have “contributed to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit…”641 
4.2.2. Public Antitrust Enforcement 
Before modernization, the enforcement system for EC competition laws allowed for 
the Commission’s monopoly. The dominant position of the Commission was established 
by the Regulation 17.642  
The dominance of the Commission with respect to antitrust enforcement deviated 
from the Community’s standard procedure, in which administrative authorities643 and 
national courts644 of the MS were the primary enforcers of Community laws, though the 
Commission was entrusted to secure the implementation of Community law by art. 85 
EC. 
Competition law enforcement as an outlier in the bigger picture of Community law 
                                                      
640 For an assessment of the desirability of the draft directive, see Alfaro & Reher, supra note 43.  
641 Permissible Cooperation and Prohibited Agreements in the EU, 
http://europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/5/15/03/?all=1 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
642 Council Reg. 17 [1959-62] OJ Spec. Ed. 87. It is the first Regulation Implementing art.85 and art.86 of the Treaty 
[1962] OJ L13/204 
643 See Komninos, supra note 27. 
644 Id.  
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enforcement may derive from political force.645 The Community wanted to construct a 
European law enforcement system. This centralized system of enforcement performed, in 
a sense, a “pedagogical” function. 
Continental Europe has a long-standing tradition of public enforcement.646  The 
foundational model for EC competition law centers on administrative decision-making.647 
In the words of Former AG Tesauro, the administrative enforcement model in Europe “is 
proving to be very effective and to some extent an alternative to judicial enforcement. 
While the protection of private complaints is not the objective of the administrative 
intervention, the outcome of an antitrust case conducted by the competition authority can 
be largely equivalent to a judge ruling.” 648  To these, it should be added that 
administrative authorities, and certainly the Commission, have extensive investigatory 
powers and the procedure entails no costs for a complainant. 
The enlargement of the European Union has called the Commission’s monopoly into 
question. This unprecedented success and the dominant enforcement role acquired by the 
Commission became a burden in the past two decades. Soon it became obvious that the 
high degree of centralization of the 1960s was no longer appropriate for the twenty-first 
century. As a result, the Commission is now prepared to relinquish some of its powers 
through the adoption of a modernized enforcement model that is decentralized and relies 
heavily upon national courts and competition authorities.649 
4.2.3. Private Antitrust Enforcement 
A. Development of private enforcement and its explanations 
There are no official statistics on private damage actions in the EU, but the Ashurst 
study of 2004 indicated the “total underdevelopment” of damages actions for breaches of 
                                                      
645 Id 
646 Claus Ehlermann, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution, 37. COMM. MKT. L. 
REV. 546 (2000). 
647 See Komninos, supra note 27.  
648 See David Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The ‘Modernization’ of European Community Competition Law: Achieving 
Consistency in Enforcement—Part I & II,27 ECLR 10 (2006). 
649 To further understand the initiative of the Commission, see former Commissioner Mario Monti, Opening Statement: 
The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2000: THE MODERNIZATION OF EC 
ANTITRUST POLICY 5 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds, Hart 2001).   
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competition law in the enlarged EU.650 This study revealed around 60 judged cases for 
damages actions as of 2004.651 Of these judgments 28 resulted in awards.652 
In the years following the promulgation of the Commission Green Paper, some MSs 
adopted rules to facilitate antitrust damage actions, and national courts in some MSs were 
asked to clarify some controversial issues in the private enforcement of antitrust rules.653 
A more recent empirical study revealed 96 antitrust damages actions under EU 
competition law from May 1, 2004 to the 3rd quarter of 2007 and provided a more 
in-depth look at the characteristics of these cases: 
First, it was found that private antitrust damages actions were observed only in 10 of 
the 27 MSs.654 
Second, litigation on vertical restraints was more common in the reference period.655 
However, no damages were awarded in vertical restraints cases. This means that 
claimants’ winning records were very sparse. 
Third, the contribution of stand-alone cases to the overall volume of private antitrust 
damages litigation was relatively small, because recent developments in damages actions 
have relied on streams of follow-on cases that can be referred to the same standalone 
decision. 
The Ashurst study identified some crucial substantive and procedural obstacles for 
the development of private actions: 
                                                      
650 Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater & Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of 
infringement of EC competition rules, Aug. 31, 2004, 1, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html.  
651 Twelve of the cases were instituted on the basis of EU competition law, around 32 on the basis of national 
competition law, and 6 on the basis of both. Id, at 1. 
652 Eight of the awards were bestowed on the basis of EU competition law, 16 on the basis of national competition law, 
and 4 on both. Id, at 1. 
653 See Renda, Peysner, Riley & Rodger, supra note 286.  
654 These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In 
Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic, however, some antitrust claims have been filed. In Ireland, Luxemburg 
and Portugal very limited private antitrust litigation has been observed, but in the few cases filed antitrust infringement 
only played a secondary role; thus, these cases were not included in the dataset. See Renda, Peysner, Riley & Rodger, 
supra note 286, n.44. 
655 Sixty-one cases out of 96 involved vertical agreements, whereas only 13 cases concerned horizontal agreements, 
concerted practices or naked cartels (12 on hardcore cartels or concerted practices, 1 on horizontal agreements); and 22 
cases involved abuses of dominance. 
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(1). The absence of an express legal basis for bringing EC competition law-based 
actions. The Treaty of Rome did not include a provision for the award of 
damages to victims of anti-competitive practices.656 However, when Regulation 
17/1962 was introduced, the Internal Market Committee of the Parliament in the 
“Deringer Report” for the European Parliament accepted the desirability and 
necessity of private actions for the effective enforcement of EC competition law, 
and proposed a study of the national laws of the then—Six in order to identify 
relevant issues for further actions. In 1966 the Commission published a study 
examining remedies in national laws for damages caused by the infringement of 
Treaty competition rules.657 In any event, there was subsequently a long and 
quiet period for the Commission on the matter of the improvement of private 
enforcement.658 It was only after the landmark rulings in Delimitis and Automec 
II that, the Commission resumed efforts in 1993 to strengthen private actions by 
adopting its Notice cooperation with national courts, efforts admittedly aimed at 
the more procedural aspects of the enforcement of competition rules by national 
courts and the Commission’s cooperation with them, but also touching on the 
issue of the substantive remedies available in national courts. The Notice, being 
a soft-law approach, was certainly not the ideal instrument to remedy this 
sensitive matter, since it did not bind national courts.659 
(2). Lack of competent courts. Only the UK has formal specialized courts for dealing 
with competition based damages actions. Other MSs have tried to solve this 
                                                      
656 Section 7 of the original Sherman Act, superseded by Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The fact that some national 
competition laws may not mention the possibility of damages actions is not conclusive, since it is usually through the 
general provisions of civil law (usually in tort or exceptionally in contract) that such actions will be possible. For 
examples of national competition law expressly mentioning the possibility of damages actions. 
657 The study concluded that in principle existing national laws of the MS were in a position to provide for remedies in 
antitrust violations. see Jacobs, ‘Civil enforcement of EEC Antitrust law’ 
658 See also European Commission, XIIIth Report on Competition Policy —1983 (Brussels, 1984) 135-6, where the 
Commission cautioned against the erroneous but widespread notion that only it could enforce the arts 85 and 86 EEC, 
stressing the practical advantages of private antitrust enforcement in national courts and the desirability ‘that the 
judicial enforcement of art. 85 and art. 86 should also include the award of damages to injured parties, because this 
would render Community law more effective.’   
659 See Komninos, supra note 27, at 162. 
 177 
problem in different ways, such as using higher jurisdictions than normal, 
limiting the number or type of competent courts or resorting to specialist panels 
within the general system of courts.  
(3). Limitations on standing and the aggregation of damages claim. The main 
limitation on standing is the prerequisite for “interest” on the plaintiff’s part for 
bringing the action ; this exists in nearly all countries. A handful of states have 
enforced further limitations, such as the requirement that the law exist to protect 
the plaintiff, or that only undertakings can sue under national competition law. 
(4). Lack of collective dispute resolution. As a matter of fact nearly all MSs provide 
for some collective or representative actions. However, pending claims of this 
sort were hardly identified except in Austria and the Netherlands. 
(5). Requirement of fault. Most MSs require fault (negligence or intention) in 
non-contractual damages actions. However, in several of these jurisdictions fault 
is rebuttably or irrebuttably presumed where a violation of competition law is 
shown. 
(6). Burden and standard of proof. In all MSs the burden of proof is on the plaintiff 
in the first instance. The way in which the requisite standard of proof is 
described varies widely between MSs. 
(7). Uncertainty as to the value of NCA, Commission, or court decisions. It was 
admitted that in all MSs, such decisions could be submitted as evidence in 
damages proceedings and are often highly persuasive. However, only in a 
handful of MSs are NCA decisions considered binding. 
(8). Lack of certainty as to the passing-on defense and the indirect purchaser. Nearly 
all MSs limited themselves to the application of general principles of 
compensation-restitution, coming to the conclusion that the passing-on defense 
was theoretically possible (though the defendant would bear the burden of proof) 
and indirect purchasers could theoretically sue, but would have trouble proving 
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causal link. The passing on defense was considered possible in Denmark, 
Germany (by some courts) and Italy where the question arose. In any case, the 
combination of the passing on defense and the difficulties faced by indirect 
purchasers seriously restrict private claims. 
Apart from the substantive and procedural barriers identified above, other factors 
may also be detrimental to effective private enforcement. For instance, the Brussels-based 
bar may not favor the idea of developed private enforcement, as it would mean a loss of 
business that would necessarily be redirected to the MS; on the other hand, lawyers 
usually lack the expertise in Community or antitrust litigation and view the introduction 
of a foreign body into their legal traditions with suspicion. Meanwhile, path dependencies 
may exist because such interlocutors as consumer groups prefer to employ rules and 
regulations that are more familiar to them, like consumer protection laws.660  
Despite the obstacles faced by the EU, two efforts are working to drive the 
improvement of private enforcement.661  
First, the EU has enlarged dramatically, so the Community system for protecting 
competition must adapt to the challenge of increasing size by becoming more efficient. 
One of the major results of this adaptation is enhanced private enforcement through 
national courts.  
Second, the ‘European model’ is put to the test by the increase of international 
“competition of systems”—a challenge that has become much more apparent since the 
introduction of the EURO. So in order to gain the upper hand in the competition of 
jurisdictions, it is important to employ all necessary tools, including private enforcement. 
B. Current debate on private enforcement and cost of harmonization  
In the landmark case Courage,662 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that 
private enforcement could “make a significant contribution to the maintenance of 
                                                      
660 Id. 
661 Mario Monti, Commissioner, Opening speech at the Conference of the European Parliament and the European 
Commission on ‘Reform of European Competition law in Freiburg: Competition in a Social Market economy (Nov. 9, 
2000), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_022_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
662 Case 453/99 Courage v. Creban [2001] ECR I-6297. 
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effective competition in the Community.” In the later Manfredi case, 663  the ECJ 
re-affirmed that the full effectiveness of European competition rules would be put at risk 
if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for losses caused by 
anti-competitive conducts, and that there is an obligation to provide for effective means to 
exercise this right. However, in the current debate on private enforcement of EU 
competition law, the focus lies in the pro-active use of art. 81 and 82 as a “sword” to 
obtain compensation for losses deriving from infringement. The desirability of improved 
private enforcement largely depends on the objective that is to be achieved. In the Green 
paper, the Commission did not provide specifics in this regard.  
Proposals to remove impediments to private enforcement actions outlined by the 
European Commission in the Green Paper have become a major focus of the current 
discussion. Key issues are the design of class action, the desirability of multiple damages, 
and the status of the passing-on defense. 
4.3 Vietnam 
4.3.1. Emergence of Antitrust Law and Its Goals  
At the 6th Party Congress of 1986, driven by strong pressure from technocrats and 
premarket reformists for a “final solution” to the DRV model,664 support from rising 
commercial interests within the state sector, and support from southern liberals who 
wished to see a return to the pre-1975 system, the Vietnamese government officially 
introduced policy doi moi, namely, renovation,665 and recognized that Vietnam would 
face tremendous difficulties and a long transitional period in the transformation from 
capitalism to socialism. At the 9th Party Congress of 2001, the Vietnamese government 
labeled all its previous market reforms as those of a “socialist-oriented market 
                                                      
663 Cases C-295/04 Vincenzo Manfredi et al. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al. [2006] ECR I-6619.  
664 There were two models in Vietnamese transition. The DRV (abbreviation for Democratic Republic of Vietnam) 
model is the Vietnamese expression of Neo-Stalinism. The division of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel at the 1954 Geneva 
Conference meant that the post-1975 government only had the experience of a socialist construction in the North, in the 
DRV. The program that the government imposed upon the united country after 1976 was thus derived from the North. 
665 ADAM FFORDE & STEFAN DE VYLDER, FROM PLAN TO MARKET: THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN VIETNAM 3-4 (1996). 
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economy.”666 The introduction of the doi moi policy and the establishment of the 
socialist-oriented market economy line have resulted in 1) re-recognition of private 
sectors as a new engine of growth potentially more efficient than public counterparts, 
and encouragement of private investment, 2) dissolution, restructuring, and equalization 
（the Vietnamese version of privatization) of many former SOEs, and 3) the dissolution 
of internal and external trade barriers; indeed, one of the first measures taken after the 
congress met in 1986 was the abolition of inter-provincial trade barriers, after which rice 
prices declined.667   
The significance of market competition was upheld in several Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) documents and socio-economic development strategies.668 As an integral 
tool for the achievement of the doi moi policy with the goal of a socialist-oriented market 
economy, competition policies were introduced prior to the formal adoption of the 
Vietnam Law on Competition (VLOC). Vietnam enacted the Commercial Law in 1997, 
which recognizes the legitimate rights of businesses of all forms and various types of 
ownership to compete fairly and legally in all commercial activities, and prohibits 
increasing or reducing prices to the detriment of producers and consumers, deceiving or 
misleading customers, using deceptive advertisements or conducting unlawful 
commercial promotions. The Ordinance on Price was enacted in 2002, prohibiting any 
price-fixing agreements aimed at dominating the market or exceeding the market share 
stipulated by law. However, these provisions were poorly enforced and had little effect on 
actual market competition due to the lack of a comprehensive system of regulations 
focused on competition issues.669  
Discussions on the enactment of a comprehensive competition law were initiated in 
late 1990s. Underlying trends included the wave of neo-liberal economic reforms and 
                                                      
666 See news “Viet Nam travels along unique path to socialism”, available at 
http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/Politics-Laws/199470/Viet-Nam-travels-along-unique-path-to-socialism.html.  
667 See Fford & Vylder, supra note 665.  
668 Alice Pham, The Development of Competition Law in Vietnam in the Face of Economic Reforms and Global 
Integration, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 547, 550, fn9 (2006).  
669 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP., Vietnam – new competition law 2005, 
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/practices/10388.pdf. 
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liberal democracy in the wake of the collapse of the communist bloc, cross-border 
anti-competitive practices arising from recent global mega-mergers, intensive economic 
integration with the WTO, and the emphasis of the importance of competition law by 
international donors.670 Thus, it was not surprising that during the drafting process, 
international institutions such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) furnished significant technical assistance efforts. 
The local conditions from which the VLOC emerged were characterized by a 
“bifurcated regulatory system,” that is, the VCP remained in political monopoly, but also 
catered to the rising demands of a market economy due to the recognition of 
inefficiencies in a rigid central plan and loss-making SOEs. The VLOC was intended to 
curtail the discrimination between public and private sectors and level the playing field, 
dealing with new challenges posed by international giants who were now able to wield 
economic power because of the integration of the Vietnamese economy into regional and 
international markets. These concerns grew with the pending WTO accession of 
Vietnam,671 and uncertainty among Vietnam’s entrepreneurs about what to expect in the 
future.672 
At the 8th National Congress in 1996, the CPV in its “Political report of the Central 
Party Committee at the 8th National Party Congress” (Report to the 8th Congress) 
explicitly expressed the need to establish a healthy competitive environment, rein in 
abuses of monopolistic positions and distorted competition, and strategically restructure 
the SOEs.673 In the spirit of the Report to the 8th Congress, the drafting task was assigned 
to the Ministry of Trade, now the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 674  With the 
                                                      
670 See Pham, supra note 668, at 549. 
671 Deputy PM Nguyen Tan Dung: Preparing Well for WTO Accession, VIETNAMNET.VN, Jan., 2004, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/news/2004/01/138206/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
672  VN enterprises vague about WTO Accession, VIETNAMNET.VN, July, 2005, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/news/2005/07/473367/(last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
673 See Pham, supra note 668, at 550, fn9. 
674 On July 31st, 2007, the 12th National Assembly adopted the Resolution No. 01/2007/QH12 unifying the Ministry of 
Industry and Ministry Trade Ministry into the current Ministry of Industry and Trade..  
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encouragement and technical support of the UNDP and the UNCTAD, the VLOC was 
eventually passed by the National Assembly on 9 November, 2004, and came into effect 
on 1 July, 2005.675 To a large degree, external subjects relied on great forces to push the 
enactment of the VLOC. 
The VLOC is supposed to apply to all business enterprises and professional and trade 
associations in Vietnam, overseas enterprises and associations registered in Vietnam, 
public utilities and state monopoly enterprises, as well as State administrative bodies. It 
takes precedence over all other Vietnamese laws regarding anti-competitive conduct and 
unfair trade practices. Subsequently to the enactment of VLOC, a number of 
implementing rules were put in place, but the enforcement of the VLOC remains 
underdeveloped. 
Although the goal of the VLOC is not clearly stated in its text, the VLOC’s role as a 
policy tool for facilitating economic growth is informed by the status of the primary 
enforcement agencies as part of the Ministry of Industry, the decision-making power in 
competition issues on the part of the Minister or even the Prime Minister, the presence of 
sizable SOEs, and a deep-rooted culture of command and control.676 
4.3.2. Public Antitrust Enforcement 
The formation of the current enforcement institution itself is a vivid illustration of the 
political economy and strategic struggle of a transitional Vietnam. 
Differing from most other countries, where the competition authority is usually 
established when or after the law is enacted, in Vietnam the Competition Administration 
Department was set up within the Ministry of Trade under the order of the Minister, prior 
to the passage of the law in 2004.  
As mentioned above, the Ministry of Trade was responsible for competition law 
drafting. The proposition for the establishment of the Competition Administration 
Department within the Ministry encountered severe criticism from other governmental 
                                                      
675 See Pham, supra note 668, at 547.  
676 MARK FURSE, ANTITRUST IN CHINA, KOREA AND VIETNAM 34 (2009). 
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agencies, academic circles, and the wider public when it was presented for debate in the 
National Assembly and opened up to national consultation and comments. People were 
concerned that the subordination of the competition authority to the administrative 
agency was likely to impede its independence and its effective prosecution of 
administrative monopolies and powerful SOEs; this is regarded as the chief cause for the 
ineffectiveness in several countries.677  Even after the “Equalization Program” was 
launched in 1992 as part of the SOE Reform Program,678many SOEs were still owned by 
different line ministries, including the Ministry of Trade itself. This dual identity as 
player and referee incurred great skepticism of enforcement neutrality.679 
Still, the Ministry of Trade successfully defended its proposal and had it passed by 
the National Assembly. It is alleged that two reasons may explain this success, both 
reflecting contradictions that characterize Vietnam’s transitional stage. First, the Ministry 
of Trade stressed the possible increase in waste and overstaffing of government agencies 
if a new agency were to be established for competition law enforcement; it also took 
advantage of its newly accumulated expertise in competition issues by quickly 
establishing Competition Administration Department, and playing a leading role in 
competition law drafting. The Ministry followed the example of other countries who were 
effectively implementing competition law despite the fact that their competition agencies 
were placed in a given ministry. Second, the subordination of the competition authority in 
a ministry can properly serve to balance economic development and control by the 
                                                      
677 See Pham, supra note 668, at 558. 
678 “It is a Vietnamese version of privatization of SOEs as part of the SOE Reform Program, in the context of general 
economic reform. Equalization is defined as the transformation of SOEs into joint-stock companies and selling part of 
the shares in the company to private investors in order to improve the performance of the firms in question. 
Equalization differs from privatization in the usual Western sense in that it does not necessarily mean that the 
government loses its ultimate control over the firm. On the contrary, in the case of Vietnam, the government still holds 
decisive voting rights in many cases.” See Karen Ellis & Rohit Singh, Assessing the Economic Impact of Competition 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6056.pdf.  
679 “It is a Vietnamese version of privatization of SOEs as part of the SOE Reform Program, in the context of general 
economic reform. Equalization is defined as the transformation of SOEs into joint-stock companies and selling part of 
the shares in the company to private investors in order to improve the performance of the firms in question. 
Equalization differs from privatization in the usual Western sense in that it does not necessarily mean that the 
government loses its ultimate control over the firm. On the contrary, in the case of Vietnam, the government still holds 




Ironically enough, following the triumph of the Ministry of Trade in the debate over 
enforcement power, government decrees on the establishment of the Vietnam 
Competition Administrative Department (VCAD), a government agency housed in the 
Ministry of Trade, and the Vietnam Competition Council (VCC), a separate independent 
adjudicative body under substantial influence of the Ministry of Trade,680 were not issued 
until 2006. Before the issuance of these two organizational decrees, the Competition 
Administrative Department restricted itself mainly to advocacy, networking, training, and 
information dissemination.  
Even after 2006, there have been no significant enforcements by the VCAD. It has 
focused more on promoting compliance by encouraging businesses to cease and desist in 
certain pricing practices that would otherwise constitute violations of the law. Some 
examples include attempts by insurance companies to cooperate and collectively set 
premiums for vehicles, by steel companies to enter into price fixing agreements, and by 
commercial banks to impose interest rate ceilings on deposits.  
The very first antitrust case was referred to the VCC for adjudication in April 2009, 
roughly four years after the VLOC entered into effect. This case originated from a 
complaint filed by Jetstar Pacific Airlines, a joint venture with a 70 per cent shareholding 
maintained by the state,681  stating that the Vietnam Aviation Petroleum Company 
(Vinapco), a monopoly supplier and subsidiary of state-owned Vietnam Air, had stopped 
the supply of aviation fuel because the complainant refused to pay a 40 per cent increase 
in the fuel charge fee. Interestingly, this case was not lodged directly with the VCAD, but 
rather with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Trade. The case was scheduled to be 
                                                      
680 Art. 4 of the Decree On establishment, functions, duties, powers and organizational structure of Vietnam 
Competition Council” states that “The Vietnam Competition Council is an independent executive agency, 
has the function of handling limited competition acts.” Art. 4 of the Decree states that “The Vietnam Competition 
Council shall have from 11 to 15 members who are appointed, deappointed by the Prime Minister upon the request of 
the Minister of Trade…The Vietnam Competition Council shall be assisted by a Secretariat. Functions, duties, 
organizational structure of the Secretariat of the Vietnam Competition Council shall be specified by the Minister of 
Trade.” 
681 When the dispute broke out, Jetstar Pacific was known as Pacific Airlines. The domestic carrier later transformed 
into the low-cost Jetstar Pacific in May 2008 under an agreement with Australia’s Jetstar Airways. See  
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heard by the VCC in mid-2009.682 
In January 2009 the VCAD found that Vinapco had abused its monopoly position by 
“imposing disadvantageous terms on a customer.” Later on, after the hearing, the VCC 
ordered Vinapco to pay a fine of VND 3.37 million and promised to forward Jetstar 
Pacific’s proposal for separating Vinapco from Vietnam Airlines to official agencies and 
tighten control over monopoly services.683 Vinapco appealed to a court in Ha Noi, but 
was rejected in early January 2011 and required to pay a fine of VND3.4 billion for 
cutting off supplies to a local carrier.684 This case has drawn tremendous attention, but it 
also has the appearance of practice, given limited experience on the part of the parties, the 
agency and the infringer. This notion of practice was suggested by a member of the VCC, 
who defined the penalty as being cautionary rather than punitive because this was the first 
violation of Vinapco.685 
















                                                      
682 Karen Ellis & Rohit Singh, Assessing the Economic Impact of Competition 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6056.pdf.  
683 Vu Ba Phu, Vision for An ASEAN Competition Regime, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/9/42712787.pdf. 
684 See news “Fierce competition”, available at 
http://www.asiaone.com/Business/News/Story/A1Story20110202-261671/3.html 
685 Vu Ba Phu, Vision for An ASEAN Competition Regime, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/9/42712787.pdf, p8.  
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Table 5 Vietnamese Achievements in Pubic Enforcement 
M&A 
 Consultations   Notification   Total number 
2007 1 -- 1 
2008 4 0 4 
2009-10 30+ 8 38+ 
Cartel & abuse of dominant position 
 Consultations   Investigation   Total number 
2007 2 1 3 
2008 2 3 5 
2009-10 1 22 23 
Source: compiled according to the data available in Annual report Vietnam Competition Authority 
2010686 and Vision for An ASEAN Competition Regime.687 
 
4.3.3. Private Antitrust Enforcement 
It seems that in the VLOC, the retributive and deterrent function of private 
enforcement outweighs its corrective and compensatory function. 
As per the VLOC, there is no general right to bring a standing-alone action against 
breaches of the law. Actions can be brought only following the initiation of an 
infringement decision by the enforcement authorities. Moreover, the VCC cannot ex 
officio order compensation, so the prospect of recovering damages for an injured party is 
somewhat remote.  
Under the rubric of “other necessary measures to overcome the competition 
restriction impacts of the violation acts”, Art. 117 (3) (3) stipulates that: 
If organizations or individuals violating competition legislation cause damage to the interests 
of the State, legitimate rights and interests of other organizations or individuals, they must 
pay compensation therefor according to law provisions. 
Art. 6 of the DDB reinforces this rule, stating at art 6(1) that: 
[a]ny organization or individual breaching the laws on competition, thereby causing loss to 
the interests of the State or to the lawful rights and interests of other organizations and 
individuals, must pay compensation for such loss. 
                                                      
686 See Vietnam Competition Authority, Annual report Vietnam Competition Authority 2010, available at 
http://earlywarning.vn/portal/sites/default/files/vca/Final%2027052011-LC.pdf, p10-11. 
687 Vu Ba Phu, Vision for An ASEAN Competition Regime, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/9/42712787.pdf, p8.  
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The procedures under which actions for compensation may be brought are those that 
fall within Vietnamese civil law. Until now, there has been no reported private antitrust 
litigation. 
4.3.4. Some Explanations 
Many barriers to competition are system-induced. There are quite a few 
interventionist regulations imposing ceilings or floors for the sums that businesses can 
charge or spend, rules that should have been left to the market to decide. Subnational 
governments arbitrarily issue documents to protect their local markets. Discriminatory 
treatment of private enterprises is also widely spread. For instance, according to the Law 
on Mineral Resources of Vietnam, only SOEs are permitted to directly run business in 
national mines, and private enterprises can only gain access to these mines through a 
contract with the SOEs. A report for the World Bank suggested that SOEs can obtain 
financial support more easily, given the government’s control of the banking system.688 
There are tremendous difficulties in coordinating with industrial regulators. A VCA 
official openly confessed that it would be “a continuing challenge to educate the sectoral 
regulators to consider the impact of their policies and activities on competition in the 
market, and to prioritize the interest of the overall economy rather than the interests of a 
particular sector. While VCAD has reached an understanding with some sectoral 
regulators that have concurrent powers to oversee competition matters in their sectors, the 
coordination between the enforcement actions of VCAD and the other sectoral regulators 
remains one of the key challenges in moving forward.”689 
Human, financial and material capitals are thin. Dealing with cases involving 
competition restraints requires a significant work and human resources. A shortage of 
labor is made worse by the lack of experienced staff, since it takes neophytes a longer 
time to handle a case than a veteran. Moreover, the budget is tight, and working facilities 
                                                      
688 Center for Internatioanl Economics (2001) “Vietnam Sugar Program—Where Next?”, prepared for the World Bank, 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVIETNAMINVIETNAMESE/Resources/other_reports_sugar.pdf  
689 Vu Ba Phu, Vision for An ASEAN Competition Regime, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/9/42712787.pdf, p6. 
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are not well-equipped. 690 
Given the short experience of Vietnam with respect to market economy, there is a 
lack of meaningful statistics for research and analysis. 
The business community is not adequately aware of the competition regime. 
Compliance with the VLOC heavily relies on a good understanding of the law. However, 
astonishingly, a survey undertaken by the VCA on public perception of the VLOC in 
2009, five years after its promulgation, indicated that 44.8 per cent of respondents were 
totally unaware of the law, and 23.2 per cent had difficulties understanding it. Apart from 
ignorance of the law, some firms do not fully appreciate or trust the influence of the 
VLOC and the VCA in securing a sound competitive environment and protecting the 
legitimate rights and interests of every enterprise. These firms do not provide full 
cooperation when the authorities conduct investigations, collect evidence, or request 
information. This uncooperative attitude is further encouraged by modest sanctions for 
failure to provide information.691 
The Civil Procedure Code of Vietnam was enacted in 2004. 692  Though a 
comprehensive framework for civil disputes has been established, this is still in the 
process of full completion and some institutions that are facilitative to private antitrust 
litigation remains unclear in Vietnamese Civil Procedure Code. A brief examination of 
the structural determinants of private enforcement is as follows: 
(1). Vietnam basically applies the British Rule, namely, the loser-pay rule. Though 
certain exceptions exist, as a general principle of Vietnamese law, unless it is 
agreed by all parties in a dispute, the loser bears the costs of civil court 
proceedings, including court fees and lawyer fees and costs.693 
                                                      
690 Vu Ba Phu, Vision for An ASEAN Competition Regime, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/9/42712787.pdf, p6. 
691 Vietnam Competition Authority, Annual report Vietnam Competition Authority 2010, available at 
http://earlywarning.vn/portal/sites/default/files/vca/Final%2027052011-LC.pdf, p56-7. 
692 See the English version of the Civil Procedure Code of Vietnam at 
http://www.noip.gov.vn/noip/resource.nsf/vwResourceList/3457A7711572E0534725767200203DDA/$FILE/CIVIL%2
0PROCEDURE%20CODE.pdf  
693 Do Trong Hai & Tran Duc Son, The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Litigation and Dispute Resolution 
2010—Vietnam, 
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(2). There is no provision under Vietnamese law which specifically authorizes 
contingency fee arrangements between lawyers and their and clients. The Law 
on Lawyers No. 65-2006-QH11 of 2006, which governs remuneration 
arrangements, provides that all levels of remuneration must be agreed on in legal 
services contracts between clients and lawyers. No other provisions under 
Vietnamese law regulate fee arrangements based on the results of litigation. So it 
is still unclear whether such arrangements are officially permitted, under though 
in practice the authorities would be unlikely to object to such arrangements.  
(3). There is no procedure that permits pre-trial exchange of evidence in Vietnam. 
Rather, the court obtains statements and evidence from the plaintiff and the 
defendant. Each party has a right to see the evidence presented by the other party. 
However, prior permission of the court must be obtained before a review of the 
other party’s evidence will be allowed. While such permission is normally 
granted by the court, it is often only granted to a party’s appointed lawyer and 
not to other persons.694 
Under the CPC, there are some cases in which a third party can be joined to ongoing 
proceedings as a joined claimant, defendant, or person with related rights and obligations 
under his or her own claims or the claims of other concerned parties. And the court may 
consolidate two or more civil cases which have been accepted separately to form one case 
for resolution, if the consolidation and resolution in that case is in compliance with the 
provisions of laws. However, the laws provide no more details. 695  There is no 
information that suggests the existence of class action or something like it. 
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4.4.1 Emergence of Antitrust Law and Its Goals  
A. Background 
After separating from Malaysia in 1965, the Singapore government set up 
government-linked companies (GLC) and statutory boards696 to drive industrialization 
allegedly in the absence of adequate private investment and expertise.  
In 1974, the Singapore government established a limited holding company through 
the Ministry of Finance, Temasek Holding, to manage its investment in GLCs. Many of 
the GLCs are listed on the Singapore Exchange, and the major listed companies account 
for over 20 per cent of total market capitalization.697 Although, GLCs are suspected of 
enjoying favors in terms of access to funds, tenders, and opportunities, and are less 
efficient than private factors, and their executives, who are usually appointed from the 
ranks of senior civil servants and military officers, are criticized for being too risk-averse 
and lacking sufficient entrepreneurial drive, Temasek Holding and its subsidiaries are 
incorporated under the Companies Act, and many of them have consistently posted strong 
financial performances. 
In an early survey on the public enterprises of Singapore, Lee found that 
“government control is in fact very loose” and that the government “normally does not 
interfere with the management of the companies directly.” The survey also indicates that 
public enterprises seem to receive few, if any, special privileges merely because of their 
government ownership.698 Another empirical work by Ramirez and Tan suggests that 
                                                      
696 Statutory boards are legislated under individual acts of parliament that define their functions, scope, and powers; 
they formed under various ministries and are accountable to them through parliament. Those boards have their own 
recruitment and human resource management policies. They are legally distinct and independent employers from the 
Civil Service. See footnote 4 in Carlos D. Ramirez & Ling Hui Tan, Singapore, Inc. Versus the Private Sector: Are 
Government-Linked Companies Different?, IMF Working Paper WP/03/156 (2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03156.pdf, p4. Also “What is the difference between Ministries and 
Statutory Boards? Are statutory boards considered part of the Singapore Civil Service?” at 
http://www.ifaq.gov.sg/psd/apps/fcd_faqmain.aspx.  
697 Carlos D. Ramirez & Ling Hui Tan, Singapore, Inc. Versus the Private Sector: Are Government-Linked Companies 
Different?, IMF Working Paper WP/03/156 (2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03156.pdf, p5. 
698 Lee, Sheng Yi, 1976, Public Enterprises and Economic Development in Singapore, Malayan Economic Review, Vol. 
21 (October), pp49-65, p57-8. 
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GLCs are competing with private sectors on a level playing ground as far as access to 
financing is concerned. Their regression results indicate that GLCs are equally 
liquidity-constrained in their investment decisions compared to their private 
counterparts.699 
B. Emergence of the Competition Act of Singapore and its goals 
The emergence of this law is the result of a joint need for economic rebalancing and 
pushes made by foreign forces. 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the last century, Singapore put 
forward government initiatives to strengthen and liberalize its domestic economy, which 
has been driven by government-linked enterprises in past decades. Some strategic sectors 
such as energy and telecommunications have been privatized over the years, and have 
come under the oversight of sector-specific regulators including those that govern 
competition regulations. No generic competition had yet been put in place. 
In 2003, Singapore signed a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, 
becoming the first to do so among Southeast Asian countries. Under this agreement, 
Singapore was required to introduce a general competition law that would “adopt or 
maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business conduct with the objective of 
promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare.”700  
The Competition Act of Singapore (Cap. 50b) (CAS) was adopted in 2005. But 
maybe as a compensation for short gestation, its prohibitions were rolled out in phases. 
On 1 January 2006, prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements and abuse of 
dominance came into effect, and on 1 July 2007, merger provisions came into effect. 
During this transitional stage, the Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS) issued a 
set of 12 guidelines on how it would interpret and bring into effect these various the 
provisions of the Competition Act.  
                                                      
699 Carlos D. Ramirez & Ling Hui Tan, Singapore, Inc. Versus the Private Sector: Are Government-Linked Companies 
Different?, IMF Working Paper WP/03/156 (2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03156.pdf, p14. 
700 Ong, Burton , Competition Law Takes Off in Singapore: An Analysis of Two Recent Decisions. Competition Policy 
International, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2007 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075264  
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The CAS contains three major parts: Sec. 34, dealing with anti-competition 
agreements, Sec. 47, dealing with abuse of dominant positions, and Sec. 54, dealing with 
mergers that substantially lessen competition.  
It has been expressed by the Singapore government that “other than the matters or 
mergers excluded as specified in the Third and Fourth Schedules, the Competition Act 
will apply to commercial and economic activities carried on by private sector entities in 
all sectors, regardless of whether the undertaking is owned by a foreign entity, a 
Singapore entity, the Government or a statutory body. However, as the intent of 
competition law is to regulate the conduct of market players, it will not apply to the 
Government, statutory bodies or any person acting on their behalf.”701 This is to say that 
the CAS also applies to GLCs, and the first ruling against a GLC was indeed handed 
down in 2010.  
As for the goals of the CAS, the official statement is that “The objective of the 
competition law is to promote the efficient functioning of our markets and hence enhance 
the competitiveness of our economy. The law seeks to prohibit anti-competitive activities 
that unduly prevent, restrict or distort competition. We recognize that any regulatory 
intervention in the markets may impose costs. Therefore, we will need to balance 
regulatory and business compliance costs against the benefits from effective competition. 
Instead of attempting to catch all forms of anti-competitive activities, our principal focus 
will be on those that have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in Singapore or 
that do not have any net economic benefit. In assessing whether an action is 
anti-competitive, we will also give due consideration to whether it promotes innovation, 
productivity or longer-term economic efficiency. This approach will ensure that we do not 
inadvertently constrain innovative and enterprising endeavors.”702 
This long articulation of the goals of CAS is interpreted by some scholars as 
reflecting an underlying utilitarian philosophy, that is, the CAS will be used as an 
                                                      
701 See “To whom will the Competition Act apply?” http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=570#1.  
702 See “What is the policy objective of the competition law?” at http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=570#1.  
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instrument to enhance the competitiveness of markets that comprise the domestic 
economy, and that the CCS intends to take an economics-based approach to the 
interpretation and application of statutory prohibitions in the Act. 
4.4.2 Public Antitrust Enforcement 
A. Competition authority  
Under the CAS, the CCS was set up as a statutory body in 2005 to administer and 
enforce the CAS. It is also an organ within Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI).  
The Commission comprises members with legal backgrounds, economists, and 
businessmen, and is headed by a chief executive appointed from the civil service system. 
When it was set up, many officers came from the government’s well-regarded Legal 
Service as well as its Economic Service. Police investigators with a background in 
white-collar enforcement were also included in the staff team. 
Under the CAS, CCS is empowered to perform quasi-legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions when addressing matters of competition. It is responsible for drafting 
and implementing regulations, guidelines, and other secondary legislation. It can carry 
out market investigations, act on complaints from the public or on its own accord, and 
make determinations as to whether or not any prohibitions have been infringed. 
Once a contravention is decided, the CCS can also issue directions requiring 
undertakings to modify or terminate infringing agreements or conduct, to enter into 
legally enforceable agreements as may be specified by the Commission, or to pay a 
financial penalty of up to 10 per cent of an undertaking’s annual business turnover for 
each year of infringement, up to a maximum period of three years.703 
Appeals of decisions made by the CCS can be filed with the Competition Appeal 
Board and, if still not satisfied, with the Singapore High Court and Court of Appeal. 
In the early stage the CCS has dedicated itself to promoting an antitrust regime in 
                                                      
703 See § 69 of Competition Act 2004. 
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Singapore via multifaceted efforts, including advocacy, education, building capacities in 
addition to law enforcement that will be discussed below. 
Advocacy is regarded as a complementary pillar to CCS’ enforcement efforts. The 
CCS has launched a series of creative advocacy initiatives in past years to make itself 
more accessible and easy to understand. For example, graphic novels and comics provide 
a vivid guide for a general understanding of CCS’ work,704“Dos and Don’ts” Guides give 
businesses simple and clear instructions for what they can and cannot do under the 
CAS,705 and the CCS case bank provides stakeholders, researchers and educators with 
important information on CCS enforcement and the CAS itself.706 Additionally, the CCS 
organized Distinguished Speaker Series to invite internationally prominent officials and 
scholars to share their insights and perspectives on developments in global competition 
law, and outreach programs to partner with other government organizations and business 
chambers to reach out to the public and private sectors. These programs include quarterly 
workshops and seminars, as well as monthly courses to educate government procurement 
officers on the telltale signs of bid-rigging. 
B. Enforcement records 
Though still a young competition agency, the CCS has already manifested impressive 
maturity. 
Considering its lack of experience and resources, the CCS has clearly spelled out its 
discretionary authority in relation to the administrative priorities listed in its guidelines. It 
is stated in CCS Guidelines on the Major Provisions that “the CCS will set its strategic 
priorities and consider each case on its merits, and in light of available resources, to see if 
it warrants an investigation.”707 The legislature has already excluded some sectors from 
the scope of the CAS that are under sector-specific regulations, bearing in mind the 
                                                      
704 More information is available at 
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/0B35E9F6-04CD-42C2-9F8C-C454C1217602/25329/FixedManga.pdf.  
705 More information is available at 
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/0B35E9F6-04CD-42C2-9F8C-C454C1217602/25328/DosandDonts.pdf.  
706 The official website of the case bank is http://app.casebank.ccs.gov.sg/.  
707 See CCS Guidelines on the Major Provisions, para. 3.6. 
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limited capacity, inexperience, and potential cross-sector conflicts.708 
In line with this widespread understanding of the CCS, its first year may be defined 
not by cartel-busting headlines, but by the consideration and clarification of technical 
details such as complex notifications for decisions, block exemptions, and the activities 
of trade and professional associations. The first two public enforcements came out in 
2006 and involved negative clearance decisions on airline alliance agreements which had 
been provided to the CCS. Although a violation of Sec. 34 was found, the CCS decided 
that the agreements nevertheless survived the net benefits exclusion examination in the 
Third Schedule.709 
Despite a series of prudent and pragmatic gestures, by 2010, the CCS had issued two 
Infringement Decisions with fines close to USD 1.45 million against a price fixing 
cartel 710  and a bid-rigging cartel. 711  Two more Infringement Decisions were also 
proposed, including the first case on abuse of dominance. The CCS had also received 18 
merger notifications.  
  
                                                      
708 Others excluded from the scope of statutory prohibitions in the Competition Act 2004 can be found in the Third 
Schedule of the Act, which includs industry sectors without their own sectoral competition codes, but are subject to 
their own comprehensive regulatory regime. These include the postal services sector, the supply of piped potable water, 
wastewater management services, public bus and rail services, and cargo terminal operations. 
709 For a though analysis of the two cases see Ong, Burton , Competition Law Takes Off in Singapore: An Analysis of 
Two Recent Decisions. Competition Policy International, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2007 . Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075264.  
710 Information about the case is available at 
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NewsEvents/PressReleases/2009/Coach+Operators+Fined.htm.   




Table 6 Summary of Cases Handled by the CCS by March 31, 2010 
Classification of cases Cases started Cases completed 
Preliminary inquiries & 
investigations 
59 48 
Notification for guidelines712 11 5 
Notification for decisions713 4 2 
Mergers  18 16 
Leniency  6 4 
Competition advisory714 14 12 
Total  112 87 
Source: Competition Commission of Singapore, Building up a Young Competition Agency: The 
Competition Commission of Singapore’s Experience, CPI ANTITRUST J., May 2010 (1), at 2. 
 
In 2010, four years after the CAS came into effect, the CCS handed down its very 
first decision against a GLC. In this case, the CCS found that SISTIC, a dominant 
ticketing service provider jointly owned by Singapore Sports Council (SSC)715 and 
TECl,716 violated Sec. 47 of CAS by signing exclusive agreements with venue operators 
and event promoters. Those agreements restricted the choice of venue operators, event 
promoters and end consumers.  
C. Sectoral and cross-sectoral competition matters 
The CAS pragmatically circumnavigated potential conflicts between the CCS and 
certain sectoral regulators by excluding those sectors from the scope of the CAS. 
However, these sectoral exclusions are not intended to be permanent. The MTI openly 
                                                      
712 The Notification for Guidance or Decision is a non-mandatory system that allows businesses to notify the CCS of 
their agreements or conduct, if they have serious concerns as to whether they are infringing the antitrust prohibitions. 
713 CCS has a voluntary merger notification system and merger parties may notify CCS of decisions as to whether their 
anticipated merger will, if carried into effect, infringe, or whether their merger has infringed antitrust prohibitions. 
714 CCS provides confidential advice and inputs to government agencies on competition matters early in the policy 
formulation process as government policies can have a significant impact on competition.  
715 A statutory body under the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports.  
716 An agency under the Ministry of Information, Communication, and the Arts. 
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promised, “after the competition law has been in place for some time, we will review the 
need for such sectoral exclusions, taking into account market developments.”717 This 
allows for a certain level of power for the young CCS and maintains room for future 
reforms. 
As well, two institutional arrangements would help secure a level playing field in 
those sectors. First, the sectors were subject to equally stringent competition rules by their 
respective sectoral regulators. Second, and more importantly, the CCS worked closely 
with sectoral regulators to coordinate competition legislation and framework. Institutions 
such as the completion impact assessment for government agencies, 718  a regular 
exchange of views on competition matters, joint studies on markets and legislation, and 
secondment of staff between agencies, have been set up to secure the smooth 
coordination and cooperation between CCS and sectoral regulators.719 
Cross-sectoral competition matters are they will be dealt with by the CCS in 
consultation with sectoral regulators. This indicates a comprehensive consideration of 
competition and other policy goals of Singapore. It has been expressly stated that when 
government agencies formulate policies, there are other policy considerations, such as 
consumer protection, social policy objectives, and the development of new industries. 
The CCS aims to generate a greater awareness among other government agencies so that 
unintended consequences of competition are minimized, and competition plays a positive 
role in achieving these other policy objectives. The cooperation between the CCS and 
other government agencies will range from the formation of new rules to back-look 
                                                      
717 See “What are the sectoral activities excluded under the Third and Fourth Schedules; and what is the basis for their 
exclusion?” at http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=570#6.  
718 This work is conducted under the CCS Guidelines on Competition Impact Assessment for Government Agencies. 
These guidelines are aimed at assisting government agencies in identifying and assessing the likely competitive impact 
of their proposed policies, so that they can in turn develop pro-competition public policies. More information on the 
“CCS Guidelines on Competition Impact Assessment for Government 
Agencies” is available at http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/A67B68FC-DB6F-415B-9DF1- 
5A97FC6855A9/22338/GuidelineOnCompetitionAssessmentcleanv1_14Oct08rev.pdf.  
719 Yena Lim, Competition Law and State Regulation: Setting the Stage and Focus on State-owned Companies, 
Conference Paper for Global Competition Law Conference: Competition Law and the State 18 & 19 Mar. 2011, Hong 
Kong, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global-competition/hongkong-2011/secure/index.shtml, p7.   
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assessment.720 
4.4.3 Private Antitrust Enforcement 
Despite the fact that there was opposition to private action during legislative 
periods,721 the final version of the CAS still granted power to private prosecutors. 
Under section 86 of the CAS, individuals who have suffered losses directly as a 
result of anticompetitive conduct prohibited by the Act enjoy the right of private action, 
but this depends on the confirmation of a violation of prohibitions by the CCS. Victims 
may seek judicial reliefs, such as injunctive relief and damages from the courts only after 
all available avenues of appeal have been exhausted.722 
The following structural determinants are present in Singapore: an indirect purchaser 
has the standing to sue; there is good information disclosure (such as within the case 
bank); one way-fee shifting,723contingency fees and punitive damages are not allowed; 
class action in the form of representative action is allowed.   
However, six years have passed and no case has been reported. 
4.5 Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
Though the emergence of each country’s respective competition regime has a 
different origin, the common political and economic features of Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan have decided these countries’ similar attitudes towards competition law and the 
evolution of law enforcement. 
Politically speaking, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have strong governments, a 
trend long fostered by the weakness of social classes,724 conscious actions taken by 
                                                      
720 http://app.ccs.gov.sg/AboutUs_CEPhilosophy.aspx  
721 For example, in the Singapore Telecommunication Corporation’s comments on the competition bill, it was 
expressly stated that “private actions for damages or loss is not appropriate. The Bill should make no provision for 
private actions for damages or loss. The focus of any general competition law is the protection of the competitive 
process not individual firms. The Bill should not provide financial incentives/rewards for parties to engage in 
regulatory gaming. Private actions only encourage the prosecution of pro-competitive activities for strategic 
advantage.” 
722 http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=570#1  
723 Singapore applies the British Rule, namely, the loser-pay rule, but not one-way fee shifting. 
724 Korea’s historical development left a social structure with no powerful social classes to contest state power. The 
landed class was eliminated through land reform at the time of the Korean War, and the incipient political organizations 
of the working class and the farmers were also crushed during the war and the subsequent domination of Cold War 
politics. See Ha-Joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
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military regimes that fundamentally shaped the political economy,725 Confucian tradition 
according to which the state commands the moral high ground and draws on the best 
talents, and the relatively long tradition of centralization.726  
On the economic side, Cumings, in a major comparative study, concluded that in the 
cases of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, state direction of development was critical.727 
The state helped set up a growth strategy, secure preferential macroeconomic policies, 
select key enterprises, maintain close ties with major business decision-makers, and 
maintain relatively sound relations with major international trade partners. 
4.5.1 Emergence of Antitrust Law and Its Goals  
A. Japan 
If Vietnam enacted its VLOC only under the encouragement of outsiders, the 
adoption of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA) took place directly under the force 
of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP).  
Cartels had long been officially recognized and even encouraged in Japan by the 
government before the WWII, to facilitate economic growth and recovery from regional 
wars.728 During WWII, to privately controlled organizations or compulsory cartels were 
utilized as War-time control machines.729 As a result, once the war closed, the SCAP 
required the enactment of a competition law and even prepared its own draft after 
rejecting a Bill for Industrial Order drafted by the Japanese government. In the following 
days, having been approved by the SCAP, a Bill Concerning the Prohibition of Private 
Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade was finally passed without many dissenting 
                                                                                                                                                              
1993. 
725 For example, the Park Chung Hee government in South Korea ruled the country from 1961 to 1979, and the KMT 
government governed Taiwan after a retreat from mainland China in 1949 until 2000. In 2008, the KMT retook the 
president’s office.  
726 Korea has traditionally been even more centralised than other Confucian countries. The Japanese feudal system was 
fairly decentralised until the Meiji Restoration, and the Chinese system, owing to the sheer size of the country, had a 
strong tendency to dissolve into a decentralised one except in the prime time of a dynasty. 
727 Bruce Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial. Sectors, 
Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, International Organization Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter, 1984), pp. 1-40 p. 11. 
728 See H. Iyori & A. Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws and Policies of Japan, Federal Legal Publications, Inc. New 
York. 1994, p3-13. 
729 See H. Iyori & A. Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws and Policies of Japan, Federal Legal Publications, Inc. New 
York. 1994, at 19 
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opinions in the Imperial Parliament in Mar. 1947 and entered into effect in July of the 
same year. 730 This law was modeled on the American antitrust law and constitutes the 
main body of the AMA. Major amendments were introduced in 1949, 1953, 1961, 1977, 
1991, 1992, and 1997. More recent amendments in 1999 and 2000 concern the abolition 
of exemptions and natural monopolies as well as civil remedies. 
 Clearly, the Japanese AMA was created from without not within, and was primarily 
aimed at dissolving or reforming cartel organizations.731 
B. South Korea 
 In contrast to the forced competition law of Japan, the competition laws of South 
Korea and Taiwan emerged from endogenous demands. 
 The emergence of Korean competition law was marked by the struggle between the 
government and established large businesses, and propelled by the contradictions 
between the distortion deriving from government intervention and a sustainable economy. 
Throughout 1960’s and 1970’s, the Korean economy was characterized by 
government interventions that adopted an unbalanced, export-driven development 
strategy. It is undeniable that this strategy attained remarkable achievements, such as an 
annual economic growth rate of approximately 10 per cent in 1960s732and 9.6 per cent in 
the 1970s.733 However, the high development speed was accompanied by microeconomic 
inefficiency.734 Excessive investment and persistent government policy during this time 
set up high entry and exit barriers for selected strategic industries, which solidified 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures and consequently caused distributive 
                                                      
730 See H. Iyori & A. Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws and Policies of Japan, Federal Legal Publications, Inc. New 
York. 1994, p16. 
731 The cartel organizations were dissolved or reformed by the Closed Institutions Ordinance of 1947, Cabinet Order 
No. 238 of 1947, issued in accordance with section 104 of the AMA and SCAP Directive No. 1860 of 1948. See See H. 
Iyori & A. Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws and Policies of Japan, Federal Legal Publications, Inc. New York. 1994, 
p15. 
732 KFTC, History of The Development of A Market Oriented Economy 12 (2001); Bon Ho Koo, A Historical 
Perspective of the Korean Economy 184 (1991). 
733 Jung-Ho Yoo, The Industrial Policy of The 1970s And the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector, 37-39, p44 
(1990). 
734 Jung-Ho Yoo, The Industrial Policy of The 1970s And the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector, 37-39, p44 
(1990). 
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inefficiencies.735 Moreover, the exclusive selection approach pursued during this era also 
propelled the emergence of chaebols, 736  which further accelerated concentrated 
economic power. Most chaebols were based in manufacturing sectors, but many have 
expanded their activities into the financial sector as well.737 The share of the ten largest 
chaebols in the GDP soared from 5.1 per cent at the beginning of the heavy and chemical 
industry (HCI) drive738 to over 10 per cent by the end.739  
It was against this backdrop that the government started to recognize a more 
competitive industrial environment was necessary for economic growth. However, the 
government’s subsequent efforts to introduce competition laws in 1960s and 1970s 
subsided when confronted with a series of eye-catching scandals due to anti-competitive 
behavior, strong opposition from business circles, and a development strategy 
confounded by industrial and competition policy. In the Sambun case of 1963, it was 
revealed that several large producers of wheat flour and sugar for the domestic market 
were able to charge 3 to 4 times the listed price for goods by deliberately sustaining a 
long time supply shortage.740 This case provoked a public consensus on the need to rein 
in anti-competitive practices.741 In response to problems of this kind, the government 
submitted the draft competition law respectively in 1964, 1966 and 1967 but all failed 
due to strong objections from the business sector.742 
                                                      
735 Bon Ho Koo, A Historical Perspective of the Korean Economy 184 (1991).  
736 Chaebols are commercial giants owned by individuals and their immediate family members. In 2000, the average 
“in-group shareholding ratio” of the thirty largest chaebols was 43.4%. Korea Fair Trade Commission, The White Paper 
on Fair Trade 82 (2001). 
737 Chaebols took over Korea’s previously nationalized commercial banks in 1981. Only a few chaebols shared 
ownership of each national bank because no single “person” was permitted to own more than 8% of any nationwide 
commercial bank’s total stock. By contrast, there was no legal ceiling on the ownership of local banks, thereby allowing 
each local bank to come under the practical control of one or two chaebols. See Kyu Uck Lee, Economic Development 
and Competition Policy in Korea，1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 67 (2002). 
738 In late 1960s, concerned about growing protectionism among major trading partners, such as the U.S., and the 
international competitiveness of Korea’s labor-intensive and export-oriented light industries, which were under threat 
from other remerging economies, the government enacted legislation to shift the focus to heavy manufacturing 
industries. The HCI drive was formally launched in 1973 and valid till early 1980s. see KFTC, History of The 
Development of A Market Oriented Economy 12-13 (2001) cited in Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea's 
Competition Law and Policies in Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 687 (2006) . 
739 Il SaKong, Korea in the World Economy, Inst for Intl Economics, p247 (1993). 
740 KFTC, History of The Development of A Market Oriented Economy 12 (2001), p4, fn 1. 
741 Id.  
742 Id. 
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In 1968, the Sinjin case became the new impetus for the introduction of a 
competition law. In this case, Sinjin, a monopolistic automobile manufacturer, was 
granted the privilege to request a commercial loan from a foreign entity, but sold its 
Korona cars on the domestic market at a price approximately three times higher than the 
international price. Riding public resentment, the government submitted another 
competition law bill but was rebuffed again. This time the business sector successfully 
brought about the argument that it was not a good time to introduce competition law, 
given that the goal of the Korean economy was to accumulate industrial capital and 
facilitate the free flow of products to the market.743 
After the oil crisis in South Korea in 1974, a severely distorted market mechanism 
resulting from government intervention and a large rise in the price of imported raw 
material led to rampant inflation and supply-demand imbalances in many markets. In 
order to solve problems triggered in large part by government intervention, the Korean 
government opted for further intervention and enacted the Act Concerning Price 
Stabilization and Fair Trade (Price Stabilization Act). During the implementation of this 
act, the government laid emphasis on price control rather than fair trade. From 1975 to 
1979, hundreds of monopolistic and oligopolistic products were targeted for price 
control.744 The number of price-controlled products dropped, but price regulation was 
carried out until 1979.745 
Extensive price control and pervasive government intervention produced a legacy of 
malfunctioning price mechanisms, compromised product quality, an imbalance in supply 
and demand, and general uncertainty, so once the military bloc stepped down, the new 
government, bearing in mind the problems caused by the grow-first strategy from past 
decades, successfully pushed the adoption of the Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade 
                                                      
743 Id, at 18), see Jung & Chang, supra note 738.   
744 Kyu Uck Lee, Competition Policy, Deregulation and Economic Development: The Korean Experience, Korea 
Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (1998), p237-40.. 
745 See Lee, supra note 737.  
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Act (MRFTA) in 1980, which entered into effect the next year.746  
Lee noted that in general, Korean competition law resembles that of the EU rather 
than that of the U.S.747 Hence, it is understandable that the Korean MRFTA would purse 
multiple objectives in addition to the promotion of economic efficiency.748 
Art. 1 of the MRFTA provides that: 
This Act seeks to promote fair and free competition such that creative enterprising activities 
are fostered, to protect consumers, and to strive for the balanced development of the national 
economy by preventing the abuse of market dominance by enterprisers and excessive 
concentration of economic power and by regulating improper cartels and unfair business 
practices. 
 
The MRFTA’s goals are is also a reflection of South Korea experience in 
development, which previously suffered from an imbalanced economic structure caused 
by the state’s growth-first strategy. 
C. Taiwan  
After the retreat of the Kuomintang (KMT) to Taiwan in 1949, at the end of the 
authoritarian phase of government,749 the KMT transformed Taiwan from an agricultural 
economy to an industrial one.750 A manufacturing base developed whereby large-scale 
industries were fostered and protected by the Party-state.  
Williams noted that while the KMT ran Taiwan as an authoritarian Party-state, the 
political economy it endorsed was labeled as the “Principle of Social Welfare,” which 
envisaged public control over key sectors of the economy but allowed ample room for the 
development of the private economy. It was akin to the German Ordoliberal ideology,751 
but with an emphasis on primary economic development and a greater role for the state in 
certain strategic sectors and coordination, so competition was not necessarily seen as 
                                                      
746 See Jung & Chang, supra note 739, at 691. 
747 Lee, MH, Recent Developments in the Treatment of Collusion by the Korean Courts, 4:2journal of Korean 
Competition Law (2005)155, p157. 
748 See Jung & Chang, supra note 739, at 695. 
749 A series of political actions, like the amendment of various repressive laws, the repeal of the Temporary Provisions 
of 1948 which had suspended the constitution, and the ending of the so-called “Period of National Mobilization for the 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in May 1990, moved Taiwan away from the authoritarian stance of the KMT. 
750 MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN, (2005).  
751 Id, Chapter 2. 
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beneficial.752    
By the mid-1960s Taiwan had become a major exporter of industrial products and the 
contributions of private enterprises gradually overtook the previous dominance of 
state-owned firms. For example, in 1952 the SOEs contributed 57% of industrial 
production but in 1980 it was less than 20 per cent. However, many strategic and 
lucrative industries, such as petroleum, electricity, gas, water, steel, railways, shipbuilding, 
posts and telecommunications, tobacco, alcoholic spirits and banking, were monopolized 
by the state. Furthermore, the KMT had significant influence over and ownership of 
many other strategic business sectors in Taiwan. 753  
The Party owned or controlled over fifty enterprises via two influential investment 
platforms and therefore had the ability to directly intervene in a number of economic 
sectors. Smaller scale manufacturing and technology-based businesses were primarily in 
the hands of family-controlled businesses that relied on export markets. The private 
sector was essentially divided into two groups: 1) one hundred large-scale business 
conglomerates composed of some seven to eight hundred component firms. These 
businesses accounted for 34 per cent of the GNP in 1988 while employing only 4.6 per 
cent of the total workforce. They were concentrated in the high-tech industry and 
domestic businesses. 2) There were also a large number of SMEs. The number in 1961 
was recorded at 178,916, but rose to 750,000 in 1986. These SMEs were predominantly 
located within the commercial sector and concentrated on export markets, and most of 
them had less than fifty employees. They were funded mainly by private capital, operated 
by families, and enjoyed less support and protection from the government than the 
large-scale businesses.754  
It is noteworthy that Taiwan’s economic success was substantially facilitated by 
economic and military assistance from the U.S., in particular the eras of WWII and the 
                                                      
752 Id, at 377. 
753 Id. 
754 Id.  
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cold war.   
With economic development and the change in the global economic and political 
climate, the free-market philosophy started to influence governmental decision-makers in 
Taiwan. Domestic monopolies and cartels, many of which were sponsored by the KMT as 
sources of economic and political patronage, were seen as less efficient and having the 
potential to undermine Taiwan’s competitive edge. The move towards liberalization was 
also thought to be essential to support Taiwan’s accession to GATT and the WTO. 
Accordingly, in 1985 the KMT government made the important economic policy decision 
to abandon substitution policies, liberalize domestic markets, privatize many SOEs, and 
reduce tariff as well as non-tariff trade barriers. In the following years, many SOEs were 
shocked by internal and external competition, and the emerging power of privatized and 
deregulated businesses increased demands for an orderly competitive environment in the 
new market-oriented economy. 755   
In response to institutional demand, a comprehensive competition statute was 
proposed. However, a hard-fought political battle made evident the difficulty in adopting 
a Taiwanese competition law. 756   
The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) took charge of drafting the law. The 
initial instructions, to prepare a draft competition law, were issued in 1980, but the bill 
was not introduced until six years later, in 1986, and the Taiwan Fair Trade Act (TFTA) 
was not in fact enacted until 1992, after a 12-year gestation period.  
There were three major areas of contention: 1) there was a fundamental question as 
to whether Taiwan in such a developmental stage, really needed a comprehensive 
competition law; 2) in the same vein, it was debated as to whether or not a vigorous 
merger and acquisition rule was suitable, given Taiwan’s fragmented market in some 
sectors, a market that lacked economy of scale and administrative inefficiencies; 3) 
whether a powerful economic regulator should be politically independent from the state 
                                                      
755 Id, at 378.  
756 Id, at 378.  
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ministry and how such an important agency could be held politically accountable? 757 
After many rounds of debate, agreements were reached on the following issues: 1) 
the government would not impede business concentrations that were helpful for 
efficiency improvement given that the purpose of the TFTA was “to protect competition, 
not competitor;”758 2) the government agreed to a moratorium on enforcement of the 
merger provision for one year from the date of enactment and that time limits for merger 
reviews would be reduced to two months from the date of completed notification; 3) the 
government was to abandon the original proposal that put the new Taiwan Fair Trade 
Commission (TFTC) within the MOEA, and make the FTC directly answerable to the 
Executive Yuan, the Taiwanese Cabinet, and allow the Chairman of the FTC to hold 
Cabinet rank. 759 
In the following years, the TFTA has been amended on three occasions, in 1999 to 
substantially increase penalties, in 2000 to amend administrative practices, and in 2002 to 
amend the merger notification system by raising thresholds and to generally increase the 
transparency of the procedure.  
Similar to South Korea and totally different from Japan, the Taiwanese TFTA also 
emerged in response to the holdback effect of anti-competitive practices and a call for a 
sustainable development requirement.  
It is presumably because of the following that the Taiwanese TFTA is applauded as 
assuming a functioning and effective maturity: the independence of the TFTA, which has 
made the law more responsive to local conditions; the late-development advantage which 
has enabled Taiwan to stand on the shoulders of the advanced antitrust regimes such as 
those of the U.S, EU, and Germany; the relatively advanced developmental stage in 
which the law was adopted; long-time gestation and advocacy; and the commitment of 
politicians.760 The readiness of this law also decided its goal as one that is more 
                                                      
757 Id, at 378.  
758 Id, at 380, fn29. 
759 Id, at 378.   
760 See Furse, supra note 666.   
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efficiency-oriented, though still maintaining but still keep a trace of multi-tasking as art.1 
of TFTA stipulates: 
 
This Law is enacted for the purposes of maintaining trading order, protecting consumers' 
interests, ensuring fair competition, and promoting economic stability and prosperity. Unless 
otherwise provided in this Law the provisions of other relevant laws shall apply. 
 
4.5.2 Public Enforcement  
A. Enforcement agencies 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have all reached a middle ground with regard to the 
institutional design of their competition law enforcement agencies, i.e., they put the 
enforcement agencies in a ministerial rank independent of any other government 
ministries,761 but still keep them within the framework of the government. Enforcement 
agencies in the three jurisdictions are all quasi-judicial bodies. 
The norm is that the prime minister or president will appoint commissioners, but 
these appointments are subject to the approval of the parliament.  
This arrangement is consistent with these countries’ state-centric political traditions, 
as well as development strategies that highlight the role of the state and require the 
coordination of competition policy with other policies, particularly industrial policies. 
The size and quality of enforcement agencies in these three jurisdictions tend to be 
excellent. For instance, the staff of TFTC consists of 218 civil servants, 25 per cent of 
whom are qualified lawyers, 18 per cent who are economists, and the remaining 57 per 
cent administrators. Over 35 per cent have Master’s degree qualifications and a further 55 
per cent have at least a Bachelor’s degree. There are roughly 400 employees in the Korea 
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), and the annual budget is approximately 250 million 
won. 
After decades of improvement, public enforcers in the three jurisdictions have 
                                                      
761 But the Chairman of the enforcement agency is not necessarily an official member of the Presidential cabinet. He, 
nevertheless, regularly attends and speaks at cabinet meetings like a cabinet member. 
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acquired broad enforcement powers. For instance, they can subpoena relevant parties for 
investigation, request information, conduct on-site inspection, and engage in search or 
seizure by virtue of a permit. 
B. Gradually increased public enforcement 
Economic regulation in Japan has been prone to a bureaucratic pattern because 
political legitimacy there derives from centuries-old administratively guided behavior.762 
It is similar in South Korea and Taiwan. This may be the major cause for the contained 
development of private antitrust in the three jurisdictions. 
The enforcement agencies of each country have invested much time in advocacy 
rather than law enforcement for the following reasons: 
Competition law is an imported institution bearing jargon and an exotic ideology, so 
harnessing it takes time.. In particular, in the case of Japan, competition law was forced 
by the Occupation Authority, which triggered dislike for the law from the beginning. 
Small business was not a strong supporter of Japan’s anti-monopoly policy. The 
concept of freedom of business activities was not previously an essential component of 
business ethics in Japan. As opposed to turning to the AMA for free and fair competition, 
they prefer to protect their interest by means of government regulations. This is 
particularly the case when the cost of lobbying is substantially less than the cost of 
antitrust actions. The end consumers share the small business’ attitudes. 
Even with respect to public enforcement, this middle-ground position taken by Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan from the beginning hid a foreshadowing of a compromise in law 
enforcement in response to conditions in economic development. 
In Japan, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has much less power compared 
with MITI which is responsible for the country’s industrial policy. Although the JFTC has 
never been entirely a paper tighter and antitrust enforcement is not a totally meaningless 
charade, most scholars agree that in any conflict between the two agencies’ objectives, it 
                                                      
762 See Hiroko, supra note 69.  
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is MITI and its industrial policy that will gain the upper hand.763 It is only after the 
deregulation pushed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the realization of the increasing decline of the competitiveness of Japanese 
firms due to high costs caused by lack of competition in domestic market, that the JFTC 
started to take more enforcement actions. 
However, the situation in South Korea and Taiwan is more optimistic.764  
In spite of the fact that the MRFTA was introduced to rein in economic power 
concentration and abuse of dominance, and that Chapter 3 of MRFTA, which is entitled 
“Restriction on the Combination of Enterprises and Suppression of Economic Power 
Concentration,” is dedicated to regulating large-scale firms, the economic concentration 
of the chaebol has never been efficiently curbed. In 1989, the number of chaebols with 
assets of more than 400 billion won was 4311 more than that in 1987. And the chaebol –
affiliated companies increased from 509 in 1987 to 673 in 1989. In 1994, the share of 
total turnovers in the mining and manufacturing sector for the thirty largest chaebols was 
39.6 per cent.765 
Nevertheless, the progress of public enforcement in South Korea is still impressive. 
Between 1981 and 1992, the KFTC issued only 94 corrective notices in relation to cartels. 
During the period of 1993 to 2000, it imposed 238 corrective notices in connection with 
collusive behaviors. As for merger review, KFTC’s record is meager. From 1981 to 2000, 
it issued corrective measures in only twelve cases. And during 2001 to 2003, the KFTC 
took corrective actions only in a very small number of cases. Although curbing the abuse 
of dominance is one of the three core goals of the MRFTA, cases of this kind have been 
scarce.766 
South Korea is even improving its enforcement. In 1996, the KFTC was given a new 
enforcement power allowing it to initiate actions to promote competition in markets in 
                                                      
763 See Amsden & Singh, supra note 69.  
764 See Lee, supra note 738.   
765 See Jung & Chang, supra note 739, at 693.   
766 Id, at 712.   
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which monopolies or oligopolies have existed for an extended period of time. Moreover, 
the KFTC has a unique set of tools to alleviate evident difficulties in enforcing the 
MRFTA. These three “statutory presumption” provisions apply identifying dominant 
firms, determining substantial restraint of competition resulting from mergers and 
identifying collusive practices 
In the case of Taiwan, in the period between 1992 and 2009, the TFTC received 
24281 cases. There were 2529 decisions that involved the imposition of a penalty, of 
which only 259 were competition cases involving monopolies, concerted practices or 
mergers. A selection of cases decided by the TFTC is available on its website. These 
cases display the expected hallmarks of competent analysis. The penalties imposed on 
defaulters are significant. It has been alleged that as regards implementation and 
enforcement of penalties, none of the difficulties identified in China now pose serious 
problems in Taiwan.   
4.5.3 Private Enforcement  
When it comes to private enforcement, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have 
limited records. The causes for this are closely related to legal culture and structural 
barriers. 
A. Japan  
Ramseyer noted that if public enforcement has been sparse in Japan, private antitrust 
enforcement has been almost nonexistent.767 Moreover, additional institutional barriers to 
litigation, such as delay and costs, the lack of the treble damage incentive, and a possible 
reluctance on the part of business firms to sue as a result of complex and close 
interrelationships, even with their competitors, also work to preclude effective use of 
damage actions either as remedy or penalty in antitrust enforcement.768 
1. Legal resources of private claims  
 Then antitrust enforcement is heavily concentrated in the JFTC, and thus private 
                                                      
767 See Mark, supra note 93. 
768 Id.  
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cause of action is exceptionally sparse in Japan.   
 There are two legal options for private causes of action. One is the art. 25 suit, 
which features absolute liabilities and accrues only after the JFTC has made final 
decisions; the other judicial option is a tort-like private antitrust suit under art. 701 of the 
Civil Code, which does not require the JFTC’s final decision, instead depending on the 
intention of the defendants. 
Given the lack of injunctive relief in Japan, an injured party to certain acts in 
violation of the AMA can act as a whistleblower, file information with the JFTC under 
Art. 45 (1), and ask for a JFTC investigation on the matter. Once the decision becomes 
final, the private party can file a damage suit under art. 25, namely, a follow-on action.  
However, in most cases the FTC will not take up cases that arise from private 
disputes that would be better solved through private initiative. In this situation, or any 
other situation where the JFTC is not involved, the private party can file a damage suit 
under art. 709 of the Civil Code. Such suits can be filed any time, regardless of the 
decisions rendered by the JFTC. Moreover, the merits of follow-on cases can be enjoyed 
by an art. 709 case as well, because the court can use its general power to seek out the 
opinions of related government offices, and when there is a final decision on the JFTC’s 
part available, plaintiffs in the art. 709 action can submit a copy of this decision as 
evidence to the court to prove facts of violation, amounts of damage, and the like.  
2. Standing to sue  
Any person who has suffered injury as a result of violation of arts. 3 and 9 is 
qualified to sue under art. 25. As in most countries, it is relatively difficult for indirect 
purchasers, in particular consumers, to prove the causal relationship of their injuries with 
violations, but this fact does not deny them the standing to sue. 
The culture and size of the geographic market of a jurisdiction have played an 
important role in the final effectiveness of private enforcement. In a country like Japan 
where business relations tend to be continuous, it is less likely that injured direct 
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customers or even competitors will file complaints with the regulatory agencies, let alone 
damage suits against other parties to the repeated games. A study group within the 
Economic Planning Agency recommended in June 1998 that a domestic version of the 
Office of the Trade Ombudsman (OTO) be established to deal with private regulations. 
However, those complaints systems have never actually been used in Japan, probably for 
fear of retaliation by the ministry in question or by competitors. Thus, as far as cartels and 
resale price maintenance are concerned, only consumers who do not have such close ties 
with business partners may resort to damage suits. If those indirect purchasers are denied 
standing, no private party may be interested in filing a lawsuit. It is also for this reason 
that only consumer goods have been subject to damage suits in the past. Yet, even end 
consumers, the seeming last saviors of private antitrust enforcement in Japan, are 
allegedly exceptionally dependent on the government for safety and health, security and 
think these values are in constant and inevitable contradiction with competition. This 
consumer behavior and attitude are attributed to centuries of paternalism in Japan.769 
3. Single damage awards, modified fee-shifting and limited contingency fee 
In Japan, there exist neither the concept of multiple damages nor that of punitive 
damages. Plaintiffs who prevail in damage suits can recover only single damages.  
With respect to the allocation of litigation costs, the general rule is the British Rule, 
namely that the losing side should bear the cost, but this rule is subject to the 
modification of the court which tends to allocate the burden judiciously between plaintiff 
and defendant. The court can award standardized attorneys’ fees for the plaintiff when he 
prevails. Up to now, such fees have been awarded in limited cases such as traffic accident 
suits.  
In Japan and Korea, however, neither contingent fees nor legal expenses insurance 
officially exist. Though illegal, lawyers in Korea and Japan are making increasing use of 
contingency fees, resorting to an expedient of contract law. Recently, Korean courts have 
                                                      
769 See Hiroko, supra note 69.  
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begun to recognize the appropriateness of contingent fees in certain types of cases. 
Contrary to popular belief, Kritzer reports that contingent fees are not a uniquely 
American phenomenon. He finds that actually contingent fees have been permitted, 
though very limitedly, in some countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Scotland.770   
4. Absolute liability 
Art. 25 provides for absolute liability for specified types of anti-monopoly violations, 
which means that one cannot be exempted from liability by proving the nonexistence of 
willfulness or negligence. Only art. 3 and art.9 violations of the AMA are subject to 
absolute liability (art. 25 (1)). Other violations, such as those of art. 6 and art.8, although 
the nature of violation is the same as in the case of art. 3 and art. 9, are excluded.   
Art. 25 is available for damage suits but it is also likely to be used in counterclaim 
suits. 
5. Exclusive jurisdiction 
Art. 25 suits can only be filed within the Tokyo High Court, according to art. 85 (2) 
of the AMA. The Tokyo High Court has a special panel of five judges, though at the High 
Court level, three judges will typically sit to hear the case, and a five-judge panel is very 
exceptional. The advantage of this system is that consistent decisions can be expected; 
however, the downside is that for those injured parties residing in areas other than Tokyo 
and its vicinity, it is inconvenient to pursue legal proceedings in Tokyo, so that an art. 709 
case instead of art. 25 case would be preferred, in spite of the blessing of the absolute 
liability provisions afforded by an art. 25 lawsuit. 
6. Value of JFTC opinions and decisions in follow-on cases 
The JFTC’s factual findings can be used in private damage suits. In the 1971 Novo 
Industri Co. case, the Tokyo High Court held that the JFTC’s facts merely acted as 
presumptions as to the existence of violations in private suits. 
                                                      
770 HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
258-9 (2004). 
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In the case of a formal decision rendered after adjudicative proceedings, the effect of 
presumption is stronger than in the case of a recommendation decision or consent 
decision. The Supreme Court in the 1975 Novo Industri Co. case, acknowledged that a 
decision issued after an adjudicative procedure was based on the establishment of a 
violation through evidence, and could have stronger presumptive effects than a 
recommendation decision. 
The JFTC can also take part in a private damage suit at the request of the court as a 
sort of amicus curiae, and render its opinion as to the extent of damages. Technical 
support requests with respect to damage calculation from the court are mandatory 
according to art. 84 (1) of the AMA. Although the law only speaks on the extent of 
damages, the JFTC is not precluded from expressing its opinion concerning causal 
relationships in injuries, the existence of damages etc.; it is also allowed to submit 
evidence in support of its opinion. It is likely that, via this role, the JFTC can impose its 
policy stance on individual cases, depending on its response to industrial policy in 
various developmental stages. 
It is clear that JFTC decisions never have a binding effect on courts. It is up to the 
individual judges who sit on a private case to decide how much weight should be given to 
such a decision. When there is a final JFTC decision, it may not be significant whether or 
not the case in front the court is an Art. 25 or Art. 709 case. 
A JFTC decision alone may not be sufficient to prove violations, but if the plaintiff 
can submit the evidence produced during the hearing proceedings, it is easier to prevail in 
proving the facts of a violation in suits based on both art. 25 and art. 709. However, it is 
difficult for ordinary private parties to request those evidentiary materials from the 
regulatory agency. From this perspective, the court’s power to gain access to evidence 
produced by the JFTC, or evidence examined in hearing proceedings under art. 319 of the 
Civil Procedure Code, becomes vital. In the past, this power was not utilized by the court 
in part due to the uncertainty of the JFTC’s response to such requests. 
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7. JFTC’s endeavor to improve private antitrust enforcement 
As mentioned above, ordinary plaintiffs, in particular consumer plaintiffs, who are 
professionally, organizationally and financially fragile, do not have sufficient access to 
evidence to meet the burden of proof. This is acknowledged as one of the key reasons 
behind weak private antitrust enforcement; and this lack of private enforcement is further 
recognized as one of the problems in Japanese anti-monopoly laws.  
In response to difficulties in accessing evidence, the JFCT established a Study Group 
on Damage Remedy Systems and its report was prepared in 1990, providing five major 
recommendations. Subsequently, in 1991 the JFTC announced a policy statement 
concerning private damage suits. The JFTC would now improve the content of their 
decision, making them more useful as evidence, and would also provide related 
evidentiary materials at the request of the injured person or the court.  
However, there is no evidence available to prove an enhancement in enforcement. 
B. South Korea 
Violation of the MRFTA may result in damages, but no right to seek injunctive relief 
is allowed.771 The liability rule here is strict liability despite that an amendment to the 
MRFTA has removed an explicit provision that stated it was not a defense for a defendant 
to prove that he acted neither intentionally nor negligently. The court that hears a 
particular private antitrust case may request that the KFTC transmit relevant records. 
Actions for damages were originally strictly “follow-on” cases. This means that a 
damaged party cannot institute a lawsuit until an order issued by the KFTC, to make the 
violator take corrective measures, become final and conclusive. However, following 
changes made in 2005, grievances now can be filed as a stand-alone case. The courts, 
however, may be cautious to act when the KFTC is simultaneously investigating the 
                                                      
771 Art. 56(1) of the MRFTA provides “[a]ny enterpriser or enterprisers' organization violating the provisions of this 
Act and consequently causing damage to a person shall be liable for compensating such person for damage. If the 
enterpriser himself/herself or the enterprisers' organization itself proves that he/she/it did not intend to commit any fault, 
and no error is found on his/her/its part, however, this provision shall not apply.” 
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alleged breach. Steps have also been taken to reduce the difficulties claimants face in 
assessing or proving the extent of damage, allowing courts the ability to assess the 
amount of damage based on the “result of evidentiary investigation and intent of [the] 
overall pleading.” Following amendments to the MRFTA, an earlier provision which 
time-barred claims being advanced more than three years after the date the claim first 
arose, was repealed. The damages provisions of the MRFTA are without prejudice to the 
more general law in relation to damages under the Civil Act, art. 750.772 Damages under 
the general rules of tortious liability are limited to the damage actually suffered. There is 
no class action, and no pre-trial discovery. 
C. Taiwan  
Although third party civil rights are clearly set out in legislation, private antitrust 
litigations in practice are limited. Liu noted that “compared with the courts, the TFTC 
monopolizes TFTA enforcement…the TFTA is not and never will become judge-made 
common law. Very few TFTA cases even exist, and none of them constitute meaningful 
precedent.” 773  He further commented that Taiwan’s competition law provides for 
ostensibly strong but practically weak civil relief. However, there have been 
developments in Taiwan’s civil procedure rules which might assist the bringing of actions 
by private parties, though the record to date is poor in this respect. In particular, following 
changes to the Consumer Protection Law of 1994, parens patriae actions may now be 
brought on behalf of consumers by recognized consumer groups, and class actions may 
also be brought. Although the TFTA expressly allows for injunctive relief to be sought, 
Liu notes that “no party to a major case has ever sought injunctive relief.”  
The rights of third parties to sue for damages and other forms of relief are set out in 
art. 30-34 of the TFTA. Art. 30 provides that, in the event of any violation of the TFTA 
that harms the rights or interests of a third party, that party may “demand the removal of 
                                                      
772 See Jung & Chang, supra note 738.  
773 Lawrence S. Liu, In Search of Free and Fair Trade? the Experience of the Republic of China on Taiwan as an Asian 
Model of Implementing Competition Law and Policy, in COMPETITION REGULATION IN THE PACIFIC RIM, (Carl J. Green 
& Douglas E. Rosenthal eds., 1996). 
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such infringement.” Such relief may also be sought where there is the likelihood that the 
TFTA will be infringed. Art 31 establishes the right to seek damages, in the event that any 
harm flows to a third party as a result of a breach of the provisions of the TFTA. Where 
the relevant court finds that the infringement was intentional, art. 32 of the TFTA permits 
the court to award punitive damages up to a maximum of three times the actual damages 
suffered. In making such an award the court must take into account “the nature of the 
infringement.” Whether to award treble damages is at the discretion of the court, and it 
appears that in practice significant damages awards have not been made. The second 
paragraph of art. 32 gives the claimant the right to seek damages based solely on the 
extent of the defendant’s potential gain. The TFTA does not set out rules relating to 
standing and causation, and it should be noted that the text leaves several questions 
unanswered, in particular that of how direct the harm must be for the right to be 
established. The reference to unlawful gain as a basis for action is also problematic, and it 
has been pointed out in the UK that making such assessments can be very complex.  
There is a limitation period of two years within which damages may be sought; this 
period begins at the time when the claimant has become aware of both the act and the 
person liable for the damage alleged. In any event, no claim may be brought after ten 
years have lapsed from the time of the infringing conduct. 
There is one further twist in this Chapter of the Act, that the claimant may request 
that the court, if an infringement is found, have judgment’s content published in a 
newspaper at the expense of the defendant. 
Private litigation is supposed to be brought before the district courts in the first 
instance, and procedures are set out in the Code of Civil Procedure. Appeals are to the 
High Courts and the Supreme Court. 
4.6 Summary  
These seven antitrust regimes for comparative analysis cover the U.S. and the EU, 
two main-stream models; Vietnam, a state with a transitional trajectory similar to China 
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but much smaller;774 Singapore, a small capitalist city-country with a strong public sector 
but a good competitive environment, and Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, three 
representatives of the East Asian Model (EAM) that features state-led competition policy 
as an integral part of development strategies. For a snapshot of the basic conditions of the 
seven jurisdictions and China, please see the following tables. 
                                                      





Table 7 Basic Conditions of Antitrust Regimes for Reference 
 China US EU Vietnam Japan South Korea Taiwan Singapore 
Total area  9,596,961 9,826,675.0  4,324,782.0  331,210 377,915.0  99,720.0  35,980.0  697 
Population (2011 est.) 1,336,718,015.0  313,232,044 492,387,344.0  91,519,289 126,475,664.0  48,754,657.0  23,071,779.0  4,740,737.0  
GDP (PPP, 2010, US$, 
est.) 
10.34 trillion 14.82 trillion 14.82 trillion 282.9 billion 4.41 trillion 1.459 trillion 841.2 billion 299.5 billion 
GDP per capita (PPP, 
US$, 2010 est.) 
7,500 47,800 32,700 3,200 34,600.0  30,600.0  36,300.0 57,800.0 
Whether middle/high 
income state/area when 
adopting competition 
law 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exports (US$, 2010 est.) 1.578 trillion 1.289 trillion 1.952 trillion 
(2007) 
72.27 billion 730.1 billion 466.4 billion 273.8 billion 351.2 billion 
Imports (US$, 2010 est.) 1.327 trillion 1.935 trillion 1.69 trillion 
(2007) 
79.95 billion 639.1 billion 425.2 billion 247.3 billion 310.4 billion 
Reserves of foreign 
exchange and gold 
(US$, 2010 est.) 
2.895 trillion 132.4 billion -- 12.93 billion 1.063 trillion 291.6 billion 387.2 billion 225.7 billion 







The eight states or areas have different market sizes and various attitudes towards the 
relation between state and market; they introduced competition law in different times, 
pursuing different goal, and have different traditions of law enforcement. See the 





























Table 8 Snapshot of the Antitrust Regimes of the U.S., EU, China, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
 Market size Timing of competition 
law enactment 
Policy tools Traditions of law 
enforcement 
Effectiveness of private 
enforcement 
Forms of state 
intervention 
U.S. Large    Emerging from within  
 In response to 
problems rising during 
transition from laissez 
faire capitalism to 
monopoly capitalism 
 Enforcement  
 Advocating  
Priority to private 
enforcement 
  
Effective   Policy maker and 
game referee  
EU Large  and 
getting even 
larger 
 Emergence from 
within  
 In response to call for a 
single market  
 Advocating   
 Enforcement 
 
 Priority to public 
enforcement 
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review  
 Not very effective; 
 Gradually improved with 
the inadequacy of public 
enforcement with the 
EU’s enlargement  
Policy maker and 














Table 8 (cont.) 
Japan  Modest    Forced by occupation 
authority to break down 
cartels in support of the 
WWII; 
 Not inherently 
consistent with 
Japanese legal system 
 Advocating  
 Enforcement 
  
 Priority to public 
enforcement 
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review 
 Underdeveloped  
 No obvious improvement  
Policy maker+ game 
referee+ sponsor of 
selective key 
industries s and firms  
South Korea Modest    Emerging from within 
but pushed by foreign 
forces; 
 In response to 
inefficiencies caused by 
concentrated economic 
power  
 Advocating  
 Enforcement 
 
 Priority to public 
enforcement 
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review 
 Underdeveloped  
 No obvious improvement 
Policy maker+ game 
referee+ sponsor of 
selective key 
industries s and firms 
Taiwan Modest    Emerging from within 
but pushed by foreign 
forces 
 In response to 
monopolistic practices 
of SOE, rising of 
private sector and 
penetration of 
multinational  
 Advocating  
 Enforcement 
 Priority to public 
enforcement  
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review 
 Underdeveloped 
 No obvious improvement 
Policy maker+ game 
referee+ sponsor of 
selective key 








Table 8 (cont.) 
China Large    Emerging from within 
 In response to 
administrative 
monopolies, rising of 
private sector and 
penetration of 
multinational 
 Advocating   
 Enforcement 
 Priority to public 
enforcement  
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review 
 Underdeveloped but 
robust in a relative sense 
Policy maker + 
game referee + 





Vietnam  Modes   Emerging from within 
but pushed by foreign 
forces 
 In response to 
administrative 
monopolies, rising of 
private sector and 
penetration of 
multinational 
 Advocating   
 Enforcement 
 Priority to public 
enforcement  
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review 
 Underdeveloped 
 No obvious improvement 
Policy maker + 
game referee + 





Singapore  Small    Emerging from within 
but pushed by foreign 
forces 
 Advocating   
 Enforcement 
 Priority to public 
enforcement  
 Public enforcement is 
focused on concerted 
conducts and merger 
review 
 Underdeveloped 
 No obvious improvement 
Policy maker + 
game referee + 









Table 9 Snapshot of Structural Determinants of Private Antitrust Enforcement in China, U.S., EU, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan 




















China 2007 3 years No  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
US 1890 7 years Yes  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU 1957 12 years Yes Yes  Yes No No No Yes 
Vietnam  2004  5 years  No Yes Yes No No No No 
Japan  1947 20 years Yes Yes Yes No No  No No 
South Korea 1980 N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes No No No 
Taiwan 1991 N/A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Singapore  2004 1 year








                                                        
775 One year after the Singapore Competition Act came into effect, but two years after its passage. 
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The conclusions that China may draw from the experiences of these countries are as 
follows. 
(1). In order to have competition law play a role, regardless of what policy tool a 
state picks up, the law must come from within in response to a state’ specific 
problems. For instance, the Japanese AMA was enacted in 1947, but it started to 
exert a meaningful influence only when anti-competitive practices became an 
unbearable obstacle to further development. 
(2). Competition law will not really have its place until economic development has 
reached a relatively higher level and an institutional foundation is basically in 
place. This is particularly the case for private enforcement in countries where 
public enforcement is traditionally more popular and a culture of litigation is not 
inherently present. It is clear that litigation is never the first choice for dispute 
resolution in East Asian countries; if there are substantial structural barriers like 
this one in pursuing private cause of action, the function of private enforcement 
of competition law, or virtually any law, will be considerably depressed. 
(3). Among all policy tools, enforcement may not be the primary choice for young 
antitrust regimes and agencies; advocacy may be more appropriate because in 
the early stages of an antitrust regime, enforcement agencies must deal with a 
lack of experience, and limited human, financial, and facility resources. The 
vulnerability of enforcement agencies will be heightened if the new antitrust 
regime is still in a less advanced developmental stage, one in which competition 
law is more likely to be treated as merely a component of the general 
development scheme; what’s more, if this stage is accompanied by a transition 
from a command and control system to a market economy, then rampant 
regional blockade and powerful SOEs will further handicap any enforcement 
efforts. Effective advocating leaves more time and room to gaining experience 
and further institutional construction, and it can also help spread competition 
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culture and knowledge, extract information, and foster constituencies in support 
of competition law by means of attending meetings of the cabinet or ministries, 
issuing non-binding opinions on proposed laws and regulations, organizing 
seminars and training classes for governmental decision-makers and executives 
of SOE large private firms, accepting consultations, and publicizing guidelines 
and closed cases to diminish uncertainties in a timely manner. 
(4). A policy of “all or nothing” with regard to antitrust enforcement may not be a 
good strategy, given the wide variation of local conditions in different countries, 
and the careful sequencing of various development components may be more 
important. When young antitrust regimes are cautious of costly American-style 
private enforcement, and espouse a preference for advocacy in their early stages, 
it does not necessarily mean that enforcement, or, more specifically, private 
enforcement, ought to be abandoned completely. This is particularly the case in 
China, a market even larger than the EU in terms of area and population. The 
country’s large size and potential for more anti-competitive practices by the 
government or private parties would make the incapacity of young public 
enforcers more salient and could call more urgently for the complementary use 
of private enforcement. As is well recognized, the enlargement of the EU was a 
major cause for the encouragement of private enforcement in recent years. 
(5). If it is important to target some important cases to set up the credibility and 
reputation of enforcement agencies and courts, given the complexity of relevant 
economic, legal, or even political issues encountered during enforcement, the 
emphasis should be laid on 1) sectors most relevant to people’s lives, such as 
food and medicine;776 and 2) relatively easily-proved hard-core antitrust 
offenses.  
                                                      
776 The first significant case prosecuted by NRDC, a Chinese enforcement agency, involved two pharmaceutical 
enterprises. The conclusion of the case has received considerable praise. See supra note 22. 
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CHAPTER 5: ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS—POLICY SUGGESTIONS  
As mentioned much earlier, whether or not China can successfully overcome the 
slowdown of economic growth and its chaotic market will decide China’s ability to carry 
on sustainable development and survive the perils of the middle-income trap or the 
transition trap. China’s backward advantage has almost been exhausted;777 what’s left are 
chronic ailments accumulated in the past sixty years, 778  such as an entrenched 
administrative monopoly, inefficient enforcement agencies, a flawed judicial system, and 
repressed individual rights, just to name a few. So an efficient Chinese AML is a 
must-have to energize private sector, level the playing ground by courtesy of facilitating 
institutional building and political reforms. However, this poses a tough question as to 
how to deal with the sequence and optimal degree of economic growth and political 
reforms. 
In a theoretical debate between Yang and Lin concerning backward advantage and 
backward disadvantage, it would be important to ask how to best look at constitutional 
transition. 
The Smithian models in the Sachs and Yang’s article suggest that economic 
development is a process with evolution in division of labor.779 Developing countries, as 
latecomers in economic development, can mimic an efficient pattern of division of labor 
by jumping over many intermediate levels if these countries have already found an 
efficient pattern by gradual social experiments.780 And it is much easier to copy a pattern 
for efficient division of labor from developed countries than to copy their institutions, so 
Yang held that developing countries tend to start at the easy parts, taking piecemeal 
transformations and leaving the most politically sensitive and economically difficult ones 
                                                      
777 See Sachs, Woo & Yang, supra note 11.  
778 As suggested by Cheng, the understanding of today’s China should look to not only the 30 year of post-reform era, 
but also the thirty years before that. See Cheng, supra note 5. 
779 XIAOKAI YANG & JEFFREY D. SACHS, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: INFRAMARGINAL VERSUS MARGINAL ANALYSES 
(Wiley-Blackwell 2003).  
780 See Sachs, Woo & Yang, supra note 11, at 7. 
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for the indefinite future. Undoubtedly, developing countries can with this approach 
achieve rapid economic growth within a short time in the absence of a fundamental 
constitutional transition, but a downside is growing inertia in institutional construction 
and an entrenched vested interest.781 Hence, in a sense, the backward advantage may be 
transformed to backward disadvantage, if institutional construction cannot be 
strengthened and vested interest cannot be strategically curbed. Yang drew a lesson from 
history, arguing that though China and Russia have different records in the post-market 
economy era, the outlook of the former may not be so optimistic because the latter has 
completed the constitutional transition while the former has not.782 
In short, Yang argued for the synchronization of institutional imitations and the 
mimicking of efficient patterns of division of labor for the sake of sustainable 
development. In contrast, Lin believes that employing the Anglo-Saxon approach would 
not secure an escape from backward disadvantage, because many countries that have 
adopted Western democracy are still suffering from political and economic chaos, 
whereas many countries have reached a high level of economic growth in the absence of 
a constitutional transition in Yang’s sense. For instance, until the 1990s, Japan had not 
undertaken a complete constitutional transition, but its GDP per capita exceeded that of 
the U.S. in 1988; Singapore is virtually under an authoritarian regime, but its GDP per 
capita caught up with the U.S. in 1996.783 A key point for developing countries is the 
development of a benign government that can precisely identify industries that may fully 
exploit the comparative advantage decided by factor endowments of the state. In this way, 
the backward advantage can be realized and developing countries can quickly take small 
steps towards a more advanced level. In contrast, if developing countries attempt to make 
great leaps within a short period of time, this will not only generate various rent-seeking 
behaviors and distortions, but will also encounter extraordinary objections from vested 
                                                      
781 For example, it took Japan about 12 years to develop from a middle income country to a high income country, while 
the time for South Korea was reduced to 8 years. 
782 See Sachs, Woo & Yang, supra note 11. 
783 See Lin, supra note 382, at 994.  
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interests that may suffocate such a bold attempt, creating failure at the outset. However, it 
is noteworthy that though not in agreement with radical transition, Lin never denied the 
importance of institutional building and political and economic reforms during the course 
of economic growth. He stressed that those changes will naturally take place in the 
interplay of economic growth and political reforms, so learning by doing is more 
appropriate and a radical constitutional transition may not fit into the realities of 
developing countries like China.784 Other scholars have expressed similar ideas. For 
instance, Laffon and Qian argue that to make economic reforms acceptable, people in 
power must be bought out. However, compensation is limited by a lack of commitment 
and liquidity. Under these constraints, development may begin with modest reforms in 
some areas or sectors where investment opportunities are large and expected benefits 
from the pre-reform system are small. Reform then may extend to other regions or sectors. 
If the propagation process generates enough savings and the proper coordination of 
economic actors takes place, a drastic reform of institutions may then occur.785 
Drawing on the work of distinguished scholars, my perception is that a radical 
constitutional transition may only kill reforms in the cradle. But merely waiting for the 
timing to mature by the interplay of economic growth and political reforms could be 
somewhat passive and naive. To be specific, in the field of competition law, a more 
appropriate approach is to, on the one hand, build up institutions to curtail new 
anti-competitive practices and the formation of new vested interests, while recognizing 
established vested interests in exchange for the tolerance of an antitrust regime in the first 
place; and on the other hand, to foster the constituency of the new institution for the 
preparation of its advancement in the future. Moreover, in the context of China, a 
jurisdiction transitioning from strict state control and rigid administrative hierarchy, the 
strong power and pervasive penetration of the state cannot be ignored. This state is the 
                                                      
784 Id.  
785 Jean-Jacques Laffont & Yingyi Qian, The Dynamics of Reform and Development in China: A Political Economy 
Perspective, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1105 (1999).   
 230 
 
final cause of persistent administrative monopolies, but it is also the thing that could force 
implementation of the AML, a law intended to break up its own monopolies. 
Bearing these basic ideals in mind, and standing informed by the seven antitrust 
regimes detailed above, some policy suggestions may be made as follows. 
5.1 Strengthening Public Enforcement  
As mentioned above, appropriate private enforcement should not and cannot be 
separated from effective public enforcement, so first I will address how to make public 
enforcement more effective. 
5.1.1 Reshuffling Public Enforcers—Higher Level and Unified Entity 
Currently, China uses a three-pillared anti-monopoly enforcement framework, and 
enforcement agencies are all placed within ministries as a lower level organ. This is a 
legacy of the previously segmented anti-monopoly-related law enforcement landscape 
and a failure to change the multiagency status quo during the decade-long law-making 
process.786 
Scholars and media have already cast a skeptical eye on decentralized enforcement 
bodies, particularly their position in administrative hierarchy, and the implied 
inefficiencies and conflicts.787  
Wang warned that those enforcement agencies will not only be inefficient, but may 
also encounter potential inter-agency conflict and friction. This potential conflict may 
become even more complex with the involvement of such authorities as provincial 
enforcement agencies788 as well as sectoral regulators.789 Having multiple agencies in 
                                                      
786 The AML was on the legislative agenda of the 8th, 9th, and 10th National People’s Congress. See Wang Xiaoye, 
Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 144 (2008).   
787 Id.; see also徐芸茜, 反垄断法三大执法机构执法效率遭质疑 [Xu Yunqian, Skepticism on Efficiencies of Three 
Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agencies], CHINA TIMES, Aug. 30, 2008, available at 
http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2008/08/3002401818685.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
788 Art. 10 of the AML provides that:  
The Anti-Monopoly Authority designated by the State Council (referred to as the Anti- Monopoly Authority under 
the State Council) shall be in charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance with this law. 
The Anti- Monopoly Authority under the State Council may, when needed, authorize the corresponding authorities 
in the people’s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government to take charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance with this Law. 
This principle regarding authorization to local enforcement agencies has been put in further details in art. 3 of Rules 
on Anti-Price Monopoly Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures issued by the NRDC, and art. 3 of Rules on 
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the AML may result in less authority and independence for any and all of these agencies 
because no enforcer may have the legal authority to override an alternative enforcer's 
decision not to enforce the AML against a specific business operator. This awkward 
situation could become salient between the NDRC, which oversees price-related 
anti-competitive behaviors, and the SAIC which is responsible for combating non-price 
anti-competitive behaviors, because anti-competitive behavior often involves both price 
and non-price components. It seems that enforcement authorities do not accept the charge 
of overlapped responsibilities and are confident in their future cooperation and no 
document streamlining cooperation and coordination among enforcement authorities has 
come out. In practice, records of enforcement targeting collusive actions and abuse of 
dominance are sparse, and close to zero at the central level.790 As for those few cases 
concluded at the local level, the division of labor is far from clear. For instance, 
price-fixing cases could be handled by local branches of the SAIC and the NDRC.791 The 
only hint that that can be taken here is that if a case only involves price-related 
anti-competitive practices, then this case would certainly fall within the purview of the 
NDRC, but if non-price-related anti-competitive practices are also involved, it is more 
likely that it would go to the SAIC. Yet still this may vary with weight of the 
price-related offenses in the whole case. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Industry and Commerce Authorities’ Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements issued by the SAIC. The MOFCOM has been 
considering authorization since 2008, but no official document has come out despite that local enforcement agencies 
are performing a de facto assisting role. 商务部目前正在研究如何对地方进行授权处理反垄断事务 [MOFCOM is 
Considering Authorization of Anti-Monopoly Enforcement to Local Agencies], XINHUA NET, Dec. 5, 2008, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-12/05/content_10459915.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); See Wang, supra 
note 306 (revealing that the MOFCOM had already done some merger plan appraisal with Department of Commerce of 
Sichuang Province, the local government of the domicile of Tengzhong, and Tengzhong itself before receiving official 
application). 
789 Art. 51 of the AML provides that 
   Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to a administer 
public affairs abuse its administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition, the superior authority thereof shall 
order it to make correction and impose punishments on the directly liable persons(s)-in-charge and other directly liable 
persons. The Anti-Monopoly Authority may put forward suggestions on handling according to law to the relevant 
superior authority.  
   Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for handling the organization empowered by a 
law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs who abuses its administrative powers to eliminate or 
restrict competition, such provisions shall prevail. 
790 There is only one concluded case report by the NRDC, on two pharmaceutical enterprises’ monopolization, but till 
now there has been no report of any concluded case by the SAIC. 
791 For report regarding fragmented enforcement, see supra note 305.  
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Enforcement authorities openly stressed that they would implement the AML 
equally with all businesses, including SOEs and international companies.792 But the 
position of these enforcement authorities in the administrative hierarchy, as lower than 
the ministerial level, makes their determination for equal enforcement not so credible, 
because many executives of the central SOE enjoy ministerial-level treatment, and as has 
been confessed by a MOFCOM official, some international companies could exert 
considerable influence, though they do not have the administrative rankings of their 
Chinese counterparts. A not so typical example: when the NDRC conducted 
investigations of two leading state-owned telecommunication companies, which were 
previously affiliated and are currently regulated by MITT, for suspected abuse of 
dominance, China Central Television Station (CCTV), affiliated to with the State 
Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) and People's Posts and 
Telecommunications News (PPTN), affiliated to MITT, it started a battle of words that 
greatly complicated the investigation.793  
In any event, a more practical solution is to reshuffle enforcement authorities so as 
to integrate resources, experiences, and the authority of three pillars into one unit, 
achieving both cost savings and analytical synergies; meanwhile the merged body should 
be lifted to at least a ministerial level, to isolate it from direct industry lines interruptions, 
and when the conditions mature, it should be lifted to an even higher level or directly 
affiliated with the People’s Congress so as to further its independence from 
administrative captures. Such an agency could still delegate certain powers to other 
enforcers but would have the authority to make final decisions regarding enforcement, 
subject to review by the courts. This is the approach adopted by Singapore, Japan, South 
                                                      
792 商务部 12日召开反垄断工作情况专题新闻发布会 [Special Press Conference Regarding Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement by MOFCOM], GOV.CON, Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-08/12/content_1678211.htm (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
793 电信联通遭反垄断调查 央视对掐人民邮电报 [China Telecom and China Unicom under Anti-Monopoly 
Investigation; Battle of Words between CCTV and PPTN], NF DAILY, Nov. 16, 2011, available at 
http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/11-16/3462971.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). Anecdotal evidence revealed that 




Korea, Taiwan and even Vietnam. When conditions permit, local branches of 
enforcement agencies could be cut off from the local budget and personnel control, and 
led directly by the central government, relying on its central budget. In the delayed 
process of political reform, this could become a valuable institutional experiment in the 
elimination of a long-entrenched regional protectionism that exists at the expense of 
justice, market order, and social welfare for the whole society. After all, compared to 
judiciaries, the bodies of the AML enforcement agencies are much smaller and 
appointing new heads will not cause the amendment of basic laws.794 
The AMC could remain in place, because before the enforcement authority can be 
completely independent from the administrative branch, the ministerial rank cannot 
secure its power in fighting monopolies of SOEs or subnational governments at the same 
level, and hence an AMC above the ministerial level can be expected to perform a better 
coordinating and decision-making role. In addition, the head of the AMC should remain 
at the Vice Prime Minister rank as is currently the case, but considering the urgent call for 
an effective competition policy and extraordinary hindrances in combating administrative 
monopolies, the job of heading the AMC should be full time, instead of part time as it is 
now. This could, on the one hand, make the Vice Prime Minister devote all efforts to 
anti-monopoly issues, and on the other hand, avoid conflicts of interest if the Vice Prime 
Minister at the same time takes charge of some industry lines, which is the current 
case.795 
5.1.2 Starting from Control of Information and Advisory  
As suggested in Chapter 2, there are generally four policy tools that could be 
employed by an antitrust regime: advocacy, enforcement, research and education. 
                                                      
794 Art. 8 (6) of the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments states that the 
chief justice and prosecutor general of a government above country level shall be elected by the people’s congress of 
this level, and the elected chief justice and prosecutor general shall be approved by the immediate upper level people’s 
congress at the request of the chief justice and prosecutor at that immediate upper level.  
795 李克强、张德江、王岐山三名新晋副总理分工已明确 [Division of Labor Has Been Fixed among Three New Vice 
Prime Ministers], DONGFANG JINBAO, Mar. 31, 2008, available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-31/064713661166s.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (reporting that Vice Prime 
Minister Wang Qishan, also the current Director of the AMC, takes charge of financial, commercial and trade issues).  
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Given China’s lack of competition culture, the sparse knowledge of the AML among 
governments, business circles and the public, the sparse experience and thin human, 
financial, and facility resources of enforcement agencies, enforcement is indeed a 
difficult task that could not be effectively achieved within a short time for a young 
antitrust regime. Moreover, it is alleged that 90 per cent of anti-competitive conducts by 
regional or sectoral government officials can be prevented or automatically corrected if 
regional government officials know relevant laws.796 
Provided that identifying, proving and combating the existence of anti-competitive 
practices is too difficult, it is more realistic to pave the way for future enforcement by 
collecting information and providing advice. To be specific, my suggestions are as 
follows: 
(1). The state council should set up fixed institutions to mandate notification 
regarding industry, trade, standardization policy-making conferences to be 
provided to enforcement agencies, and allow the latter to attend these 
conferences. Enforcement agencies may not voice support or objection to the 
policies proposed policies at such a conference, but must instead submit a 
competition evaluation. Then this make the competition evaluation should be a 
mandatory component of any proposed policy proposal, just as an 
environmental evaluation is required in any construction falling under the 
purview of the Environment Evaluation Law.797 However, a lesson that can be 
drawn from the environment evaluation system is that evaluation is largely 
controlled by subnational governments, so due to the yardstick competition that 
has widely incentivized regional blockade, environment protection often 
succumbs to economic growth.798 Therefore, the independence of local 
                                                      
796 See Office of Fair Trading of the SAIC & International Law Study Center of the CASS, supra note 136, at 105. 
797 Huang jing ying xiang ping jia fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Appraising of Environment Impacts] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sep. 1, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
798 环保部通报 30家环评机构 称地方审核形同虚设[The Environmental Protection Department Openly Condemned 
30 Environmental Evaluation Organizations and Criticized that Local Approval Process exists in Name Only], 163.COM, 
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enforcement agencies is very important, or at least, their enforcement actions 
must be closely monitored by the three agencies at the central level. 
With competition evaluation, the final decision-maker, no matter at the State 
Council, ministerial or local level, must learn the competition implications of 
the proposed policy and initiate a rational discussion on the appropriateness of 
the policy from all relevant perspectives; the maker of the policy would be 
required to incorporate competition thinking into its preparation, and avoid 
thinking merely from his or her own perspective. Transparency is of great 
importance during this process. The publication of every policy should be 
accompanied by the competition effect evaluation for public oversight.  
(2). When attending policy-making conferences, enforcement agencies may collect 
data and information from other ministries and subnational governments 
regarding key industries and enterprises for future enforcement, research and 
education. At an early stage, considering the limited capacity of these 
enforcement agencies, they may focus on a few strategic industries that have 
great impact on everyday life and the operation of the economy, such as 
telecommunications, energy, railway, food and medicine, to name a few. 
(3). Enforcement agencies should provide consultation, advice and training to 
government officials, executives of large SOEs and private firms, the most 
sensitive areas for anti-competitive conducts. If resources permit, with careful 
arrangement of the frequency and scale, publication of competition knowledge 
to the public could also be encouraged. Taiwan and Singapore have done an 
excellent job in this regard by opening training classes to enterprises as well as 
the public.  
                                                                                                                                                              
July 2, 2010, http://news.163.com/10/0702/09/6AJ1EBNM0001124J.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).  
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(4). Enforcement and advocacy could be properly combined by timely publication of 
concluded cases. Actors in the market would then be able to extract useful 
information to diminish uncertainties. 
5.1.3 More Information Disclosure  
A key parameter in any private enforcer’s incentive equation is information. This 
includes information on competition conditions in various markets that could help private 
enforcers decide the validity and merit of their claims in the pre- or post-litigation stage, 
and public enforcement information that could assist private enforcers in proving wrongs 
and total suffered damage. In this sense, information disclosure should be broadly 
enhanced in every government agency, but as the main advocators for a Chinese AML, 
the enforcement agencies should bear more responsibility for information disclosure. 
Another benefit of information disclosure and the following involvement of news media 
and public opinion is that it may help to cure 10 per cent of stubborn anti-competitive 
behaviors that would not have been corrected by administrative advice letters or caution 
statements.799 
Among the three enforcement agencies, the MOFCOM has done the best job in this 
regard relative to the other two; the AML expressly requires timely disclosure of the 
banned business concentration or conditional approval,800 more resources have been 
invested in the MOFCOM in terms of staff numbers and their accommodation of the 
AMC. Yet still, the MOFCOM’s publicized cases are criticized as being too simple to 
provide useful hints for potential actors. As for the NDRC and SAIV, the AML only states 
that they may publicize those cases against which they have made decisions,801 so only 
sporadic reports regarding enforcement are available. 
The Chinese Regulation on Open Government Information was enacted in 2008,802 
                                                      
799 See Office of Fair Trading of the SAIC & International Law Study Center of the CASS, supra note 136, at 105. 
800 See art. 30 of the AML. 
801 See art. 44 of the AML. 
802 国务院办公厅关于施行《中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例》若干问题的意见 [Opinions of the General Office 
of the State Council on Some Issues about Implementing the Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the 
Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by General Office of the St. Council, April 29, 2008, effective 
April 29, 2008), LAWTIME.CN (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).  
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but a sluggish implementation has long been criticized and even incurred a lawsuit in 
2011.803 Some common problems include requiring more personal information of the 
applicant than necessary, no response, delayed response and prevarication. These are all 
areas that enforcement agencies should be wary of. Of course, enforcement agencies are 
always subject to budget and resource restraints, particularly when young, so it is more 
important to set up internal rules for the frequency and form of information disclosure to 
be able to actively disclose information without waiting in response to massive individual 
requests; for this, advanced technology should be fully utilized, such as electronic 
newsletters, bulletin boards and micro-blogs, to name a few. Again, in this regard, the 
TFTC has set a good example. It sends every subscriber to its newsletter every case 
concluded, including a relatively detailed analysis.  
5.1.4 Streamlined Responses to Whistleblowers 
Whistle-blowing mechanisms are a good bridge to connect the comparative 
advantage of private and public parties in the different stages of prosecuting an 
anti-monopoly case. Private parties in every corner of the economy are the most sensitive 
to anti-competitive practices, especially within the downstream firms and competitors 
that are known with a given industry and possess more expertise in terms of the structure 
of the market and cost constitution. Enforcement agencies, in comparison, have the 
advantage of economies of scale, more general expertise in law and economics, and, 
importantly, more political power and resources to overcome hurdles during the course of 
investigation and prosecution. 
Whistle-blowing mechanisms are new in China at all, even in the anti-monopoly 
field. As early as 1998, the State Development Planning Commission issued “国家计委
关于价格举报工作的规定 ” [Regulations of the State Development Planning 
Commission on Complaint of Price Law Violation].804 Subsequently in 2002, the NDRC 
                                                      
803 张子森, 清华女生起诉三部委 称政府信息公开之钟需有人撞 [Zhang Zisen, A Femail Student of Tsinghua 
University Sued Three Ministries Alleging that Hurdles of Government Information Disclosure Should Be Broken 
through], CHINA.COM.CN, Sep. 26, 2011, http://www.china.com.cn/news/law/2011-09/26/content_23491800.htm (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
804 国家计委关于价格举报工作的规定[Regulations of the State Development Planning Commission on Complaint of 
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issued “价格违法行为举报规定” [Regulations on Complaint of Price Law Violation].805 
Compared to the 1998 Regulation, the 2002 Regulation has the following major changes: 
(1). The 2002 Regulation grants the power to accept complaints and investigate 
suspected violations to subnational governments. It is not good to curb 
protectionism.  
(2). As for the right to information on the complaints, the 2002 Regulation steps back 
a little, saying that the agency will provide notice of the results as appropriate, 
but it does not make it clear how to define appropriateness. 
(3). The bright side is that 1) like the 1998 Regulation, the 2002 Regulation also set 
up time limits for case handling; 2) new communication methods like email have 
been added; 3) rewards are allowed but not mandated to encourage 
whistle-blowing; 4) an accountability system has been added for malpractice by 
price agencies in dealing with complaints; 5) it makes clearer what kind of 
complaint it will not accept.  
However, these regulations are limited to price violations. Although there is 
provision in the AML for the right to complain and report, there have been no generic 
rules streamlining the whole process of whistle-blowing. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that there is no lack of whistleblowers in antitrust issues, which is understandable given 
the chaotic market order, but what kind of whistle-blower may finally draw the attention 
of the authorities is not clear. 
5.2 Invigorating Private Enforcement 
As described above, the implementation of private anti-monopoly law enforcement, 
relying on decentralized information and cost advantages, has a special meaning for 
China’s large market, limited public resources, vindication of private interest, and 
sluggish public enforcement. However, enforcement must be fine-tuned, considering the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Price Law Violation] (promulgated by Nat’l Planning Commission, Sep. 18, 1998, effective Oct. 1, 1998), 
LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
805 价格违法行为举报规定[Regulations on Complaint of Price Law Violation] (promulgated by NDRC, Jan. 1, 2002, 
effective Jan. 1, 1998), LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
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political and economic context. 
5.2.1 Selective Tolerance of Class Action 
In my interviews with judges and lawyers, both groups confessed that class action is 
now a very sensitive option for judges. In most cases, the norm is to “break down class 
action suits and deal with them case by case.”806 The recent widely discussed sweeping 
rejection of an environmental class action in east China vividly demonstrated the hassles 
encountered by fishermen who suffered great damage caused by oil spillover and wanted 
to seek relief through class action.807 
It is imaginable that concerns about social stability and its depression of class action 
would not disappear within a short period of time, and may actually last a relatively long 
time, subject to the mitigation of urgent contradictions during transition. But social 
stability is not the only goal; rather, a competitive and fair market is also important, and 
could, to a large degree, alleviate contradictions by providing lower priced utilities, more 
opportunities for SMEs and as a result more employment and income for ordinary people, 
and more social security. After all, the capacity of pubic enforcers is limited, without the 
participation of consumers, the AML cannot exert itself in the large Chinese market. 
Accordingly, my suggestion is that in the short term, a compromised approach could 
be adopted; that is, to delegate to consumer associations the right to institute class action 
on behalf of average consumers. Riding on the organizational advantage of consumer 
associations, it will be easier to overcome such problems as free riding, rational apathy, 
coordination, and lack of expertise and funds. At the same time, this would also avoid 
non-meritorious cases. The non-government status of these associations may make them 
indifferent to interest groups. However, it is noteworthy that consumer associations are 
quasi-governmental organizations,808 so their behaviors may also be interrupted by 
                                                      
806 Interview with judges in Beijing and Qingdao (June 5 and 21, 2011). 
807 法院为何沉默？康菲案无一桩被立案 律师痛批司法不作为 [Why Did Court Keep Silence? No Lawsuit against 
ConocoPhillips Has Been Accepted; Lawyers Condemned Judiciary Inaction], XINHUA NETWORK, Dec. 27, 2011, 
http://forum.home.news.cn/thread/92606049/2.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
808 China Consumers’ Association is a NGO, but meanwhile directly under the SAIC. See Introduction to China 
Consumers’ Association, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zzjg/jgsz/.  
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various forcers, especially those from the government. When they are expected to bring 
corrective justice to average consumers and deterrence to infringers, the pioneering role 
of consumer associations is limited. 
After all, only the people will take care of themselves best. So in the long run, rights 
granted to people by the law should be returned to them.  
5.2.2 Punitive Damage—An Asymmetric Approach 
Punitive damage is allowed in Chinese law but narrowly applicable in product 
liability cases.809 
Due to high barriers to the institution of antitrust litigation and tremendous 
uncertainty towards the court’s decision, the incentive to sue may be forced rely on 
punitive damage. Nevertheless, considering different cost-benefit analyses faced by 
average consumers and business actors and the relatively larger error cost in transitional 
China, an asymmetric approach with regard to punitive damages can be adopted. This 
means awarding multiple damages to consumer-filed cases, but not to competitor-filed 
cases,810 because the former are more likely to be meritorious and courts and government 
tend to pay more attention to justice in the former situation. 
5.2.3 Contingency Fees 
Due to the considerable up-front cost invested in litigation and lack of special 
knowledge of competition issues, a contingency fee mechanism can help to assist the 
victims of anti-competitive practices in terms of financial and knowledge capital.  
Contingency fees are allowed but unavailable to some categories of litigation 
                                                      
809 Art. 49 of Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests provides that: 
“Business operators engaged in fraudulent activities in supplying commodities or services shall, on the demand of the 
consumers, increase the compensations for victims' losses; the increased amount of the compensations shall be two 
times the costs that the consumers paid for the commodities purchased or services received.” 
Art. 47 of Tort Liability Law of the People's Republic of China provided that “in the event of death or serious 
damage to health arising from a product that is manufactured or sold when it is known to be defective, the infringee 
shall be entitled to claim corresponding punitive compensation.” Qin quan ze ren fa [Tort Law of the People’s Republic 
of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July. 1, 2010) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.).. 
810 Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling of Antitrust Damages, 28 J. L. & ECON. 445, 461 (1985) (discussing the relative 
merit of suits files by consumers and competitors). 
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including class actions.811 So my suggestion is to expand the legal area served by 
contingency fees to AML-related class actions. In this way, an effective private 
enforcement mechanism can be relatively quickly established, and more incentives would 
be provided for Chinese lawyers who are unfamiliar with the new legal business to learn 
as quickly as possible. In my interviews with lawyers who have engaged in antitrust cases 
in the past three years, their perception was generally that the anti-monopoly-related legal 
market is close to none in China.  
Some might worry about whether contingency fees would result in frivolous 
litigation, as is the case in the U.S., but my perception is that because of China’s cultural 
traditional of non-litigation and structural barriers, the risk of fostering a litigation culture 
is nearly ignorable. Additionally, the existence of contingency fees in other areas has 
never supported such a concern.   
                                                      
811 See art. 12 of Measures for the Administration lawyer fees. 律师服务收费管理办法[Measures for the 
Administration of Lawyers' Fees] (promulgated by NDRC & MOJ, April 13, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006), 
LAWINFROCHINA (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Chinese AML was adopted in response to a call for a level playing field, one that 
could leverage the achievement of multiple goals for transitional China: sustainable 
economic growth as the foundation of the legitimacy of the CCP, a robust private sector 
to provide the vast majority of output, tax and employment, a reduction of the corruption 
that once put China on the brink of subversion, and a persistent stability which rests on 
the three factors mentioned. Therefore a Chinese antitrust regime must include some 
measures to empower people economically to help themselves, as stated by Fox.812  
Private enforcement is an institution that can help fulfill the goals of the AML and 
meanwhile gradually empower the people. This conclusion is inherently decided by 
China’s transitional stage, i.e., its politically captured market, thin human and financial 
capital, and flawed institutions. Nevertheless, this current transitional stage also implies 
that China should design her own path when embracing the intellectual legacy of the 
West, especially given that, the West’s antitrust regime is not perfect anyway. In this 
sense, the sequencing and pacing of reforms indeed matter.813  
When looking ahead to an effective private antitrust enforcement in China, the focal 
point in the early stages should be on public advocacy and enforcement in hard-core 
cases, in particular, those industries closely related people’s livelihoods, such as food, 
telecommunication, railway and utilities. Rome was not built in one day. In order to 
actualize antitrust enforcement, it must be mastered by relevant parties in the first place. 
Antitrust enforcement, as any reform that may touch on sensitive areas, must hold back 
full-scale implementation until the benefit outweighs the cost in exchange for the support 
of the vested interest, but meanwhile new anti-competitive practices must be curtailed as 
completely as possible so as not to fall into the trap of backward disadvantage; 
additionally, some modest measures may be implemented to foster a constituency that 
                                                      
812 See Fox, supra note 596, at 213.  
813 See Stiglitz, supra note 64, at 35. 
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will compose the major force in support of the new competitive order. 
Private parties, including average consumers and private firms, have suffered from 
structural discrimination due to the exploitation of powerful state and affiliated interest 
groups, so private cause of action, though vulnerable in the face of many transitional 
issues, is a significant platform for the sustainment of basic social stability and economic 
balance. Private antitrust enforcement, as private enforcement of any other public laws in 
China, will confront various structural barriers, so a more benign attitude towards it is 
unlikely to generate frivolous litigations, rather safeguarding a more orderly development. 
Hence, such components of private enforcement, most of which already exist in some 
area of law, could be gradually expanded to include a new antitrust regime. Even though 
full expansion could not be achieved in a short time, some middle ground arrangement 




ACFIC  All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce 
ALEA  Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authorities 
AMA        Anti-Monopoly Act 
AMC  Anti-Monopoly Commission 
AML    Anti-Monopoly Law 
APL    Administrative Procedure Law of China 
AQSIQ  General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine 
CAAC    Civil Aviation Administration of China 
CAS     Competition Act of Singapore 
CATA      China Air Transport Association 
CBRC    China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CCS   Competition Commission of Singapore 
CCTV    China Central Television Station 
CIRC    China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
CPC    Communist Party of China  
CPL    Civil Procedural Law of China 
CSRC    China Securities Regulatory Commission 
DOJ   Department of Justice 
EAM    East Asian Model 
ECJ    European Court of Justice 
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
GLC   Government-linked Companies 
HCI    Heavy and Chemical Industry 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
JFTC     Japan Fair Trade Commission 
KFTC      Korea Fair Trade Commission  
KMT    Kuomintang 
MIIT    Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
MOEA    Ministry of Economic Affairs 
MOFCOM     Ministry of Commerce of China 
MRFTA   Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade Act 
MS    Member State 
MTI   Ministry of Trade and Industry 
NAO    National Audit Office 
NDRC      National Development and Reform Commission of China 
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NIEs   Newly Industrialized Economies 
OECD      Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTO    Office of the Trade Ombudsman 
SOE    State-Owned Enterprise 
PPTN    People’s Posts and Telecommunications News 
SAIC    State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
SARFT   State Administration of Radio Film and Television 
SASAC   State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
SCAP   Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
SERC    State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
TFTA   Taiwan Fair Trade Act 
TFTC    Taiwan Fair Trade Commission 
TVE      Township and Village enterprises 
VCAD   Vietnam Competition Administrative Department 
VCC   Vietnam Competition Council 
Vinapco   Vietnam Aviation Petroleum Company 
VLOC    Vietnam Law on Competition 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP   United Nations Development Program  
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APPENDIX 1 Summary of Rules & Regulations of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law Regime 





反垄断法 AML Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong. 
08/30/07 08/01/08 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Provisions of the State Council On Prohibiting 
Regional Blockade in Market Economic 
Activities  
 St. Council 04/21/01 04/21/01 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
国务院关于经营者集中
申报标准的规定 
Provisions of the State Council on the Standard 
for Declaration of Concentration of Business 
Operators 
 St. Council 03/08/08 03/08/08 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
国务院反垄断委员会关
于相关市场界定的指南 
Guide of the Anti-monopoly Committee of the 
State Council for the Definition of the Relevant 
Market 
Anti-Monopoly 
Commission of the St. 
Council 
05/04/09 05/04/09 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
金融业经营者集中申报
营业额计算办法 
Measures for Calculating the Turnover for the 
Declaration of Business Concentration in the 
Financial Industry 
CBRC, CIRC, CSRC, 
MOFCOM, & PBOC 
05/04/09 05/04/09 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Interim Provisions on Assessing the Impact of 
Concentration of Business Operators on 
Competition 
MOFCOM 08/29/11 09/05/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 






APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
未依法申报经营者集中
调查处理暂行办法 
Interim Measures for Investigating and 
Handling Failure to Legally Declare the 
Concentration of Business Operators 
MOFCOM 12/30/11 02/01/12 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Interim Provisions on the Divestiture of Assets or 
Business in the Concentration of Business 
Operators 
MOFCOM 07/05/11 07/05/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
经营者集中反垄断审查
办事指南 
Guide of the Undertaking Concentration 
Examination 
MOFCOM 03/11/10 03/11/10 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/a
article/xgxz/200902/2009020
6034057.html  (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
经营者集中审查办法 Measure for the Undertaking Concentration 
Examination 
MOFCOM 11/24/09 01/01/10 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
经营者集中申报办法 Measure for the Undertaking Concentration 
Declaration 
MOFCOM 11/21/09 01/01/10 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Guiding Opinions of the Anti-monopoly Bureau of 
the Ministry of Commerce on the Declaration 
Documents and Materials of the Concentration of 
Business Operators 
MOFCOM 01/05/09 01/05/09 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
关于经营者集中申报的
指导意见 
Guiding Opinions of the Anti-monopoly Bureau of 
the Ministry of Commerce on the Declaration of 
the Concentration of Business Operators 
MOFCOM 01/05/09 01/05/09 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
反价格垄断行政执法程
序规定 
Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for 
Law Enforcement against Price Fixing 
NDRC 12/29/10 02/01/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 







APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
反价格垄断规定 Provisions against Price Fixing NDRC 12/29/10 02/01/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
关于禁止公用企业限制
竞争行为的若干规定 
Certain Regulations on Prohibiting 
Anti-competitive practices of Public Enterprises 
SAIC 12/24/93 12/24/93 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
工商行政管理机关禁止
垄断协议行为的规定 
Provisions for the Industry and Commerce 
Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Agreements 
SAIC 12/31/10 02/01/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Provisions for the Industry and Commerce 
Administrations on the Prohibition of Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position 
SAIC 12/31/10 02/01/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Provisions for the Industry and Commerce 
Administrations to Stop Acts of Abusing 
Administrative Power for the Purpose of 
Eliminating or Limiting Competition 
SAIC 12/31/10 02/01/11 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Provisions on the Procedures for the Administrative 
Departments for Industry and Commerce to 
Investigate and Handle Cases of Monopolization 
Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Market 
Position 
SAIC 05/26/09 07/01/09 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 




Provisions on the Procedure for the Industrial and 
Commercial Administrations to Stop Acts of 
Abusing Administrative Power for Excluding or 
Limiting Competition 
SAIC 05/26/09 07/01/09 LAWINFROCHINA (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) 
 
